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ABSTRACT 
Anti-dumping measures, safeguards and countervailing measures are trade remedies within the 
context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). More specifically, the imposition of anti-
dumping measures is a remedial measure, which may be evoked when dumped imports cause or 
threaten to cause injury to the domestic market. Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) defines dumping as a situation where products of one country are introduced 
into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products, and causes or 
threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or 
materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. In such a situation, the WTO allows 
countries to take action, if there is a causal link between injury to the domestic market and 
dumping.  
Zimbabwe has been a Member of the GATT since July 1948 and subsequently it became a Member 
of the WTO in March 1995. It also has anti-dumping legislation since 2002 namely Competition 
(Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty) (Investigation) Regulations, 2002 (Statutory Instrument 
266 of 2002). Despite this, dumping remains a challenge in Zimbabwe. Different stakeholders in 
Zimbabwe have lobbied for anti-dumping laws to be strengthened and applied, to protect the 
domestic industry from dumped imports. Regardless of the lobbying, the Competition and Tariff 
Commission (CTC) which is the institution that deals with unfair trade practises in Zimbabwe, has 
to date not conducted any investigation in dumping. 
This study ascertains what the shortfalls in Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 are, and the measures 
to be taken, to develop a sound framework that paves way for effective anti-dumping regime in 
Zimbabwe. The study highlights the need for an overhaul in Zimbabwe’s anti-dumping system. 
This study also engages in a discussion of anti-dumping laws in the European Union (EU) and 
South Africa, both whom have developed anti-dumping systems, which Zimbabwe can learn from. 
In addition, EU used to be Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, but has since been replaced by 
South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
Trade remedies allow countries to take remedial action against imports causing material injury to 
a domestic industry.1 They can be categorised into three groupings, namely: anti-dumping 
measures;2 countervailing measures3 and safeguard measures.4 The difference between these is 
that anti-dumping and countervailing measures seek to counter unfair trade, whereas safeguards 
protect domestic industries from a sudden surge in imports.5 Anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures are sometimes confused because they both remedy unfair trade practices.6 
Rogers once gave an intuitive quote on dumping, noting that ‘if the other fellow sells cheaper than 
you do, it is called dumping because, if you sell it cheaper than him, that is mass production’.7 
This assessment brings to the fore several questions such as; What then should be termed as 
‘dumping’? How can dumping be regulated? Is dumping not a result of one country being more 
competitive than others?  
Cohn sheds light onto what constitutes the practice of dumping as: ‘occurring when a firm sells 
products in an export market at a lower price than it charges in the home market or below the cost 
of production’.8 One might then pose the question as to why firms might sell goods at a price below 
cost. Numerous reasons can be advanced in this regard, including that the one party might want to 
drive the other parties out of business.9 
                                                            
1Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ‘Trade remedies: 
Anti-dumping, countervailing measures and safeguards’ available at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/topics/pages/anti-
dumping-and-safeguards.aspx (accessed 01 April 2018). 
2Anti-dumping measures are applied when there is dumping injuring the domestic industry in the importing country. 
These can be in form of duties or undertakings. 
3Countervailing measures are applied to counter the effect of subsidised imports that are found to be injuring 
domestic producers. 
4Safeguard measures are applied to protect the domestic industry where there is surge of imports that causes serious 
injury to the domestic industry. 
5Murigi WC The Development of a Successful Antidumping Regime In Kenya (unpublished LLM thesis, University 
of the Western Cape, 2013) 1. 
6Anti-dumping and countervailing measures both remedy unfair trade practises but the first one is applied where a 
product is exported by the exporting country at price lower than in the exporting country domestic market, whilst 
countervailing measures remedy harm caused by subsidised imports.   
7Bovard J The Fair Trade Fund: How Congress Pillages the Consumer and Decimates American Competitiveness 
(2016) 107 (hereafter Bovard J (2016). 
8See generally Cohn T Global Political Economy (2015).  
9Gottheil F Principles of Microeconomics (2013) 473. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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In Zimbabwe, dumping remains a key challenge that may negatively affect macro-economic 
stability and hamper the growth of local industries. This has somehow been witnessed through a 
heavy influx of cheaper goods, making it difficult for local industries to flourish. Mugano contends 
that the influx of goods is mainly because of, among others, ‘dumping, flouting of rules of origin, 
porosity of borders, corruption, trade liberalisation and lack of industrial competitiveness’.10 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
When dealing with dumping as a factor affecting macro-economic stability and hindering the 
growth of local industries, it is important to look at how best anti-dumping should be regulated. 
An analysis of the international framework that is applicable to anti-dumping provides members 
with a foundation of how to regulate anti-dumping.  
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was established in 1995.11 It was born out of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had been in existence since 1948.12 One of the 
key aims of the WTO is to upsurge production and trade between Members by means of reducing 
barriers and tariffs.13 These WTO laws on the reduction of barriers and trade tariffs are not without 
exception. Where a Member is involved in an unfair practice against another, such unfairness 
would qualify as an exception.14 These exceptions are ‘trade remedy laws’ that consist of 
countervailing measures, safeguarding measures and anti-dumping laws.15 This study focuses on 
anti-dumping laws because at a global scale, dumping is seen as a serious threat to economies.16 
Dumping as a form of price discrimination has welfare implications, which can be assessed from 
three points of view, ‘namely income distribution, the level of output and the competitive process 
itself’.17 As such, a sound legal framework provides a basis for effective regulation of dumping.18 
When regulation is effective and anti-dumping measures are utilised there is a general benefit to 
                                                            
10Mugano G ‘Time to tighten screws on dumping’ The Herald 31 October 2013. 
11Andersen H EU Dumping Determinations and WTO Law (2009) 1(hereafter Andersen H (2009).  
12Bown CP Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement (2010) 11. 
13Andersen H (2009) 1. 
14Andersen H (2009) 1. 
15Anwar R & Raslan A Anti-dumping: A developing country perspective (2009) 1 (hereafter Anwar R & Raslan A 
(2009). 
16 Bovard J (2016) 107.  
17Dale R Welfare Implications of Dumping. In: Anti-Dumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order (1980) 21. 
18 Payments Association of South Africa ‘Legal & Regulatory Framework’ available at 
http://www.pasa.org.za/national-payment-system/legal-regulatory-framework (accessed 19 February 2019). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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domestic producers through cessation or reduction of imports.19 Even if the use of anti-dumping 
measures do not effect a cessation of imports, the price of the product can be greatly affected, 
negatively impacting an exporter’s profitability.20 Besides these benefits the use of anti-dumping 
measures are also ‘becoming the largest trade barriers threat to international trade’.21 As such, a 
sound regulation may positively contribute in minimising the use of anti-dumping measures as a 
form of protectionism.22 
Article VI of GATT contains regulations on dumping.23 The Article dwells on trade aspects, 
providing Members with the option to levy additional tariffs in exceptional situations, rather than 
directly providing for the legality of dumping.24 These additional tariffs are known as anti-
dumping duties. Skyes defines anti-dumping duties as:  
‘Tariffs in addition to ordinary customs duties that are imposed to counteract certain [allegedly] 
‘‘unfair’’ pricing practices by private firms that injure or threaten to cause ‘‘material injury’’ to 
a competing industry in an importing nation.’25 
Whilst anti-dumping duties are concerned with tariffs, dumping on the other hand is where 
‘products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the 
normal value’.26 Herein, the normal value is understood as meaning the domestic price at which 
the commodity is marketed and sold in the exporting country.27 Placing Article VI into context, 
one could for example cite an example where a commodity is sold in the United States for $10, 
while when exported, the product is exported to the South African market for R65 (approximately 
$6).  
                                                            
19 Dorn  JW & Layton DW ‘The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement: A Guide For Developing Countries’ in The 
World Bank  Legal Aspects of International Trade (2001) 189. 
20 Dorn  JW & Layton DW ‘The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement: A Guide For Developing Countries’ in The 
World Bank  Legal Aspects of International Trade (2001) 189. 
21 Qian  K ‘The impact of The USA’s anti-dumping measures against China with a case study’ (unpublished Master 
of International Bussiness  Bodø Graduate School of Business  2010) 1. 
22See generally Funke N ‘Trends in protectionism: Anti-dumping and trade related investment measures’ (1994). 
23Stoll Pt & Schorkopf F Wto: World Economic Order, World Trade Law (2006) 150 (hereafter Stoll PT & 
Schorkopf F (2006)). It is important to highlight that when WTO was formed there was a merge of GATT in WTO, 
hence the application of GATT in the WTO system.  
24Stoll PT & Schorkopf F (2006) 150. 
25Skyes AO ‘Trade Remedy Laws’ (2005) John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 240 2. 
26Article VI.1 of GATT 1994. 
27Andersen H (2009) 1.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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Anti-dumping rules have developed over time. Importantly, the Tokyo round28 saw the negotiating 
Member States agreeing upon more comprehensive rules, which were further supplemented during 
the Uruguay round29 where subsequent expansion was undertaken.30 This expansion, during the 
Uruguay round, gave birth to the Agreement on Implementation of Article V1 of GATT usually 
referred to in many circles as the Anti-dumping Agreement (ADA).31 The Uruguay ADA is, 
however, subject to a binding dispute resolution system.32 It is important to note that, while the 
crux of these anti-dumping regulations is to combat injurious dumping, they also seek to ensure 
that protectionist tendencies are nipped in the bud. For this reason, a balancing approach must be 
adopted.  
Since the WTO anti-dumping rules have been in place, they have not been without success. To 
date, the WTO has heard 128 cases relating to dumping.33 The latest one, dated 17 October 2018 
is a request consultation by Ukraine ‘concerning anti-dumping measures applied in the Kyrgyz 
Republic on the importation of certain types of steel pipes.’34 The number of disputes points to the 
fact that more and more countries are embracing anti-dumping rules.  
On development of anti-dumping rules, Anwar and Raslan aver that anti-dumping regulations have 
emerged together with trade liberalisation.35 The rationale behind their point of view is that ‘anti-
dumping regulations help these countries adjust to trade liberalisation and maybe used as safety 
valves to reassure domestic markets against the adverse effects of trade liberalisation’.36  This 
contention is somewhat true in suggesting that trade liberalisation brings about some undesired 
effects such as dumping due to open markets. In some other countries, adoption of anti-dumping 
rules may not necessarily emerge together with trade liberalisation but may emerge after trade 
liberalisation.  
                                                            
28Tokyo Round was between 1973 and 1979. 
29Uruguay Round was between 1986 and 1994. 
30Stoll PT & Schorkopf F (2006) 150.  
31Stoll PT & Schorkopf F (2006) 150. 
32See generally The European Commission ‘The Uruguay Round’ available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-94-24_en.htm (accessed 29 October 2017). 
33 WTO ‘Dispute Settlement: The Disputes Chronological list of disputes cases’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm (accessed 09 August 2018). 
34WTO ‘Dispute Settlement: The Disputes Chronological list of disputes cases’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm (accessed 25 October 2018). 
35Anwar R & Raslan A (2009) 7. 
36Anwar R & Raslan A (2009) 7. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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Zimbabwe is one typical example. On one end, markets open up and policies that promote trade 
liberalisation are adopted.37 On another end, when the markets are under pressure, the government 
is quick to impose protectionist measures.38 Moreover, anti-dumping regulations in Zimbabwe 
may have evolved separately from trade liberalisation. This is due to the fact that Zimbabwe had 
already initiated a number of unilateral reforms geared towards liberalisation before enacting anti-
dumping regulations.39 It only enacted a statute that investigates unfair trade practices in 2002 but 
liberalisation had started around 1991.40  In addition, after first efforts of liberalisation there was a 
subsequent policy review in 1998 that showed that liberalisation was not sustainable and this led 
to increase in tariffs.41 Thus, anti-dumping regulations did not emerge together with liberalisation 
because they were enacted after liberalisation polices were already abandoned.  
In Zimbabwe, the Competition and Tariff Commission (CTC) is the investigative body responsible 
for dealing with cases of unfair trade practices.42 The functioning of the Commission is capacitated 
by two statutory instruments, namely: (1) Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty (Investigation) 
Regulations, 2002 (Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002) and (2) The Competition (Safeguards) 
Regulations 2006.43  
According to the Zimbabwe National Trade Policy: 
‘Government will capacitate and strengthen the Investigating Authority for it to be able to 
establish the existence of unfair trade practices caused by dumping and subsidised imports, with 
a view to initiating anti-dumping-action as well as instituting countervailing measures.’44 
                                                            
37For example, Zimbabwe inherited a heavily regulated foreign trade economy, but in 1991-1995 Zimbabwe 
undertook the International Monetary Fund (IMF) driven Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP). Under 
this program, the markets were liberalised, quantitative controls abolished, and tariffs and duties reduced and 
harmonized. See Makochekanwa J & Kambarami P ‘Zimbabwe’s Experience with Trade Liberalisation’ (2012) 245 
African Economic Research Consortium 14 (hereafter Makochekanwa J & Kambarami P (2012).  
38After 1995, there were policy reversals, which were made resulting in the process of trade liberalisation process 
becoming unstainable. See Makochekanwa J & Kambarami P (2012) 14. 
39Tekere M ‘Trade Liberalisation under Structural Economic Adjustment – Impact on Social Welfare in Zimbabwe’ 
(2001) 8.  
40Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) spearheaded trade liberalisation in Zimbabwe. It 
was launched in 1990, and was meant to herald a new era of modernised, competitive, export-led industrialisation. 
41Makochekanwa A, Hurungo TJ Kambarami P ‘Zimbabwe’s Experience With Trade Liberalization’ (2012) African 
Economic Research Consortium Research Paper 245 16 (hereafter Makochekanwa A, Hurungo TJ Kambarami P 
(2012). 
42Zimbabwe National Trade Policy 2012-16.  
43Zimbabwe National Trade Policy 2012-16.  
44Zimbabwe National Trade Policy 2012-16. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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Despite these promised measures, dumping of foreign goods remains a problem that is deep-seated 
inside the Zimbabwean market.45 At the Annual Conference of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Zimbabwe (ICAZ) in 2015, it was noted with concern that the Zimbabwean 
economy was struggling due to the closure of numerous businesses that produce secondary 
goods.46 In 2012, Muganda of Buy Zimbabwe47 averred that Capri Zimbabwe48 was suffering 
because of dangerous dumping practises by some South African companies such as Defy.49Though 
the company has not shut down, it alluded to the problem of unfair practices in the market.   
This sentiment resonates with ICAZ, which noted that:  
‘This is due to low priced imports some of which are subsidised and some which would not qualify 
under the certificates of origin and the fact that the Zimbabwean companies are operating in a 
high cost environment.’50 
ICAZ substantiates its averments by citing the concerns raised by local manufacturers, who 
concede that traders who bring in cheaper imports of finished products have unfairly pushed them 
out of the market.51 Similar to one of the arguments raised by Mugano, ICAZ argues that the influx 
of imported finished goods is a resultant effect of lax border controls by the Zimbabwe Revenue 
Authority (ZIMRA).52 
                                                            
45Sibanda OS ‘Are anti-dumping measures in multilateral trade justifiable or not? A call for an academic debate in 
Africa’ (2003) 44(2) Codicillus 87. 
. Sibanda observes that dumping remains a problem in Zimbabwe (as well as other African Countries in Zimbabwe 
such as Kenya and Angola) because of the lack of an adequate legal infrastructure, technical skills and appropriate 
safeguard mechanisms and anti-dumping practices.  
46ICAZ ‘The Future of the Manufacturing Sector’ available at https://www.icaz.org.zw/iMISDocs/manufacture.pdf 
(accessed 16 September 2015).  
47Buy Zimbabwe is an organisation that work closes with different institutions and the government to encourage 
Zimbabweans to locally produce and consume local goods and services both home and abroad. 
48Capri Zimbabwe is a company that manufactures refrigerators. 
49Muganda RG ‘Lets enforce dumping laws’ The Herald 27 September 2012 available at 
http://www.herald.co.zw/lets-enforce-dumping-laws/ (accessed 03 March 2018). 
50ICAZ ‘The Future of the Manufacturing Sector’ available at https://www.icaz.org.zw/iMISDocs/manufacture.pdf 
(accessed 16 September 2017). 
51Mugano has also been  most insightful on this, discoursing that ‘in order to curtail the influx of certain goods 
which are threatening the survival of local industry, government must consider a mix of safeguard measures under 
WTO rules’ see  Mugano G ‘Time to Tighten Screws on  Dumping’ The Herald 31 October 2013. 
52ICAZ ‘The Future of the Manufacturing Sector’ available at https://www.icaz.org.zw/iMISDocs/manufacture.pdf 
(accessed 16 September 2017). 
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One of the subsequent arguments that arise is that not only are these cheaper imports pushing out 
local producers out of the market, but also some of them are also sub-standard goods.53 Taylor 
notes that: 
‘The Zimbabwean market has been invaded by Chinese goods, locally known as ‘zhing zhongs’ 
(a derivative term to refer to anything that is substandard), which have been undercutting local 
industries. [Taylor cites the opinion of one economist who opined that] ‘‘there was quite an 
element of dumping [in Zimbabwe] with factory seconds and rejects coming in, and this was true 
especially of footwear and clothes.’’ A huge influx of goods from China was experienced from 
2004 onwards and although Harare increased the import duties on such merchandise, China’s 
penetration of the economy remains apace.’ 
Since 2009, the Standards Authority of Zimbabwe (SAZ) has been advocating for the formulation 
of a statutory framework operating in the form of an import/export Pre Shipment (PVoc) scheme 
in order to curb the flooding of substandard products.54 Substandard products are  
‘products of faulty workmanship, rejects and products of limited use as made, by reason of their 
dimensions or of defects including defects of quality, which are sold below the undertakings 
published list prices for first quality products’.55  
It should, however, be noted that not all substandard products and cheaper products amount to 
dumping because some of them may not have been exported at prices below the normal value.   
With the challenges presented in the introduction and background, it becomes important to 
investigate the anti-dumping regulations in Zimbabwe. The next section discusses the research 
problem and objectives, the benefits of the study, the research methodology and the Chapter 
outline.  
                                                            
53ICAZ ‘The Future of the Manufacturing Sector’ available at https://www.icaz.org.zw/iMISDocs/manufacture.pdf 
(accessed 16 September 2017). 
54ICAZ ‘The Future of the Manufacturing Sector’ available at https://www.icaz.org.zw/iMISDocs/manufacture.pdf 
(accessed 16 September 2017). 
55Glosbe Dictionery ‘Sub-standard’ available at https://glosbe.com/en/en/substandard%20product (accessed 16 
September 2017). 
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1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES 
Dumping has been a problem in many economies across the world.56 With a divergence of opinions 
on how strict dumping should be regulated, it becomes difficult for countries to agree on when a 
particular act by an exporting country, constitutes dumping on the importing market. Within the 
context of the WTO, dumping takes place when selling a product below the normal value. 
However, anti-dumping action can only take place when dumping causes injury.57  
Article VI of GATT, further clarified by the ADA, enables the domestic country to take action 
against dumping.58 Application of these two agreements allows a country to act in a manner and 
form that would violate GATT principles of non-discrimination and one of having a binding 
tariff.59 Herein, the domestic market has the right to combat dumping by imposing an extra import 
duty on the offending product.60 The purpose of this import duty is to equalise the value of the 
imported good, with that in the domestic market. Therefore, investigations of anti-dumping remain 
within the bounds of domestic law and must be consistent with the ADA.61 
In Zimbabwe, the government has only applied precautionary measures in order to guard the 
market against cheaper and allegedly dumped imports, with variable results. These results include 
instances where this has actually encouraged and promoted smuggling; or it has succeeded in 
protecting the domestic market; and the measures sometimes were not adequate to protect the 
domestic market from harm.62 For these reasons, there has been massive lobbying by different 
industries in Zimbabwe for the government to enforce anti-dumping laws in order to protect the 
                                                            
56See generally Trebilcock MJ Advanced Introduction to International Trade Law (2015). 
57WTO ‘Understanding the WTO: The Agreement’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (accessed 25 September 2017). 
58WTO ‘Understanding the WTO: The Agreement’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (accessed 25 September 2017). 
59The two basic rules of WTO are the most favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT) which are premised 
on the notion of non -discrimination. They ensure that there is a levelled playing field between all trading partners. 
On-discrimination in trade policy means there is equal treatment of trading partners. 
60Government of India: Ministry of Commerce and Industry ‘Anti-Dumping & Anti-subsidy measures: FAQs’ 
available at http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/ad_measures_3.asp (accessed 08 March 2017). 
61South African Government ‘Trade and Industry on anti-dumping duties imposed on imported frozen chicken 
portions’ 2 March 2015 available at http://www.gov.za/speeches/anti-dumping-duties-imposed-frozen-chicken-
portions-imported-germany-netherlands-and-united (accessed 08 March 2017). 
62Kachembere J & Majaka N ‘Car duty goes up, bale imports banned’ Daily News 30 July 2015.  
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domestic industry from dumped goods.63 In 2012, Zimbabwe’s local newspaper reported that one 
of the local refrigerator manufacturers, Capri had fallen victim to dangerous dumping practices.64 
The CTC also cited that some allegations referred to it for investigations in the 2012 financial year 
did not technically involve dumping.65 In 2013 the CTC handled a complaint by Kind Brands (Pvt) 
Limited on dumping of imported shoe polish on the local market.66 The CTC closed the case due 
to lack of interest by the company, because of its failure to furnish the required information needed 
to pursue an investigation.67 
Although years have passed since these allegations, the issue of dumping has remained prevalent 
in Zimbabwe. The CTC had its first trade tariffs workshop on the 18th of August 2018.68 Amongst 
the issues discussed was the role of anti-dumping measures in reindustrialisation.69 It was 
emphasised that anti-dumping measures should be applied to remedy the injurious dumping on 
Zimbabwe’s local industries.70 The need to strengthen the current anti-dumping laws was also 
emphasised echoing Mugano’s 2013 sentiments.71 
Within the above context, the main objective of this study is to examine the current anti-dumping 
framework in Zimbabwe for purposes of creating a sound anti-dumping system. Before examining 
Zimbabwe’s anti-dumping framework, the study analyses the WTO anti-dumping framework. 
Both substantive and procedural provisions will be discussed in relation to how Members who 
intend to use these provisions should go about. In addition, the study considers if there are any 
problems within the framework. Most importantly, the WTO framework will be the foundation for 
development of a successful anti-dumping regime in Zimbabwe. Looking elsewhere, this thesis 
examines the legal and institutional framework on dumping in the European Union (EU) and South 
                                                            
63Companies such as Capri, Willowvale Mazda Motor Industries, Ouest Motors, National Foods, and Olivine 
amongst others have called for the enforcement of anti-dumping laws but to date Zimbabwe has never investigated 
any dumping allegation. 
64Muganda RG ‘Lets enforce dumping laws’ The Herald 27 September 2012.  
65See generally CTC Annual Report 2012. 
66 See generally CTC Annual Report 2013. 
67 See generally CTC Annual Report 2013. 
68See generally CTC Zimbabwe available at   https://twitter.com/ctczimbabwe?lang=en (accessed 25 October 2018). 
69This was a live recording; see generally CTC Zimbabwe available at https://twitter.com/ctczimbabwe?lang=en 
(accessed 25 October 2018). 
70This was a live recording; see generally CTC Zimbabwe available at https://twitter.com/ctczimbabwe?lang=en 
(accessed 25 October 2018). 
71This was a live recording; see generally CTC Zimbabwe available at https://twitter.com/ctczimbabwe?lang=en 
(accessed 25 October 2018) See also discussion by Mugano on the need tighten screws on dumping in Mugano G 
‘Time to Tighten Screws on Dumping‘ The Herald 31 October 2013. 
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Africa both whom have experience in utilising anti-dumping measures. The aim is to draw lessons 
from these frameworks where Zimbabwe can learn to ensure protection of its domestic industries.  
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Even though Zimbabwe has anti-dumping regulations in place, there are, however, problems 
concerning the investigating authority and the substantive requirements and procedure that need 
to be addressed to enable creation for a sound anti-dumping system, providing a platform for 
development of a healthy and competitive market. The main question the thesis seeks to answer 
is; is there a need for assessing Zimbabwe’s national anti-dumping framework? In order to 
ascertain the need and ensure the framework is satisfactory in protecting the domestic industry 
protected from injurious dumping, the thesis will also answer these supporting questions: 
a) How is dumping defined under the provisions of the WTO and what are the procedures for 
the use and implementation of anti-dumping rules by a Member?  
b) What are some of the problems in anti-dumping rules at the WTO level? 
c) How is dumping regulated under the provisions of South Africa: is it in compliance with 
international obligations under the WTO? 
 
d) How is dumping regulated under the provisions of EU: is it in compliance with 
international obligations under the WTO? 
 
e) How is dumping regulated under Zimbabwe’s national anti-dumping framework: is it in 
compliance with international obligations under the WTO? 
f) What lessons can Zimbabwe learn from the EU and South Africa, who have successful 
anti-dumping experience? 
1.5 AIM OF THE STUDY 
By attempting to answer the above research questions, the study aims to contribute towards the 
fuller elaboration of preventing dumping in Zimbabwe, a subject that has lacked in-depth scrutiny 
thus far. There is no doubt that the study brings immense relevance to the existing body of 
knowledge in anti-dumping laws. Local industries have been heavily under siege from imports, 
which has resulted in the near annihilation of the local clothing industry and the contraction of 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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multiple other manufacturing industries.72 Due to these problems, the effects of dumping practises 
have trickled down to other downstream businesses, such as retailers. Thus, the pressing need on 
how to use anti-dumping laws to protect local industries from dumping has become unavoidable.  
This research also comes at a time where the Government has dismally failed in job creation 
opportunities, leading to reliance in informal trading.73 Although efforts to revive the economy are 
notable, the domestic industry is failing to compete. In addition, the thesis will also clarify the 
existing misconceptions on dumping in Zimbabwe in order for dumping laws to safeguard the 
domestic industry.74 To this end, the thesis seeks to diminish the obscurity on the issues of both 
competition and dumping.  
There is also a gap in literature insofar as anti-dumping laws in Zimbabwe are concerned. A 
contribution to the limited body of knowledge is made by this study, as it examines the institutional 
framework in Zimbabwe with regard to unfair trade practices and suggests what the nature of scope 
of their power with regard to dumping should be. Additionally, the study attempts to clarify the 
adequacy of anti-dumping rules within the WTO/GATT regime. In this effort, such evaluations 
may be beneficial to the WTO in revamping its anti-dumping rules in ensuring the adequate 
protection of the industries of its Members. Lastly, the thesis makes recommendations that pave 
the way for development of an effective anti-dumping regime in Zimbabwe.  
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a desktop study that engages in a theoretical review of the literature in order to furnish 
answers  to the research questions posed above. The study will use primary sources, inclusive of 
national legislation and regional and international agreements. These include the Zimbabwean 
Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002, the different WTO agreements that cover anti-dumping rules 
and South African and EU anti-dumping legislation. This thesis will also provide a critical review 
of the provisions of these primary legislations in order to ascertain what exactly is provided for, 
                                                            
72In 2014, it was reported that Zimbabwe’s textiles and clothing industry was still seriously weighed down by the 
pre-inclusive government challenges and was operating below 10% capacity. 
73Since 2013, elections the government has not delivered on the jobs it promised the people during election 
campaign. 
74Such misconceptions include, for example, the importation of basic commodities from South Africa, goods which 
are sold lower than the price in the Zimbabwean market, the value of which goods is more than they are sold in the 
South African market. 
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and what could be done better. The thesis also consults secondary sources such as journal articles, 
academic textbooks, academic commentaries, newspaper articles and internet sources.  
Furthermore, the thesis looks at what South Africa and the EU do with the aim of drawing lessons 
for Zimbabwe in the later Chapters. South Africa’s selection is based, amongst other reasons, its 
geographical nexus with Zimbabwe. It is also an established user of anti-dumping provisions and 
there has been a transition of its laws since 1914.75 South Africa is also Zimbabwe’s biggest trading 
partner in Southern African Development Community (SADC).76 The selection of the EU is on 
the basis that the Union used to be the major export destination for Zimbabwe, accounting for two-
thirds of total exports.77In addition, the EU has also continuously ammended its anti-dumping 
laws, with each amendment improving on its predecessor.78  
It is also imperative to investigate how South Africa and the EU protect their respective domestic 
industries against dumping, since both have been cited in several dumping cases. Of note is that 
this thesis is not a comparative study, but rather uses South Africa and the EU as cases of best 
practices in order to draw lessons for Zimbabwe.79 As a result, the use of South Africa and the EU 
provides guidance to Zimbabwe on the characteristics of a successful anti-dumping system. 
1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis comprises of six Chapters: 
Chapter 1 is the introduction. It provides an overview of the background to the study, the problem, 
the significance of the study, and methodology. 
                                                            
75Brink G ‘One Hundred Years of Anti-dumping in South Africa’ (2015) 49 Journal of World Trade 325. 
76The Southern Times ‘South Africa still ranks high on Zimbabwe’s trading partners’ list’ available at 
https://southernafrican.news/2016/06/29/south-africa-still-ranks-high-on-zimbabwes-trading-partners-list/ 
(accessed 20 November 2017); Department of Research and Information ‘Economic overview: Recent 
developments in  the global and South African economies (2016) 9. 
77Zimbabwe National Trade Policy 2012-16. 
78See generally Bridges ‘EU Institutions Sign Off on Draft Changes to Anti-Dumping Legislation’ (2017) Bridges 
Volume 21 - Number 3. 
79The study cannot be a traditional comparative study because Zimbabwe has never conducted any anti-dumping 
investigation whilst South Africa and EU have conducted numerous investigations; for a discussion of what a 
comparative entails see generally Boele-Woelki K ‘What comparative family should entail’ in Boele-Woelki K (ed.) 
Debates in family law around the globe at the dawn of the 21st Century (2009) 3- 36. 
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Chapter 2 discusses the international anti-dumping framework within the context of the WTO. 
Special reference will be made on the relevant provisions of GATT as well as the substantive and 
procedural requirements for enacting anti-dumping measures as provided for in the ADA. Whilst 
discussing substantive and procedural requirements, the Chapter also discusses some of the 
problems in anti-dumping rules at the WTO level. 
Chapter 3 discusses what South Africa is doing in order to regulate the injurious dumping of goods 
into its domestic markets. It assesses South Africa’s legislative framework as the best African 
practice with the aim of drawing lessons for Zimbabwe in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 4 discusses anti-dumping laws in the EU and how the laws have been used to regulate the 
injurious dumping in the EU. The aim is also to use the EU as a case of best practice and draw 
lessons for Zimbabwe in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 discusses an overview of the existing anti-dumping system in Zimbabwe. It looks at 
how dumping is defined. What do the substantive and procedural requirements of the anti-dumping 
provision entail? Are the provisions in compliance with the WTO? What lessons can Zimbabwe 
learn from SA and EU?  
Chapter 6 concludes the study. The Chapter also proposes recommendations for the reform of 
anti-dumping laws in Zimbabwe.
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK ON DUMPING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
International trade has seen consumers all over the world enjoy a wide range of goods, especially 
in this 21st century. More importantly, many countries worldwide have embraced trade 
liberalisation as a means to advance their international trade.1 Trade liberalisation has significantly 
facilitated a freer movement of goods from one country to another than before: thereby, creating 
larger markets with more affordable goods.2 
Within the above context, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is the multilateral body 
responsible for regulating rules that govern international trade and trade liberalisation.3 The 
primary function of the WTO is to ensure that there is a balance of power among Members. To 
achieve this, the WTO uses two basic principles, namely: the most favoured nation (MFN) and the 
national treatment (NT). The notion of non-discrimination underpins the MFN principle, which is 
the cornerstone of the WTO system.4 Article 1.1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) is the founding provision for the MFN principle. It ‘prohibits discrimination between like 
products originating in, or destined for, different countries’.5 Hence, the extension of a favour 
should be done at the very instance where such a favour has been granted to one trading partner, 
equally and unconditionally.6 
Moving on to the NT principle, it is also based on non-discrimination; thereby, it prohibits 
discrimination between imported and domestically produced goods with respect to internal 
taxation or other government regulation.7 In other words, the NT principle prohibits Members from 
giving discriminatory treatment that results in treating imported products less favourably compared 
                                                            
1Trade liberalisation is concerned with the removal of or reduction in trade practices that supress free flow of goods 
and services from one nation to another. It includes eliminating both of tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
2See generally Froning D ‘The Benefits of Free Trade: A Guide For Policymakers’ (2000) Centre for International 
Trade and Economics No. 1391. 
3World Trade Organisation Understanding the WTO 5ed (2015) 9 (hereafter WTO (2015) 
4Mayurama W ‘Preferential Trade Arrangements and the Erosion of the WTO's MFN Principle’ (2010) 46(2) 
Stanford Journal of International Law 177. 
5See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 84.  
6Van den Bossche P The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (2005) 371.  
7Article III.I of GATT states that ‘The contracting parties recognise that internal taxes and other internal charges, 
and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of 
products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production’. 
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to like domestic products.8 However, exceptions such as the allowance of ‘the application of 
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation 
of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product’ are provided for.9 Hence, when 
charges are levelled for purposes of transporting goods, such charges do not constitute a violation 
of NT principle because they do not deal with the origins of the concerned products. Therefore, 
NT applies only when a product has entered a certain market, as such customs duty on imported 
products do not violate NT principle.10 
Despite the WTO aims of creating an equal playing field, this is not always achieved, as unfair 
trade practices, which may cause harm to domestic industries, may occur. By way of definition, 
an unfair trade practice is a prejudicial trade conduct that has the effect of potentially limiting 
permitted market competition.11 In international trade, unfair trade practises take place in two 
forms, namely: dumping and subsidies.12 This thesis, however, deals exclusively with dumping 
owing to the fact that there have been calls by Zimbabwean industries to tighten anti-dumping 
laws so that the government protects their goods from dumped products.13 
In light of the above, there is a pressing need to look at the WTO anti-dumping framework to 
protect domestic products from those dumped from outside. This study is also pertinent owing to 
the fact that Zimbabwe is a Member of the WTO. In doing so, this Chapter first turns its attention 
to the history of rules on dumping because it is through the past events that elaborate why anti-
dumping legislation came about. Having set the historical scene, the Chapter discusses the 
definition of dumping; types of dumping, effects and schools of thoughts on anti-dumping duties. 
Thereafter, the Chapter will discuss dumping under WTO in relation to substantive requirements 
                                                            
8Jensen LC & Hønneland G Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (2015)192. 
9Article III.I of GATT 1994. 
10WTO (2015) 11. 
11Korea Fair Trade Commission ‘Unfair Trade Practices’ available at 
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/policyarea/competitionpolicy_practices.jsp?pageId=0201 (accessed 07 April 2018). See 
generally also, Hoekman BM and Mavroidis PC ‘Dumping, antidumping and antitrust’ (1996) 30 Journal of World 
Trade. 
12The WTO defines a subsidy as ‘any financial benefit provided by a government which gives an unfair advantage to 
a specific industry, business or even individual’ The WTO lists five types of subsidies. See WTO ‘Agreement on 
subsidies and countervailing measures’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf 
(accessed 27 May 2017). For a detailed analysis of the remedies, see Erixon F ‘Anti-dumping in the European 
Union’ in Debroy B and Chakraborty D (eds) Anti-dumping: global abuse of a trade policy instrument (2007) 128-
130. 
13Muganda RG ‘Lets enforce dumping laws’ The Herald 27 September 2012 also see Mugano G ‘Time to Tighten 
Screws on Dumping’ The Herald 31 October 2013. 
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for determining both dumping, injury and causation. The Chapter will also discuss the procedural 
requirements for enacting anti-dumping measures, reviews and the institutions that deal with 
dumping. The Chapter will then discuss challenges within WTO anti- dumping rules and the WTO 
dispute settlement processes. The last part contains a conclusion. 
2.2 BRIEF HISTORY OF WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION RULES ON DUMPING 
Dumping has been a part of GATT since its inception in 1947.14 However, anti-dumping rules had 
already found their existence prior GATT negotiations. For instance, Canada was the first country 
to enact anti-dumping rules as part of its national laws in 1904.15 In addition, the United States of 
America (USA), South Africa, Australia, France, New Zealand and the Great Britain incorporated 
anti-dumping rules in their respective national laws by mid-1920s.16 As a result, basic tests such 
as the determination of normal value were put in place around this time.17 Furthermore, dumping 
was determined by using tests such as ‘price on the home market of the country of exportation, 
price of the product when exported to other countries and cost of production in the country of 
exportation’.18 It is of note that while these countries had put some anti-dumping laws in place, 
USA was the only country, which used the three determinants mentioned above.19 
Despite the existence of these basic tests, there was no consensus on whether to include dumping 
provisions during the 1947 GATT negotiations.20 For instance, the inclusion of Article VI in 
GATT was only made possible at the persistence of the USA.21 The USA had to submit proposals 
modelled on USA’s 1921 Anti-Dumping Act.22 They also outlined four types of dumping that had 
                                                            
14See generally Lloyd PH ‘Anti-Dumping and Competition Law’ in Appleton AE & Plummer MG (ed) The World 
Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis Volume I (2007) 68-80. 
15Pomfret R International Trade: Theory, Evidence and Policy (2016) 184.  
16See generally Snyder F ‘The Origins of the ‘Nonmarket Economy’: Ideas, Pluralism & Power in EC Anti-dumping 
Law about China’ (2001) 7(4) European Law Journal; Mastel G Antidumping Laws and the U.S. Economy (2016). 
17Luo Y Anti-dumping in the WTO, the EU, and China: The Rise of Legalisation in the Trade Regime and Its 
Consequences (2010) 56. 
18Snyder F The EU, the WTO and China: Legal Pluralism and International Trade Regulation (2010) 217.  
19The tests included the ‘price on the home country of the country of exportation, price of the product when exported 
to other countries and cost of production in the country of exportation’ Paul J International Marketing: Text and 
Cases (2008) 234. 
20Van den Bossche P & Zdouc W The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 3ed (2013) 675. 
21See generally Riesenfeld SA ‘The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable German Judgment’ 
(1971) 65(3) American Journal of International Law. 
22See generally Johnson TE ‘The Retroactive Application of the Antidumping Act of 1921’ (1979) 1(1) 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 262-283. 
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to be included as part of dumping provisions.23 These were service dumping, price dumping, social 
dumping and exchange dumping.24 Of the four, only price dumping was accepted and became a 
part of Article VI.25 
Once inserted in GATT in 1947, Article VI laid the foundation of anti-dumping framework that 
exists to date.26 Though it has remained unchanged, the provision has been continuously 
supplemented. For example, additions to Article VI were made during the 1967 Kennedy round 
and then by the Anti-Dumping Code during the 1973–1979 Tokyo negotiations.27 Nonetheless, 
problems still arose at the Uruguay round in the 1980s with USA, Japan and China, for example, 
vying different implementation disciplines of anti-dumping measures.28 Despite their differences, 
a consensus was reached as is now reflected in Article VI of GATT 1994 and Implementation of 
Article VI of GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA). 
Despite this consensus as reflected in the ADA, there are also recent developments of 
supplementing Article VI framed within the Doha round. Negotiations and proposals have been 
tabled by some WTO Members urging the need improve the ADA.29 In this regard, USA 
specifically emphasised that anti-dumping measures should remain effective in countering unfair 
trade practices.30 The constant lobbing for anti-dumping laws to continue being amended is an 
indication that dumping is a complex issue, which constantly needs to be monitored to see if the 
laws still cater for emerging markets and changing trade dynamics. In addition, due to the 
complexity of dumping, there is need for a sound definition bearing in mind that WTO does not 
                                                            
23Raju KD World Trade Organisation Agreement on Anti-dumping: A GATT/WTO and Indian Jurisprudence (2008) 
11(hereafter Raju KD (2008). 
24Service dumping is where subsidies are given which allows exporter to sell at lower price, exchange dumping is 
where exporter manipulates exchange rates to gain advantage in export industry, social dumping is where cheaper 
labour is used and in the end it lowers product price in Raju KD (2008) 11. 
25Price dumping is where the product is sold at a lower price than it is sold in the home country. 
26Ndlovu L ‘South Africa and the World Trade Organization Anti-Dumping Agreement nineteen years into 
democracy’ (2013) 28(2) Southern African Public Law 282. 
27WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2017). 
28Bown CP and McCulloch R ‘US–Japan and US–China trade conflict: Export growth, reciprocity, and the 
international trading system’ (2009) 20(6) Journal of Asian Economics 669-687. 
29An informal group of 15 participants (Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; 
Korea; Mexico; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; and Turkey) calling themselves 
“Friends of Anti-Dumping Negotiations” (FANs) has called for the reform of the current Anti-Dumping Agreement’ 
see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/rules_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2016). 
30See generally briefing notes at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/rules_e.htm (accessed 08 
April 2018). 
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regulate dumping but it regulates how governments can react to it. As such, the next section 
discusses different definitions of dumping. 
2.3 DEFINITION OF DUMPING 
Viner defined dumping as the taking place of international price discrimination.31 Price 
discrimination is a pricing strategy where same provider in different markets’ transacts identical 
or similar goods or services at different prices.32 In simple words, price discrimination occurs when 
a company sells the same product for different prices in different markets.33 Viner’s definition is, 
however, problematic in defining dumping because price discrimination is not an unfair trade 
practice as opposed to dumping itself. To illustrate this point, price discrimination occurs where a 
Zimbabwean cooking oil producing company sells its cooking oil for 5 dollars locally and 7 dollars 
in Zambia, the difference in prices cannot constitute dumping in the Zambian market. This is 
because the price in Zambia is not less than the normal value of cooking oil in Zimbabwe; also the 
difference in price may be due to import duty, which has nothing to do with dumping. 
In terms of GATT, Article VI defines dumping as a situation when ‘products of one country are 
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products, and 
causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party 
or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry’.34 Thus, the provision encompasses 
three elements of dumping, namely: dumping occurs only when a product is introduced by the 
exporting country at less than normal value; the domestic industry experiences material injury; and 
there is a link between the dumping and the injury.35 To this end, if any of these elements were not 
satisfied, then one cannot argue that dumping has occurred. 
In addition to GATT, Article 2.1 of the ADA defines dumping as the introduction of certain 
products: 
                                                            
31Viner J Dumping: A problem in International Trade (1923) 4. 
32See generally CTI Reviews Microeconomics: Economics, Microeconomics 5ed (2015) available at 
https://books.google.co.za/books?id=qz7MAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed 08 
April 2018). 
33Economics Online ‘Price Discrimination’ available at 
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Price_discrimination.html (accessed 08 April 2018). 
34Article VI.1 of GATT 1994. For a commentary of article VI of GATT, see also Vermulst EA & Graafsma F WTO 
Disputes: Anti-dumping, Subsidies and Safeguards (2002) 418. 
35Czako J, Human J & Miranda J A handbook on anti-dumping investigations (2003) 2. 
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‘into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product 
exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of 
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country’.36  
The ADA and GATT definitions have some slight deviations. While the ADA is silent about 
material injury but talks about export price, the opposite is true for GATT. Arguably, the 
differences are not that important because Article VI should always be read together with the ADA 
since the latter supplements the former.  
The term dumping is also used to describe a situation where a product is banned in the exporting 
country.37 The effect is that the ‘dumped’ product can find its way on markets of poor countries 
even though it is banned in the exporting country.38 Overall, there is a consensus that dumping 
occurs when selling the product at a lower price than it sells for in the exporting country as 
contained in the ADA. 
2.3.1 Types of Dumping 
There are several reasons one can table in giving reasons for dumping and it is from these reasons 
that the types of dumping can be framed. The formulated types of dumping particularly in relation 
to commerce dumping are sporadic, predatory and continuous dumping.39 The classifications are 
because of the effects and continuity of dumping.40 
Starting with sporadic or distress dumping, it is dumping, which is occasional, and casual, 
occurring at scattered instances and is not exactly a manifestation of an established price policy.41 
It occurs mainly when an exporting country produces more goods than needed in its domestic 
industry.42 Viner, a significant contributor to international economics, avers that a producer may 
                                                            
36Article 2.1 of ADA. For a commentary of article 2.1 of ADA, see also McMahon J The WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture: A Commentary (2006) 111. 
37World Health Organisation ‘Trade, foreign policy, diplomacy and health’ available at 
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story018/en/ (accessed 08 April 2018). 
38World Health Organisation ‘Trade, foreign policy, diplomacy and health’ available at 
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story018/en/ (accessed 08 April 2018). 
39Carbaugh R International Economics 12ed (2008) 163 (hereafter Carbaugh R (2008). 
40Viner J ‘Dumping as a Method of Competition in International Trade II’ (1923) 1(2) The University Journal of 
Business 182 (hereafter Viner J (1923). 
 See generally, Aggarwal A The Anti-Dumping Agreement and Developing Countries: An Introduction (2007). 
41Dale R Anti-dumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order (1980) 8. 
42See generally Ehrenhaft PD ‘Protection against International Price Discrimination: United States Countervailing 
and Antidumping Duties’ (1958) 58(1) Columbia Law Review 44–76.   
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choose to sporadically dump his goods rather than store the surplus stocks to the next season as he 
may incur storage charges.43 Moreover, reducing prices in the domestic market in order to increase 
sales is not an option; because once prices are reduced, it is difficult to then sell the products again 
using the original price.44 Consequently, the producer opts to sell the excess goods to the importing 
country or countries at a lower price than the exporting country.45 
There are different views on the selection of the importing country where producers sporadically 
dump the products. For example, Aswathappa observes that the importing country is usually a 
country where the product is not normally sold.46 On the contrary, Alamri states that sporadic 
dumping is dependent upon the elasticity of foreign demand for the manufacture’s commodity and 
if the producer is a monopolist in the domestic market.47 In support of Alamri, Leclerc states that 
sporadic dumping is motivated by rational business strategies as such producers mainly act in an 
economically efficient manner.48 The study supports Lecrec and Alamri, because the issue of 
demand is a business strategy, which determines where the product is needed most. Therefore, it 
makes more business sense to undertake sporadic dumping in a country where there is high demand 
of the product. 
Sporadic dumping can also be unintentional.49 This may take place due to prices in the export 
markets rising without notice or inexperienced exporters.50  Sporadic dumping is brief in nature 
and may not necessarily injure the domestic industry of the importing country.51 Dwivedi also 
submits that this type of dumping is not so much of a threat to the domestic industry of the 
importing country because it is short lived and at most, it prevents a downslide in the domestic 
industry of the exporting country.52   
                                                            
43Viner J (1923) 183. 
44Viner J (1923) 183. 
45Lee YS Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis 2ed (2005) 200. 
46Aswathappa K International Business (2015) 459. 
47Alamri MA ‘A Conceptual Framework: “Dumping” And “Anti-Dumping” In The International And Regional 
Legal Systems’ (2017) 5 (1) Global Journal of Politics and Law Research 31. 
48Leclerc JM ‘Reforming Anti-Dumping Law: Balancing the Interests of Consumers and Domestic Industries’ 
(1999) 44 McGill Law Journal 117. 
49Viner J (1923) 184 also see generally Aggarwal A The Anti-Dumping Agreement and Developing Countries: An 
Introduction (2006) (hereafter Aggarwal A (2006). 
50Madar D Big Steel: Technology, Trade, and Survival in a Global Market (2009) 68 (hereafter Madar D (2009) also 
see generally Aggarwal A (2006). 
51Madar D (2009) 68. 
52Dwivedi DN Managerial Economics 8ed (1980) 444. 
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Whilst sporadic dumping is done randomly to relieve stress on the domestic industry, predatory 
dumping is the exact opposite. With predatory dumping, goods are manufactured for sole purpose 
of dumping because there is a well-established export policy in place.53 Predatory dumping occurs 
when goods are sold for less at a loss in order to gain access to a market and drive competitors out 
of competition.54 This type of dumping has a crippling effect on the domestic industry, which in 
turn affects the consumers by driving out competitors, leaving dumping firms to monopolise the 
market and increase prices making goods more expensive than they normally would have.55 
Research notes that predatory dumping is the most harmful type of dumping as it has a double 
effect of injuring world welfare of importing countries by driving out local producers, resulting in 
exploitation of consumers.56  
Lee avers that proving of intent of predatory dumping is difficult on exporters.57 One can then 
observe that although predatory dumping may warrant a higher anti-dumping duty because of its 
destructive nature, if it is not proved, investigative authorities may not apply such duty. This may 
lead to partial elimination of the effects caused by predatory dumping, crippling the domestic 
industry of the importing country. Economists have however highlighted that predatory dumping 
is unlikely to occur because it is irrational for firms to produce goods made specifically for 
dumping.58 
The last type of dumping is known as continuous or sacrificial dumping.59 It involves ‘the repeated 
supply of goods at a lower price than the supply cost for a considerable period of time’.60 This is 
sacrificial dumping in the sense that consumers in the domestic industry sacrifice their money by 
buying goods at a higher price to compensate the lower price abroad. Madar observes that 
                                                            
53Anwar R &Raslan A Anti-dumping: A developing country perspective (2009) 13. 
54Srinivasan R International Marketing (2008) 89; Markusen JR International Trade: Theory and Evidence (1995) 
355. 
55Chapter Eight Exercises available at http://www.franke.nau.edu/eastwood-j/eco486/hwk-
text_exercises/hwch08.htm (accessed 22 March 2017). 
56Stanbrook C and Bentley P Dumping and Subsidies: Law and Procedures Governing the Imposition of Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties in the European Community (1996) 7. 
57Lee YS Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis 2ed (2005) 200. 
58Bolton RA ‘Anti-Dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-Dumping Duties under the W.T.O. through Heightened 
Scrutiny’ (2011) 29(1) Berkeley Journal of International Law 72. 
59Raju KD World Trade Organization Agreement on Anti-dumping: A GATT/WTO and Indian Jurisprudence 
(2008) 10. 
60Koh KM & Hyun JW Competition Law in the Republic of Korea (2011) 70. 
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continuous dumping is both detrimental and to some extent beneficial to domestic industries.61 A 
net welfare benefit can be produced through efficient producers that come about through shift in 
change.62 
To sum up, different types of dumping may result in material injury, which adversely affects local 
industries that receive or have received the dumped imports. When dumping causes injury, 
domestic industries can benefit from relief in the form of anti-dumping duties to the dumped 
products.63 Anti-dumping duties instil a balanced position between domestic products and 
imported products in terms of market competition. Hence, the next section discusses the different 
schools of thoughts that pertain to the imposition of these anti-dumping duties. 
2.3.2 Schools of thoughts on anti-dumping duties 
Raju proposes three theories that may at least; explain governments’ reactions to dumping. 
According to these theories, anti-dumping duties are a response to either unfair trade, or special 
protection or strategic weapon.64 
Anti-dumping duties are necessary to remedy unfair trade practices. This principle underpins logic 
behind this principle is that, by levelling the playing field with anti-dumping duties, industries may 
compete effectively. The remedying of unfair trade practices is also done through creation of 
market barriers to exporting firms using predatory pricing to drive out competition.65 When 
Canada initiated its first anti-dumping laws in 1904, it intended to protect the ‘Canadian steel 
industry from short-term predatory dumping from the cartelised U.S. steel companies’.66 
Therefore, they were reacting directly to the unfair trade instigated by companies from USA. 
The ADA permits anti-dumping duties to be applied only when all elements mentioned in Article 
VI of GATT are present.67 This supplements the fact that in terms of the ADA there is a 
                                                            
61Madar D Big Steel: Technology, Trade, and Survival in a Global Market (2009) 68. 
62OECD Multifunctionality towards an analytical framework: Towards an analytical framework (2001) 70. 
63Czako J, Human J & Miranda J A handbook on anti-dumping investigations (2003) 2. 
64Raju KD World Trade Organization Agreement on Anti-dumping: A GATT/WTO and Indian Jurisprudence (2008) 
7. 
65Evolutionary Archetypes ‘Antidumping at the Intersection Between Free and Fair Trade’ available at 
http://evolutionary-archetypes.com/en/know-hub/Antidumping-at-the-Intersection-Between-Free-and-Fair-Trade-
.15/ (accessed 19 April 2018). 
66Denton R ‘(Why) Should Nations Utilize Antidumping Measures?’ (1989) 11(1) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 229. 
67Czako J, Human J & Miranda J A handbook on anti-dumping investigations (2003) 2. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
23 
 
qualification for anti-dumping duties to be used as a response to unfair trade practices. Duties may 
be used as a remedy where there is an introduction of a country’s products into that of another ‘at 
less than the normal value of the products, and causes or threatens material injury to an established 
industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic 
industry’.68 Thus, anti-dumping duties are used only as a reaction upon proving all the relevant 
elements. 
Critiques of the theory that anti-dumping duties counter unfair trade aver that they are a form of a 
protectionist measure.69 Finger opines that although anti-dumping regulations are justified under 
GATT system, if one looks closely at them, they are nothing but protectionist regulations.70 Raju, 
however, views it as special protection rather than a protectionist measure because they protect the 
domestic industry from unfair competition.71 Raju further argues that anti-dumping duties are a 
strategic weapon.72 Prusa also avers that anti-dumping measures are usually imposed against 
members who previously investigated them.73 
In support of Raju, Lindsey and Ikenson have argued that, indeed anti-dumping laws serve political 
interests more than anything else.74 They submit that international competition should be subject 
to ‘certain agreed-upon ‘‘rules of the game’’ according to which some sources of competitive 
advantage – trade barriers, subsidies, and other market distorting governmental policies - are 
                                                            
68Article VI of GATT 1994. 
69Anti-dumping duties are viewed as protectionist because some countries that apply the duties do not want local 
products to face competition from foreign products hence they apply the duties to drive out competition see 
generally Cheng LK,  Qiu LD &Wong KP ‘Anti-Dumping Measures as a Tool of Protectionism: A Mechanism 
Design Approach’ (2001) 34 (3) The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique; Gay P 
‘Unveiling Protectionism: Anti-Dumping, The GATT, And Suggestions For Reform’ (1997) Dalhousie Journal Of 
Legal Studies. 
70Finger MJ(ed) Antidumping: How it Works and who Gets Hurt (1993) 13. 
71In this regard, anti-dumping laws are regarded as a form of short-term protection, which temporarily protects 
domestic products from international competition. This theory argues that, had it not been for this special protection 
Member States of the WTO would not have agreed to the reduction of tariffs in the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds of 
WTO/GATT negotiations. 
72Raju KD World Trade Organization Agreement on Anti-dumping: A GATT/WTO and Indian Jurisprudence 
(2008) 7. 
73Prusa TJ ‘On the Spread and Impact of Anti-dumping’ (2001) 34(3) Canadian Journal of Economics 591. 
74Lindsey B & Ikenson D Anti-dumping Exposed: The Devilish Details of Unfair Trade Law (2003) 18 (hereafter 
Lindsey B &Ikenson D (2003).   
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deemed as unfair’.75 In other words, the principle of legitimacy, rather than efficiency, must guide 
anti-dumping laws.  
The justification by Lindsay and Ikenson is unnecessarily complex because it proposes that even 
though the motivation of anti-dumping laws might be political, the practical effect is that it in the 
process the playing field islevelled by denying benefits of unfair advantage.76 Smith, Rosendorff 
and Wruuck also concur with Lindsey and Ikenson, further arguing that where there is leadership 
change in autocratic rule there is more likely to be administrative protection, which may lead to 
increased anti-dumping investigation.77 This is the opposite for democratic countries because a 
‘leader accountable to a larger coalition will also have fewer resources to allocate to service a 
specific industry, and may choose not to pursue the investigation further’.78 
The school of thought that best reflects on the use of anti-dumping measures in terms of WTO is 
the one that proposes that anti-dumping duties are necessary to remedy unfair trade.79 This is 
because under WTO, Members cannot impose anti-dumping duties unless the dumping is causing 
injury and if there is a causal link between dumping and injury.80 However, one may argue 
otherwise contending that anti-dumping duties may be used by Members to serve political 
interests. They will unlikely be used to punish allies as compared to their use amongst countries, 
which have no political gains amongst them.  
The next sections of this thesis will discuss dumping in the WTO including substantive and 
procedural requirements for legislating anti-dumping duties and the institutions that deal with anti-
dumping disputes in the WTO. The main headings under this section will be determination of 
dumping, determination of injury, procedural requirements for legislating anti-dumping measures, 
challenges within WTO anti-dumping rules and WTO dispute settlement. 
                                                            
75Lindsey B &Ikenson D (2003) 18. 
76Lindsey B &Ikenson D (2003) 18. 
77Smith A, Rosendorff BP &Wruuck P ‘Political Change, Domestic Institutions and the Onset of Anti-Dumping 
Investigations’ (2015) New York University and University of Mannheim 3 (hereafter Smith A, Rosendorff BP 
&Wruuck P (2015). 
78Smith A, Rosendorff BP &Wruuck P (2015) 8. 
79WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2018). 
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2.4 WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION TREATMENT OF DUMPING 
As discussed under the definition of dumping, the WTO definition of dumping is governed by 
Article VI of GATT and Article 2.1 of the ADA. These provisions do not prohibit dumping per se 
as private companies usually do dumping.81 In this vein, it is imperative to note that the ADA does 
not regulate the actions of companies who engage in dumping; rather its focus is on how 
governments can or cannot react to dumping through regulating anti-dumping actions.82 WTO 
Members are also not obliged to enact national anti-dumping legislations. However if Members 
elect to, they must enact these laws in accordance with WTO rules.83  The legal framework that 
governs the reactions of Governments to dumping is thus Article VI of GATT and the ADA. It is 
therefore imperative to discuss the determination of dumping as per these WTO instruments. These 
instruments are highly complex and require a high level of technical expertise in accountancy, 
economics and law fields.84 
2.4.1 Determination of Dumping 
This part of the Chapter reviews aspects of the dumping determination. It analyses concepts such 
as normal value and export price. WTO Members should be able to use the correct calculations 
and principles in determining normal value and export price. These are imperative concepts, since 
they form the basis for calculating the dumping margin (the percentage of dumped products in 
monetary value). If incorrect principles and calculations are used, it may compromise the 
investigation and this may lead to disputes. The next section also addresses the need for 
comparison of normal value and export price, including the fair comparison requirement. It further 
addresses the calculation of the dumping margin.  
2.4.1.1 Determination of Normal Value 
There is need to determine the normal value when determining if a product is dumped. The ADA 
provides that ‘a product is to be considered as being dumped if it is introduced into the commerce 
                                                            
81UNCTAD ‘Dispute Settlement: World Trade Organisation’ (2003) 3. 
82WTO ‘Anti-dumping’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm (accessed 18 April 
2018). 
83WTO ‘Anti-dumping’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm (accessed 20 April 
2018). 
84Brink G ‘A nutshell guide to anti-dumping action’ (2008) 271 available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8445/Brink_Nutshell%282008%29b.pdf?sequence=1   accessed 
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of another country at less than its normal value...’85 Normal value in general terms refers to the 
price of the product in question, when it is sold in the exporting country market.86 Within this 
context, in US — Hot-Rolled Steel the Appellate Body held that the  
‘text of Article 2.1 expressly imposes four conditions on sales transactions in order for them to be 
used to calculate normal value: first, the ‘sale must be “in the ordinary course of trade”; second, it 
must be of the “like product”; third, the product must be “destined for consumption in the exporting 
country”; and, fourth, the price must be “comparable”’.87  
Thus, the failure to meet these four conditions then means that the sales transaction cannot be used 
to determine normal value. 
Starting with the first condition that sales must be in the ‘ordinary course of trade’, the ordinary 
meaning of this phrase (ordinary course of trade) is not provided for by the ADA.88 This implies 
that one has to look for its interpretation outside the ADA. The agreement does, however, provide 
for instances where production is not in the ‘ordinary course of trade’.  For example, it states that 
when sales are made at ‘prices that are below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production 
plus administrative, selling and general costs, they may be treated as not being in the ordinary 
course of trade’.89 Thus, they may not be used in determining normal value if investigating 
authorities conclude that the sales were made within an extended period of time and their prices 
prohibits the recovery of all costs within a ‘reasonable period’ of time.90 
Interestingly, in US,Hot-Rolled Steel, the panel, held that ‘a ‘reasonable period’ must be interpreted 
consistently with the notions of flexibility and balance that are inherent in the concept of 
‘reasonableness’, and in a manner that allows for account to be taken of the particular 
circumstances of each case’.91 The study therefore submits that there cannot be a concrete measure 
                                                            
85Article 2.1 of the ADA. For a commentary on Article 2.1 of the ADA, see Andersen H EU Dumping 
Determinations and WTO Law (2009) 109. 
86See generally Lester S, Mercurio B & Davies A World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (2012). 
87United States – Anti-Dumping Measures On Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products From Japan  WT/DS184/AB/R 
para 165 (hereafter Appellate Body US — Hot-Rolled Steel). 
88Appellate Body US — Hot-Rolled Steel [2001] para 165. 
89Article 2.2.1 of the ADA. For a commentary on Article 2.2.1 of the ADA, see Stoll PT & Koebele M WTO - Trade 
Remedies (2008) 24. 
90See generally Article 2.2.1 of the ADA. 
91Appellate Body US — Hot-Rolled Steel para 165. 
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of what constitutes reasonableness as it decided on a case-by-case basis, taking all the 
circumstances in consideration. 
The second requirement is that there must be a ‘like’ product. The ADA defines a ‘like product’ 
‘as a product which is identical, that is alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or 
[where such product does not exist], another product which, although not alike in all respects, has 
characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration’.92 In US – Softwood 
Lumber - the panel held that a ‘like product’ for purposes of the determination of dumping, ‘is the 
product which is destined for consumption in the exporting country’. 93It is therefore to be 
compared with the allegedly dumped product, generally referred as the product under 
consideration in the ADA.94 It is submitted that it is important for Members to determine a like 
product in relation to the ADA as the word may be used differently in other WTO Agreements. In 
EC– Asbestos, the Appellate Body held that 
‘in each of the provisions where the term “like products” is used, the term must be interpreted in 
light of the context, and of the object and purpose, of the provision at issue, and of the object and 
purpose of the covered agreement in which the provision appears.’95 
As such, an investigating authority should be aware that the term like product is given specific 
meaning in Article 2.6 of the ADA, which should be used throughout the Agreement.96 This is not 
the case in other WTO Agreements, as such in anti-dumping investigations ‘like products’ should 
be given their meaning within the context of dumping.97  If meaning is drawn outside the context 
of dumping, it may affect the basis of selection of companies, which constitute the domestic 
industry.98 This is in turn compromises the scope of the investigation, inclusive of determination 
of injury and causal link.99 
                                                            
92Article 2.6 of the ADA. 
93United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada WT/DS264/R para 7.152 
(hereafter Panel Report US – Softwood Lumber). 
94Panel Report US – Softwood Lumber para 7.152. 
95European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products WT/DS135/AB/R para 
88 (hereafter Appellate Body EC– Asbestos). 
96Appellate Body EC– Asbestos para 88. 
97Appellate Body EC– Asbestos para 88. 
98 WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2018). 
99 WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2018). 
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The third requirement is that the product must be ‘destined for consumption in the exporting 
country’.100 Again, Article 2.1 of the ADA does not define what constitutes ‘exporting country’. 
According to Andersen, clarifications such as the meaning of ‘exporting country’ are important 
especially where the product at issue is not produced in the country being investigated.101 
However, Article 2.5 of the ADA provides relief where an intermediary country produces the 
goods.  It states that if the ‘product is merely transhipped through the exporting country, normal 
value may be determined on the basis of the price’ of the product in the country of origin, not the 
exporting country’s price.102  
The last requirement is that the price must be ‘comparable’. This means that the price used should 
provide a fair comparison between normal value and export price, as stated in Article 2.4 of the 
ADA.103 Therefore, if sales of transactions are not comparable, the standard method of calculating 
normal value cannot be used. 
Most importantly for sales transactions to be used in the calculation of normal value, all the four 
requirements should be fulfilled. In some cases, determining normal value in the ordinary course 
of business is difficult due to lack of sales of such product(s) in the domestic market.104 In these 
instances, the ADA provides alternative methods for the determination of normal value. Article 
2.2 provides three special circumstances where standard situation of calculating normal value 
cannot be used and it provides two alternative methods for calculating normal value, namely: third 
country exports and constructed normal value.105  
The first special situation is when ‘there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of 
trade in the domestic market’106 which means that the product exported or under investigation is 
not sold in the exporting country domestic market. The second situation is where the volumes of 
                                                            
100Appellate Body US — Hot-Rolled Steel para 165. 
101Andersen H EU Dumping Determinations and WTO Law (2009) 106. 
102WTO ‘Indirect Exports’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 05 
May 2017). 
103Article 2.4 of the ADA requires that when determining dumping a fair comparison should be made between the 
export price and the normal value. 
104WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2018). 
105United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Dispute Settlement in International Trade: 
Anti-Dumping Measures (2003) 9. 
106Article 2.2 of the ADA. 
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sales are too low107 in the domestic industry to allow for calculation of normal value.108 The last 
situation is when sales in the domestic industry of exporting country do not allow a proper 
comparison of normal value and export price.109  
In the special situations, the ADA provides that normal value can be calculated using the export 
price to a third country or constructed normal value.110  The first alternative involves the use of 
export price to the third country. For example, where Zimbabwe exports steel to South Africa, 
Zambia and Malawi, and if it dumps the steel in South Africa, normal value can be calculated 
using the price of steel from Zimbabwe to Zambia only if standard calculation cannot be used.  
However, for price of steel to Zambia to be used, Article 2.2 states that Zambia needs to be 
appropriate.111 Andersen submits that the word appropriate in Article 2.2 of the ADA suggests that 
investigating authorities must consider a number of different countries to ensure that they select 
the appropriate country.112 Murigi avers that this option is rarely used because there are worries 
that third country prices may also be dumped.113 Besides the issue that prices may also be dumped, 
the Article does not clarify the requirements to qualify as ‘appropriate’ third country. This makes 
it difficult for Members to rely on third country prices in calculating normal value.  
Besides using the price of third country exports, the ADA provides that normal value can be 
constructed.114 Constructed normal value is when normal value is determined by looking at 
production, general costs, selling expenses, administrative expenses, and profits of ‘like products’ 
by the exporting country being investigated.115 These costs should be constructed by actual data 
                                                            
107Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting country shall normally 
be considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the normal value if such sales constitute 5 per cent or 
more of the sales of the product under consideration to the importing Member, provided that a lower ratio should be 
acceptable where the evidence demonstrates that domestic sales at such lower ratio are nonetheless of sufficient 
magnitude to provide for a proper comparison’ see Footnote 2 of the ADA. 
108Article 2.2 of the ADA. 
109Article 2.2 of the ADA. 
110See generally Article 2.2 of the ADA. 
111See generally Article 2.2 of the ADA. 
112Andersen H EU Dumping Determinations and WTO Law (2009) 146. 
113Murigi WC The Development of a Successful Antidumping Regime In Kenya (unpublished LLM thesis, University 
of the Western Cape, 2013) 13. 
114See generally Article 2.2.2 of the ADA. 
115See generally Article 2.2.2 of the ADA. 
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pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary course of trade.116 If that is not possible, the 
expenses can be calculated based on three possibilities, namely: 
(i)    ‘the actual amounts incurred and realised by the exporter or producer in question in respect 
of production and sales in the domestic market of the country of origin of the same general 
category of products; 
(ii)    the weighted average of the actual amounts incurred and realised by other exporters or 
producers subject to investigation in respect of production and sales of the like product in the 
domestic market of the country of origin; 
(iii)    any other reasonable method, provided that the amount for profit so established shall not 
exceed the profit normally realised by other exporters or producers on sales of products of the 
same general category in the domestic market of the country of origin’.117 
In US – OCTG (Korea), the panel held that in order to make a profit determination under Article 
2.2.2(i) or to calculate a profit cap under Article 2.2.2(iii) of the ADA, there must be a 
determination by an investigating authority of which products fall within the ‘same general 
category of products’.118 Although the ADA does not contain a definition of ‘same general 
category of products’, the scope must be understood to be broader, not narrower than that of the 
like product.119 As such, although the definition of ‘same general category of products’ does 
include the ‘like product’, the meaning is broader than that of the ‘like product.120 
In Egypt — Matches, a complaint against Egypt was filed by Pakistan arguing that Egypt breached 
Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, and 2.2.2 of the ADA when it failed to use actual data provided by Khyber 
or another reasonable method to calculate the Selling, General & Administrative (SG&A) expenses 
and profits for Khyber.121 Instead, Egypt had used data from other sources in its construction of 
the normal value for the Pakistan Company.122 Though a request for panel was set, a mutual 
                                                            
116See generally Article 2.2.2 of the ADA. 
117See generally Article 2.2.2 (i) (ii) (iii) of the ADA. 
118United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain oil country tubular goods from Korea WT/DS488/R para 7.63 
(hereafter Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea). 
119Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea) para 7.66 also see European Communities — Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports 
of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India WT/DS141/R para 6.60 (hereafter Panel Report EC – Bed Linen para 6.60; and 
Thailand —Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from 
Poland WT/DS122/R para.7.112 (hereafter Panel Report Thailand – H-Beams). 
120Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea) para 7.72. 
121Egypt – Anti-Dumping Duties on Matches from Pakistan WT/DS327/2 para 14 (hereafter Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by Pakistan Egypt — Matches). 
122Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Pakistan Egypt — Matches para 17. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
31 
 
consensus was reached before the panel deliberated on the matter.123 This dispute, however, 
illustrates that if correct procedures are not used in constructing normal value, the result may be 
flawed, which in turn will violate provisions in the ADA. Moreover, in most cases where normal 
value is constructed, it leads to higher anti-dumping duties124 in which Members may not always 
agree on the method used in construction. This leads to disputes.  
2.4.1.2 Determination of Export Price 
Neither the ADA nor Article VI of GATT defines what export price is.125 The ADA provides for 
construction of export price in circumstances where actual export price cannot be used. Brink states 
that this shows that the normal process would involve use of the actual export price.126 The export 
price is the price at which the product is sold for export purposes.127 However, like with normal 
value, in some circumstances the actual export price may not be good enough to be used for 
comparison.128  
The ADA recognises that there are circumstances where the actual export price cannot be used and 
in such circumstances, export price should be constructed.129 The ADA states that where there is 
no export price or where concerns of unreliability of export price are raised because there was 
association or a ‘compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a third 
party,’ export price can be constructed.130 Construction may be based on the price at which the 
imported products are first resold to an independent buyer.131 If not resold to an independent buyer 
or in the exact condition as imported, construction may be based on reasonable basis as determined 
by authorities.132   
                                                            
123See Egypt — Matches Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution 29 March 2006. 
124See generally Vermulst E & Horlick G ‘Problems with Dumping and Injury Margin Calculations in Ten User 
Countries’ (2007) 2 (1) Global Trade and Customs Journal 2. 
125Czako J, Human J & Miranda J A handbook on anti-dumping investigations (2003) 12. 
126Brink G A theoretical framework for South African anti-dumping law (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Pretoria 2004) 186. 
127WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2017). 
128WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2017). 
129See generally Article 2.3 of the ADA. 
130Article 2.3 of the ADA. 
131Article 2.3 of the ADA. 
132Article 2.3 of the ADA. 
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Instances where there are no export prices include but are not limited to where ‘export transaction 
is an internal transfer, or if the product is exchanged in a barter transaction’.133 It would also 
include instances where no price has been fixed at the time the product was exported.134 Where 
concerns are raised because there was association or compensation arrangement. The reason for 
constructing export price is that the transaction price may not be a free market price, as it may have 
been manipulated for different reasons including that of tax.135 Accordingly, there are two 
preconditions for constructed export price to be used but they exist independently and thus there 
is no need to fulfil both.136 
In US – OCTG (Korea) the panel held that for investigating authorities to use constructed export 
price because of association, it should be clear that they have grounds for the view that there is 
association.137 If association does not exist, the export price cannot appear to be unreliable to the 
investigating authority on basis of association.138 The panel held that  
‘the use of the terms “appear to the authorities” and “unreliable” in Article 2.3 denotes a situation 
in which, because of the association at issue, the investigating authority perceives the export price 
not to be trustworthy’.139  
This requires the investigating authority to always establish facts properly and evaluate them in a 
neutral and objective manner.140  
Importantly, this means that Article 2.3 of the ADA does not allow construction of export price by 
an investigating authority each time there is association; rather they should evaluate facts in an 
unbiased manner.141 In addition, Article 2.3 does not place any separate requirement on an 
                                                            
133WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2018). 
134WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2018). 
135WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2018). 
136The first precondition is where there is no export price and second one is where the export price that is available is 
appears unreliable because there was association or a ‘compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the 
importer or a third party’. 
137Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea) para 7.146.  
138Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea) para 7.146 see also Article 2.1 of the ADA. 
139Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea) para 7.147. 
140Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea) para 7.147. 
141Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea) para 7.148. 
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investigating authority to make a determination as to the trustworthiness of the export price.142 It 
is therefore submitted that an evaluation of Article 2.3 of the ADA is not an evaluation on the 
reliability of the export price itself, but it evaluates the reliability of the export price where it is 
may be unreliable because of association. 
2.4.1.3 Comparison of Normal Value and Export Price 
After the normal value and export price have been determined, the ADA requires that a fair 
comparison of the two be made.143 The requirements for such comparison are that: prices be ‘made 
at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly 
as possible the same time’.144 In Egypt — Steel Rebar,145 the panel held that Article 2.4, on face 
value, requires a fair comparison of export price and normal value which is the calculation of the 
dumping margin.146 It held that the ordinary meaning of the provision is concerned with the nature 
of the comparison of export price and normal value, with emphasis being on fairness comparison 
rather than what normal value or export price entails.147 For this reason, the Article’s main 
emphasis is on fairness rather than a general comparison. 
The ADA requires fairness, transparency and participation as key components to trade and as part 
of that, the investigating authorities have a duty to notify all relevant parties of the information 
‘needed to ensure a fair comparison; and may not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on 
parties’.148 This information may include issues such as adjustments, allowances, and conversion 
of currency.149 
In ensuring that prices are comparable, the ADA requires that adjustments be made to either the 
normal value, or the export price, on merit in order to accommodate differences in product, or 
circumstances of sale, in both importing and exporting markets.150 These allowances must be made 
for ‘differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, quantities, physical characteristics, and 
                                                            
142Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea) para 7.147. 
143See generally Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
144See generally Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
145Full case citation is Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey WT/DS211/R 
(hereafter Panel Report Egypt — Steel Rebar). 
146Panel Report Egypt — Steel Rebar para 7.333. 
147Panel Report Egypt — Steel Rebar para 7.333. 
148See generally Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
149WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2018). 
150See generally Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
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other differences demonstrated to affect price comparability’.151  In adjusting, it may happen that 
there is an overlap of factors; as such, the existing authorities need not duplicate adjustments made 
already in the same provision.152 
If price ‘comparability has been affected,’ the ADA provides specific rules which apply to such a 
situation.153 It requires that either ‘normal value be established at a level of trade equivalent to that 
of the constructed export price’, or due ‘allowance be made for differences in conditions and terms 
of sale, taxation, quantities, physical characteristics, and other matters demonstrated to affect price 
comparability.’154 In addition, allowances should be made for ‘costs, including duties and taxes 
incurred between the importation of the product and the resale, as well as for profits accruing’.155    
It may happen that currency conversion is required in comparing normal value and export price, 
so the ADA provides specific rules governing such conversions.156 It provides that the exchange 
rate used should be that in effect on the date of sale.157 If, however, the ‘sale of foreign currency 
on forward markets is directly linked to the export sale involved, the rate of exchange to be used 
is that of forward sale’. 158 
Additionally, exchange rate fluctuations must be ignored, but exporters must be given at least 
60 days by authorities to adjust their export prices to so that they may be in harmony with exchange 
rates during the period of investigation.159 In EC — Tube or Pipe Fittings, the panel held that 
‘references to “sale”, “export sale” and “export prices” in Article 2.4.1 are but a textual indication 
that the provision refers to currency conversion in connection with the prices of export sales, and 
should not be construed to conversion occurring when calculation of specific adjustments is made 
to either the normal value or the export price’.160 
                                                            
151See generally Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
152See generally Footnote 7 of the ADA. 
153WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2018). 
154See generally Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
155See generally Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
156See generally Article 2.4.1 of the ADA. 
157Normally, the date of sale would be the date of contract, purchase order, order confirmation, or invoice, 
whichever establishes the material terms of sale Footnote 7 of the ADA. 
158Article 2.4.1 of the ADA. 
159See generally Article 2.4.1 of ADA. 
160European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil 
WT/DS219/R para 7.198 (hereafter Panel Report EC — Tube or Pipe Fitting). 
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The panel held that Article 2.4 imposes a general obligation that a ‘fair comparison be made 
between export price and normal value, and this obligation informs the other obligations in Article 
2’.161 Conversion of currency in Article 2.4.1 is not related to conversions made in order to 
calculate adjustments under same article since its extension may distort fair comparison.162 
Furthermore, certain situations163 ‘where conversion of all currency data as at the date of export 
sale might therefore distort a fair comparison, investigating authority should only progress as 
necessary toward the ‘comparison’ referred to in Article 2.4.1 after it has made all essential 
adjustments’ required.164 
As stated above in Egypt — Steel Rebar the panel held that Article 2.4, on its face, ‘requires fair 
comparison of export price and normal value, which is the calculation of the dumping margin’.165 
The next section of the work will discuss what dumping margin really entails and the methods that 
are used in calculating dumping margin. 
2.4.1.4 Determination of Dumping Margin 
The definition of dumping margin has been defined by Czako, Human & Miranda as the ‘extent 
by which normal value exceeds export price which is expressed as a percentage or as a specific 
amount’; 166 while Van den Bossche & Zdouc interpreted it as the difference between the export 
price and the normal value.167 Czako, Human & Miranda is clear and precise. However, Van den 
Bossche & Zdouc’s definition is ambiguous because the word ‘difference’ is misplaced, as it does 
not give a clear understanding of whether one must subtract normal value from export value or 
vice versa. Therefore, the author adopts Czako, Human & Miranda’s definition because it is 
precise, however, it also has a shortfall because it does not take into account the adjustments that 
may have taken place. 
Article 2.4.2 provides three methods that should be used in calculating dumping margin; the basic 
method is the weighted average-to-weighted average that is a ‘comparison of a weighted average 
                                                            
161Panel Report EC — Tube or Pipe Fitting para 7.199. 
162Panel Report EC — Tube or Pipe Fitting para 7.199. 
163An example of such a situation include that of credit and warranty expenses. 
164Panel Report EC — Tube or Pipe Fitting para 7.199. 
165Panel Report Egypt — Steel Rebar para 7.333.  
166Czako J, Human J & Miranda J (2003) 13. 
167Van den Bossche P & Zdouc W (2013) 690. 
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normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions’.168 In US — 
Stainless Steel the panel held that the ‘reference in the singular to “a weighted average normal 
value” simply means that there must be a single weighted average normal value and export price 
in respect of comparable transactions’.169 The text does not infer that one is meant to ‘compare a 
single weighted average normal value to a single weighted average export price in cases where 
some of the export transactions are not comparable to the transactions that represent the basis for 
the normal value’.170 
The second method is the ‘transaction-to-transaction method’.171 This involves ‘a comparison of 
normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis’.172 The third method is the 
‘weighted average-to-transaction’ method, which involves a comparison of the weighted average 
of the normal value to the export prices of individual transactions.173 In US — Washing Machines 
the panel held that the ‘phrase “individual export transactions” refers to the transactions that fall 
within the relevant pricing pattern, a more limited universe than the export transactions covered 
when applying the symmetrical comparison methodologies foreseen in the first sentence of Article 
2.4.2’.174 As a result, even if the next sentence of the methodology states that it is used where 
patterns differ significantly if one chooses this method, the transaction must fall within a relevant 
pricing pattern.175 
The ADA provides that the third method should only  be used if reasons why differences of ‘pattern 
of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods’ 
cannot be accounted for by the first two methods.176 The panel in US — Washing Machines held 
that ‘in order to fulfil the object and purpose of the second sentence of Article 2.4.2, the weighted 
average-to-transaction comparison methodology allows the investigating authority to zoom in on 
the evidence of dumping in respect of pattern transactions’.177 The zooming allows them to ensure 
                                                            
168See generally Article 2.4.2 of ADA. 
169United States – Anti-Dumping Measures On Stainless Steel Plate In Coils And Stainless Steel Sheet And Strip 
From Korea WT/DS179/R para 6.112 (hereafter Panel Report US — Stainless Steel). 
170Panel Report US — Stainless Steel para 6.112. 
171See generally Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
172See generally Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
173See generally Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
174United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea 
WT/DS464/R para 7.188 (hereafter Panel Report US — Washing Machines). 
175Panel Report US — Washing Machines para 7.188. 
176See generally Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
177Panel Report US — Washing Machines para 7.188. 
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that evidence is ‘fully reflected in the margin of dumping, rather than being masked through the 
use of one of the symmetrical comparison methodologies provided for in the first sentence.’178 
Thus, in order to determine dumping margin using the weighted average-to transaction method, 
the investigating authority must have compared different pattern transactions in order to conclude 
that they differ significantly.179 
When determining dumping because of the weighted average-to-transaction method, problems 
used to arise because the provision did not take into account all issues involved when calculating 
dumping margin.180 The method of zeroing is one of the methods, which has been utilised in the 
context of the weighted average-to-transaction method, but it has been under scrutiny and has been 
branded unfair.181 The USA Department of Commerce (DOC) in its determination of dumping 
margins used this method.182  
The DOC would assign a zero value to a transaction where when normal value is less than the 
price charged in the USA; rather than subtracting the difference from the final dumping margin.183 
This practice was condemned for artificially inflating ‘dumping margins, increasing both the 
likelihood that the DOC will find injury and the value of punitive duties that can be assessed on 
dumped products’.184 In US — Washing Machines, the panel did not agree with the argument 
submitted by USA supporting zeroing.185 The panel held that there was ‘no basis to conclude that 
one (pattern) transaction priced significantly lower than non-pattern transactions might mask 
evidence of dumping in respect of another (pattern) transaction priced significantly lower than 
non-pattern transactions’.186  
                                                            
178Panel Report US — Washing Machines 7.188. 
179See generally Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
180Kim BY ‘Understanding “Zeroing” in Anti-Dumping Procedures and Korea’s Negotiation Strategy’ (2004) Korea 
Review of International Studies 89 (hereafter Kim BY (2004). 
181United States – Anti-Dumping And Countervailing Measures On Large Residential Washers From Korea 
WT/DS464/AB/R para 6.10 (hereafter Appellate Body US — Washing Machines). 
182European Union ‘What is Zeroing’ 6 February (2016) 4 available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/february/tradoc_149065.pdf (accessed 10 November 2017). 
183Markheim D ‘Time to End "Zeroing" in Trade Dumping Calculations’ (2008) available at 
http://www.heritage.org/trade/report/time-end-zeroing-trade-dumping-calculations (accessed 10November 2017) 
(hereafter Markheim D (2008). 
184Markheim D (2008). 
185‘The United States argued that zeroing is needed to ensure that pattern transactions whose export price is above 
normal value do not mask the evidence of dumping in respect of pattern transactions whose export price is below 
normal value’ Panel Report US — Washing Machine para 151. 
186Panel Report US — Washing Machines para 7.191. 
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The Appellate Body further stated that zeroing has the effect of not only ‘inflating the magnitude 
of dumping, thus resulting in higher margins of dumping, but it also makes a positive determination 
of dumping more likely in circumstances where the export prices above normal value exceed those 
that are below normal value’.187 Moreover, by zeroing  
‘“individual export transactions” an investigating authority fails to compare all comparable export 
transactions that form the applicable “universe of export transactions” as required under the second 
sentence of Article 2.4.2, thus failing to make a “fair comparison” as required by Article 2.4’.188  
The author strongly brands this method as protectionist, which the WTO should never allow as it 
defeats the purpose of using anti-dumping duties as a response to unfair trade. 
The ADA provides for transhipments that mean that although the same methodologies are applied, 
the normal value is determined in the country of origin, rather than in the country of export. It 
states that if ‘products are not imported directly from the country of origin but are exported to the 
importing member from an intermediate country, the price at which the products are sold from the 
country of export to the importing member shall normally be compared with the comparable price 
in the country of export’.189  However, country of origin price may be used for comparison, ‘if, the 
products are merely transhipped through the country of export, or such products are not produced 
in the country of export, or there is no comparable price for them in the country of export’.190  
As discussed under the definition of dumping, dumping under WTO is not only a situation of price 
discrimination,191 thus, determination of dumping is just but an initial step. In addition, to the 
determination of dumping there is needed to show that the domestic industry is ‘materially 
injured’, or there is threat of material injury, or material retardation.192  
2.4.2 Determination of Injury  
A determination of injury is amongst the elements that are needed in order to impose anti-dumping 
measures.193 In order to determine injury, it is imperative to establish that a domestic industry exits 
                                                            
187Appellate Body US — Washing Machines para 6.10. 
188Appellate Body US — Washing Machines para 6.10. 
189Article 2.5 of the ADA. 
190See generally Article 2.5 of the ADA. 
191See generally 2.3 Definition of Dumping. 
192United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Dispute Settlement in International Trade: 
Anti-Dumping Measures (2003) 21. 
193See generally 2.3 Definition of Dumping. 
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or there is a retardation of the establishment of an industry. Therefore, the next section will discuss 
what a ‘like product’ is and what domestic industry entails as both are important elements in anti-
dumping investigations. The section will then discuss injury. 
2.4.2.1 ‘Like product in the importing country’ 
The ADA provides that a determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT should be 
based on ‘positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the 
dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like 
product.’194 As such in order to determine the companies that make up a domestic industry, it is 
important that a ‘like product’ be determined, as this plays an important role in governing the scope 
of the anti-dumping investigation, determination of injury and establishing causation.195 In US – 
Softwood Lumber, the panel held that a ‘like product’ for purposes of injury determination and the 
determination of domestic industry support for application ‘is a product being produced by the 
domestic industry allegedly being injured by the dumped product’.196 
Moreover, when an investigating authority determines what a like product as defined in Article 
2.6 of the ADA, the product should remain consistent.197 In EC – Tube or Pipe Fitting the panel 
held that Article 2.6 establishes the like product for the purposes of the entire investigation, this 
requires an investigating authority to keep the ‘like product’ consistent when determining both 
dumping and injury.198 In addition, the panel in US – Softwood Lumber emphasised that in both 
instances it is clear that the starting point can only be the product allegedly being dumped.199 As 
such, the product to be compared to it for purposes of the determination of dumping, and the 
‘product the producers of which are allegedly being injured by the dumped product, is the “like 
product” for purposes of the dumping and injury determinations, respectively’.200 The decision 
                                                            
194Article 3.1 of the ADA. 
195WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2018). 
196Panel Report US – Softwood Lumber para 7.142. 
197Panel Report EC — Tube or Pipe Fitting para 7.247. 
198Panel Report EC — Tube or Pipe Fitting para 7.247. 
199Panel Report US – Softwood Lumber para 7.152. 
200Panel Report US – Softwood Lumber para 7.152. 
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regarding what constitutes a ‘like product’ is important because it is the basis for determining 
which of the companies constitute the domestic industry.201 
2.4.2.2 The ‘domestic industry’ 
The term ‘domestic industry’ is defined in the ADA as ‘the domestic producers as a whole of the 
like products or those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major 
proportion of the total domestic production of those products’.202 In EC – Fasteners (China), the 
panel held that ‘the plain language in Article 4.1 makes it clear that domestic producers of the “like 
product” are the starting point for the definition of the domestic industry’.203 As such, the first 
reference of what constitutes a domestic industry is the producers of the ‘like products’. In EC – 
Salmon (Norway), the panel held that nothing in the text of Article 4.1 is indicative of the notion 
that there is any other circumstance in which interpretation of the domestic, from the outset, 
excludes certain categories of producers of the ‘like product’, other than those set out in that 
provision.204 
 The first instance where producers are excluded from the outset definition of domestic industry is 
based on the fact that producers are related to the ‘exporters or importers under investigation, or if 
they import the allegedly dumped product’.205 Relationship to exporters or importers only applies 
if  
‘(a) there is control between the two either directly or indirectly, (b) control is by third 
party between both parties and such control is either directly or indirectly or (c) if both 
parties control a third person, and there are grounds which support that the relationship 
may affect the producers behaviour from producers who are not’.206  
Thus, such exclusion is based on the notion that injury analysis may be distorted because producers 
may be benefiting from the dumping, but despite the exception, exclusion is not mandatory it 
                                                            
201WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2018).  
202Article 4.1 of the ADA. 
203European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China 
WT/DS397/R para 7.218 (hereafter Panel Report EC – Fasteners (China). 
204European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway WT/DS337/R para 7.112 
(hereafter Panel Report EC – Salmon (Norway). 
205Article 4.1(i) of the ADA. 
206See generally Footnote 11 of the ADA. 
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remains the decision of the importing country authorities to interpret the term domestic industry 
to mean rest of the producers.207 
The second situation that is provided for in the ADA is where consideration of injury is based on 
producers comprising a ‘regional industry’.208 The ADA does not itself use the term ‘regional 
industry’ however; the term is derived from the text. The ADA provides that where circumstances 
are unique concerning production at issue, territory of a member can be split into competitive 
markets that are two or more and the producers in these markets may be regarded as a separate 
industry.209 These producers can be regarded as a separate industry if they sell all or most of their 
product at issue within the boundaries of such market and the demand of the market where they 
produce is not significantly met by producers located somewhere other than the said territory of 
product at issue.210 In such a case, injury may exist, even if a huge proportion of the completely 
domestic industry, thus inclusive of producers falling outside the region, is not injured.211  
However, existence of injury to the regional industry is only permissible if two requirements 
met.212 Firstly, dumped imports should be concentrated into the market served by isolated industry, 
and secondly dumped imports should be causing injury to production in its either entirety or almost 
entirety of produces produced by producers falling in the boundaries of such a market.213  
The ADA provides that if a domestic industry has been given the meaning stipulated in Article 
4.1(ii), anti-dumping duties should be limited only on the products in question consigned for final 
consumption to that area only if constitution permits.214  Consequently, it is submitted that the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties cannot be extended to markets which have not been isolated 
and where products are not under investigation.  
                                                            
207United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Dispute Settlement in International Trade: 
Anti-Dumping Measures (2003) 23. 
208WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
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209See generally Article 4.1(ii) of the ADA. 
210Article 4.1(ii) of the ADA. 
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When the constitution of the importing country does not permit the imposition of anti-dumping 
duties on such grounds, these duties may be imposed by importing country without restrictions 
that apply to isolation of industry.215 Levying without restrictions may only take place if: 
‘(a) the exporters have been given an opportunity to cease exporting at dumped prices to the area 
concerned or otherwise give assurances pursuant to Article 8 and adequate assurances in this regard 
have not been promptly given, and (b) such duties cannot be levied only on products of specific 
producers which supply the area in question.216  
Therefore, if exporters are not given an opportunity, imposition cannot be extended to other 
markets. The definition of ‘domestic industry’ is important because it is intertwined with the 
concept of injury; a dumped product may injure a domestic industry.   
2.4.2.3 Injury 
As discussed before, WTO requires that all three elements be present in order for anti-dumping 
measures to be enacted and a determination of injury is amongst these elements.217 In terms of the 
ADA, ‘injury’ means three things and they are all injury to a domestic industry. Injury means 
material injury or threat of material injury, or material retardation.218 The ADA does not provide 
a definition of what material injury, threat to material injury or material retardation is. Article 3 
provides guidelines on how to establish material injury or threat of material injury; it has no 
concrete definition of what each type of injury means.219 The next section will discuss the three 
types of injury namely material injury, threat of material injury and determination of material 
retardation and how their existence can be established.  
2.4.2.3.1 Material injury 
Material injury refers to a substantial whole impairment in the situation of a domestic industry.220 
However, the ADA does not define the ‘material’ concept but provides guidelines on what to look 
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at in the determination of material injury.221 In determining what constitutes material injury, the 
result should be based on positive evidence done through an objective examination of the volume 
of dumped products, how they affect domestic prices in the market of importing country and their 
subsequent effect on the domestic industry.222  
In Thailand — H-Beams, the Appellate Body held that the requirement in Article 3.1 that an injury 
determination be based on ‘positive’ evidence and involve an ‘objective’ examination does not 
infer that such determination be based only on rationale or facts that were divulged to, or 
discernible by, the parties involved in the investigation of anti-dumping.223 Rather, it permits an 
investigating authority making an injury determination to base its determination on all relevant 
reasoning and facts before it.224 Therefore, even confidential relevant information can be used to 
determine material injury.225 
Article 3 contains some specific additional factors to be considered in evaluating injury, but is 
silent on how to assess these factors or weigh them and worse, how the determination of causal 
link is to be made.226 The additional factors firstly relate to the volume of the dumped imports, 
investigating authorities are required to look at whether there has been a substantial increase in 
dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing 
country.227  
Secondly, the factors are concerned with how dumped products have affected prices. This requires 
investigating authorities to have a look at whether there has been significant price undercutting 
because of dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product in the importing 
country.228 It also requires it to look at whether the effects of such imports is otherwise to 
significantly reduce prices or prevent increases of price which would have occurred if not for 
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226WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2018). 
227See generally Article 3.2 of the ADA. 
228 See generally Article 3.2 of the ADA. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
44 
 
imports.229 The ADA requires that all of these factors be considered collectively as using one or a 
few of them will not lead to decisive guidance.230 
Besides the factors listed in Article 3.2, the ADA also requires an assessment on the impact of the 
dumped imports on the domestic industry.231 This examination should include an assessment of all 
economic factors, which are relevant inclusive of indices affecting the domestic industry.232 These 
factors are, 
‘actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on 
investments, or utilisation of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the 
margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, 
wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investment’.233  
Most importantly, just like Article 3.2, Article 3.4 requires that all of these factors be considered 
collectively as using one or a few of them will not lead to decisive guidance.234  Moreover, the 
case of EC-Bed Linen held that evaluation of all factors is obligatory.235 Article 3.2 does not 
provide any methodology to use when assessing these factors. Most importantly, investigating 
authorities have to develop analytical methods that can be used in considering these factors.236  
In the paragraphs above it was pointed out that, there is no definition of what ‘material injury’ is 
in the ADA. Despite this position, there have been numerous definitions of what it is, but the most 
comprehensive one was tabled during negotiation rules in 2005. The delegations proposed that 
‘material injury’ should refer to ‘the state of the domestic industry as demonstrated by an important 
and measurable deterioration in the operating performance of the domestic industry, based on an 
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overall assessment of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the 
domestic industry including those enumerated in Article 3.4’.237   
Bolton, however, seems to suggest that the absence of a definition does not necessarily mean that 
the definition cannot be implied. He mentions that the determination of normal value and export 
price are the most difficult because after you have determined the two, material injury is inferred 
because negative pointers in a domestic industry such as price reduction in the market, domestic 
producer’s sales reduction and lower market share can point to injury.238 
On the contrary, Bolton also argues that the failure of Article VI of GATT or the ADA to provide 
a definition of what material injury entail restricts the effectiveness of the provision as a shield.239 
This is because the ADA gives too much flexibility to an investigating authority to ‘determine how 
to interpret evidence and there is no obligation to the importing country to disclose all of the factors 
it considered in reaching its conclusion’.240 
2.4.2.3.2 Threat of material injury 
In some cases, there will not be material injury present but there will be a threat of material injury 
that may materialise if anti-dumping duties are not imposed, in such a case, the ADA requires the 
authorities to make a determination of threat of material injury.241 Article 3.7 provides that such 
determination must be founded on facts rather than mere ‘allegation, conjecture or remote 
possibility’.242  
In Mexico – Corn Syrup: Art 21.5 – US the Appellate Body held that establishment of facts by 
investigating authorities should include positive findings of actual events occurring in the period 
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of investigation and assumptions linked to such events.243 The investigating authorities should 
necessarily make assumptions relating to the ‘occurrence of future events because future events 
can never be definitively proven by facts’.244 
The determination of threat should also stem from the point that the threat is imminent.245 As such, 
investigating authorities are required to consider factors in Article 3.7 when determining presence 
of a threat of material injury.246  
These factors include: 
(i) ‘a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the domestic market indicating the 
likelihood of substantially increased importation;  
(ii) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the exporter 
indicating the likelihood of substantially increased dumped exports to the importing Member’s 
market, taking into account the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional 
exports;  
(iii) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or  suppressing 
effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports;  and  
(iv) inventories of the product being investigated’.247 
These factors should not be looked at in isolation, neither should a combination of more than two 
be made.248 They need to be assessed in totality because departing from totality will not give 
decisive guidance on the fact that material injury will occur if protective action is not put in 
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place.249 Besides factors in Article 3.7, in Mexico – Corn Syrup the panel held that an analysis of 
threat of material injury should also include an evaluation of factors listed in Article 3.4.250  
2.4.2.3.3 Determination of material retardation 
There have been discussions on the first two types of injury but less has been said on material 
retardation, and it may be because there are fewer cases in which countries have relied on material 
retardation when imposing anti-dumping duties.251 The ADA does not define the concept of 
material retardation, but despite the non-existence of a definition, it does state that injury also 
means material retardation of a domestic industry.252 However, Article 3 provides guidelines on 
the determination of material injury or threat of material injury but is silent on determination of 
material retardation.253 
Some countries in their national legislation have tried defining material retardation and one of the 
definitions254 provides that ‘although no material injury or threat of material injury has been caused 
to a domestic industry; the establishment of a domestic industry has been seriously retarded’.255 
Egypt, during the 2006 WTO negotiating rules, acknowledged that the concept of material 
retardation is closely connected the establishment of an industry but has suggested that it should 
not only apply to new industries but should also concern domestic industries that are facing a ‘new 
start’ after being reorganised or have never been developed on a commercial scale.256  
Narayanan discusses material retardation in length. He argues that an authority must first look at 
whether an industry is established in order to make a determination on whether dumped goods are 
materially retarding an industry.257 This is because the requirement of material retardation is only 
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applicable to unestablished industries.258 In the USA, the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC)259 has grouped unestablished industries into two distinct groups.260 These 
are either ‘“embryonic,” which are, industries that have not commenced production, or “nascent,” 
which are, industries that have commenced production but have not stabilised.261 As such, 
protection under material retardation can only be afforded to industries, which fall within either of 
the two categories. Further, an embryonic industry should also show ‘substantial commitment to 
commence production’.262 
In Morocco-Hot-Rolled Steel (Turkey), the Ministère délégué auprès du Ministre de l'Industrie, du 
Commerce, de l'Investissement et de l'Économie Numérique chargé du Commerce Extérieur 
(MDCCE) came to a conclusion that an industry was unestablished by applying a five-part test.263 
It looked at, 
‘(a) how long the domestic industry had been producing the domestic like product; (b) the 
market share of the domestic like product; (c) whether the domestic industry's production 
had been stable; (d) whether the domestic industry had reached profitability/break-even 
point; and (e) whether the domestic industry constituted a “new” industry’.264  
This five-part test should be evaluated, objectively and be based on positive evidence.265 Positive 
evidence refers to underpinning facts, justifying the determination of injury.266 It is concerned with 
the quality of the evidence that authorities may depend on when concluding such a 
determination.267 Moreover, the word ‘"positive", in particular, means that the evidence must be 
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of an affirmative, objective, and verifiable character, and it must be credible’.268 When looking at 
‘objective examination’, it generally relates to the conduct of the investigation.269 This means an 
injury investigation must  
‘conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness, and 
that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be investigated in an 
unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party’.270 
Importantly the panel holds the same position with that of the USITC. It avers that ‘material 
retardation of the establishment of the domestic industry’ does not only apply to  
‘cases where the domestic industry had not yet started producing the like product in 
question, but also to cases where the domestic industry had not yet reached a stable 
presence on the market’.271 
Despite guidelines in different national legislation, the WTO has not clarified on the guidelines 
concerning material retardation. The panel in Morocco-Hot-Rolled Steel (Turkey) confirms the position. 
It held that Article 3.1 does not prescribe a particular methodology that an investigating authority must 
follow in assessing whether a domestic industry is established.272 As such, an investigating authority enjoys 
a certain degree of discretion in choosing a methodology that guides its analysis.273 The exercise of this 
discretion must nonetheless be within the bounds of the requirements in Article 3.1.274 
When exercising such a discretion, an investigating authority may, have to rely on reasonable assumptions 
or draw inferences.275 Accordingly, these assumptions should be derived ‘from a credible basis of facts, and 
should be sufficiently explained so that their objectivity and credibility can be verified’.276 When a 
methodology is premised on unsubstantiated assumptions, it fails to meet the standard of an examination 
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based on positive evidence.277 An assumption does not qualify as properly substantiated when there is no 
explanation from an investigating authority why it would be appropriate to use it in the analysis.278 
The author opines that the issue of material retardation affects mostly developing countries, as they 
have emerging industries. This may be one of the reasons the issue of material retardation has not 
been clarified. The WTO based multilateral trading system has been accused of building ‘a legacy 
of treating developing countries like second class members of a rich men’s exclusive club’.279 As 
such it may not be unusual for it to fail to address, in many ways, difficulties faced by developing 
countries.280 Whilst Members have a discretion to determine the guidelines concerning material 
retardation, the examination of evidence should comply with Article 3.1 of the ADA.281 However, 
for maintenance of WTO standards it is important for WTO to develop guidelines on material 
retardation.  
2.4.3 Causation 
After injury is determined it is crucial to establish if there is a  causal link between  injury and the 
purported dumping because anti-dumping measures may only be imposed if dumping is the cause 
of injury in the domestic industry. 
Causation is an important element in anti-dumping investigations, and if it cannot be proven, anti-
dumping measures cannot be imposed. Article 3.5 of the ADA provides that there must be a 
demonstration indicating the fact that the injury is caused by the dumped imports when assessing 
factors in Articles 3.2 and 3.4.282 This causal link should be based on all relevant evidence as 
examined by investigating authorities.283 An investigating authority must also have a look at any 
known factors besides dumped imports that may be concurrently injuring the domestic industry, 
of which injuries resulting from such factors should not be attributed to dumped imports.284  
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Article 3.5 provides some of the factors285 that are of relevance to establishing a causal link and 
securing non-attribution.286 On non-attribution, the Appellate Body in US-Hot-Rolled Steel held 
that in ensuring non-attribution investigating authorities are obliged to assess injurious effects of 
other known factors.287 Thus, they must examine the injurious effect of other factors even if the 
factors are not the cause between dumped imports and injury. 
In EC — Tube or Pipe Fittings the Appellate Body goes further and states that for the non-
attributed ‘obligation to be triggered, Article 3.5 requires that the factor at issue: (a) be “known” 
to the investigating authority; (b) be a factor “other than dumped imports”; and (c) be injuring the 
domestic industry at the same time as the dumped imports’.288 Thus, there are three conditions 
attached to the provision and all three should be fulfilled. The Appellate Body also mentioned that 
the ADA does not explicitly state how an investigating authority can become aware of such known 
factors, or how interested parties, for them to be eligible, must raise such factors.289  
Furthermore, the ADA does not ‘expressly state to what degree a factor must be unrelated to the 
dumped imports, or whether it must be extrinsic to the exporter and the dumped product, in order 
to constitute a factor “other than the dumped imports”’.290 Despite the ADA not expressly stating 
these, ‘a factor is either “known” to the investigating authority, or it is not “known”; it cannot be 
“known” in one stage of the investigation and unknown in a subsequent stage’.291 This means that, 
once a factor is known in one stage of the investigation it remains known and relevant in the 
subsequent stage.292 
It is important to note that the factors provided in Article 3.5 are a mere illustration and are not 
mandatory like those provided in Article 3.4.293 In Thailand — H-Beams the panel held that the ‘text 
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of Article 3.5 indicates that the list of other possible causal factors enumerated in that provision is 
illustrative’.294  One can then observe that although listed factors in Article 3.5 ‘might be relevant 
in many cases, and the list contains useful guidance as to the kinds of factors other than imports 
that might cause injury to the domestic industry, the specific list in Article 3.5 is not itself 
mandatory’.295  
Thus dumping in terms of the WTO is where products of one country are introduced into the 
importing at a price less than the ‘normal value of the products, and causes or threatens material 
injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the 
establishment of a domestic industry’.296 Anti-dumping measures may only be imposed if all the 
elements are fulfilled, that is dumping, injury and causation. The next section discusses the 
procedures that should be followed in anti-dumping investigations. 
2.5 PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LEGISLATING ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 
Anti-dumping investigations are mainly conducted to allow the imposition of anti-dumping 
measures. The ADA regulates the minimum procedural requirements that members should comply 
with when enacting anti-dumping measures. For instance, if Zimbabwe were to impose an anti-
dumping duty on a country that is dumping products in its domestic industry, it must have complied 
with the procedure in the ADA. WTO does not necessarily therefore prevent members to create 
more procedural requirements to supplement those in the ADA. However, additional requirements 
must be consistent with WTO rules of non-discrimination. The next section discusses these 
procedural requirements, as they must be complied with in an anti-dumping investigation. 
2.5.1 Initiation 
The requirements for initiation of investigations are embedded in Article 5 of the ADA. According 
to this provision, investigations for determining the extent and effect of dumping allegations must 
be initiated by way of a written application.297 This application must be lodged by the domestic 
industry alleging dumping or it can be made on its behalf.298 The application should be supported 
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by evidence of dumping.299 In addition, the application must also show proof of either ‘material 
injury’ or ‘threat of material injury’ or ‘material retardation’ and should show a causal linkage 
between dumped imports and injury.300  Furthermore, the application should also contain other 
information regarding the ‘product, industry, importers, exporters, and other matters, in written 
applications for anti-dumping relief’.301 Thus, applications based on simple assertion and not 
evidential support cannot meet initiation requirements, as stipulated by Article 5.2 of the ADA.302 
Furthermore, Members have a duty to examine the accuracy and adequacies of evidence presented 
before them, and then decide whether such evidence warrants an investigation to commence.303 In 
Mexico — Steel Pipes and Tubes, Guatemala accused Mexican authorities (Economía) for acting 
on information without scrutinising whether or not the evidence submitted for investigations was 
sufficient, accurate and relevant  information as prescribed by Article 5.3 of the ADA.304 The panel 
emphasised that in anti-dumping disputes, matters should be decided on case-by-case basis.305 
Although Mexico had acted inconsistently with Article 5.3 of the ADA, the provision did not 
impose substantive obligations on investigating authorities where assessment of sufficiency of 
evidence is concerned.306 Therefore, after evaluating, that the evidence submitted is correct and 
accurate authorities may proceed in initiating an application.307 It is submitted, that the problem in 
using information that is not accurate is that the basis for initiation of investigation will be 
incorrect. As such, there is no justification for initiation of an investigation in accordance with 
Article 5.3 of the ADA. 
Before an anti-dumping investigation is initiated, the importing country’s authorities should 
inform the exporting country of their intention to lodge an initiation, but can only notify them after 
receiving a properly documented application.308 Moreover, before a decision to initiate an 
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investigation is taken, the importing country should avoid making public the application for the 
initiation of the investigation.309 As a way of lowering the disruptiveness of anti-dumping 
investigations, Article 5.10 places a time limit on the investigations.310 After initiation, 
investigations should be finalised within one year.311 However, in exceptional circumstances time 
can be extended to a maximum of 18 months.312 During anti-dumping investigations, custom 
clearance procedures should not be hindered.313 Thus, anti-dumping investigations should not 
cause problems where normal day-to-day custom clearance is concerned.  
The ADA regulates grounds for terminating an anti-dumping investigation where there is 
insufficient evidence of either dumping or injury to support proceeding with an investigation.314 
Investigations should be terminated if it comes to the attention of concerned authorities that the 
volume of imports are insignificant or ‘the margin of dumping is de minimis, or that the volume of 
dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible’.315 If dumping margin is less  than 
2 per cent of export price it is considered de minimis  whilst the volume of dumped imports is 
considered negligible if it accounts for less than 3 per cent ‘like product’ of the importing 
country.316 
2.5.2 Conduct 
Once an application for initiation of investigations complies with Article 5 of the ADA, the ADA 
then prescribes the rules on how the investigation should be conducted.317 These include evidence 
collection and use of sampling techniques.318 Article 6.1 requires that interested parties should be 
informed of the information required by authorities for investigation in question, of which they 
must be given sufficient opportunity to produce in writing all relevant evidence.319 In Mexico — 
                                                            
309See generally Article 5.5 of the ADA. 
310WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2017). 
311See generally Article 5.10 of the ADA. 
312See generally Article 5.10 of the ADA. 
313See generally Article 5.9 of the ADA. 
314Article 5.8 of the ADA. 
315See generally Article 5.8 of the ADA. 
316See generally Article 5.8 of the ADA. 
317Article 6 of the ADA. 
318WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2017). 
319Article 6.11 of ADA   “interested parties” include: 
(i ‘an exporter or foreign producer or the importer of a product subject to investigation, or a trade or business 
association a majority of the members of which are producers, exporters or importers of such product; 
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Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, the panel held that Article 6.1 requires an active participation of 
the investigating authority in the identification of interested parties in order to fulfil the obligation 
that all interested parties be given notice of the information they need to produce.320 Thus, the 
investigating authority needs to actively take part in the process because if it were passive they 
would be acting inconsistently with Article 6.1. 
Exporting producers given questionnaires in anti-dumping investigations are required to respond 
within 30 days and if there is need for an extension, valid reasons should be submitted.321 
Investigating authorities are then required to protect all confidential information acquiesced for 
purposes of investigations but are also required to produce the information on time to other 
interested parties taking part in the investigation.322 
Additionally, during an anti-dumping investigation authorities may be requested to create 
platforms for interested parties to meet, present and argue their views.323 Investigating authorities 
are obligated to create such platform because all interested parties have rights to defend their 
interests.324 It should be noted that setting up of such opportunities require investigating authorities 
to be conscious of their obligation to preserve confidentiality and convenience to the 
parties.325 Moreover, attendance by a party is not an obligation and failure should not amount to 
prejudice on the interested party’s case.326 When providing justifications, interested parties are also 
allowed to present other information orally.327 Hence, Article 6.2 focuses on the power of 
investigating authorities to set up opportunities where parties involved in the investigation can air 
their views and at the same time defend their positions. 
                                                            
(ii) the government of the exporting Member;  and 
(iii a producer of the like product in the importing Member or a trade and business  association a majority of the 
members of which produce the like product in the territory of the importing Member. 
However list does not prevent members from allowing domestic or foreign parties other than those mentioned in the 
list to be included as interested parties.’ 
320Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice WT/DS295/R para 7.192. 
321See generally Article 6.1.1 of the ADA. 
322See generally Article 6.1.2 of the ADA. 
323See generally Article 6.2 of the ADA. 
324See generally Article 6.2 of the ADA. 
325See generally Article 6.2 of the ADA. 
326See generally Article 6.2 of the ADA. 
327See generally Article 6.2 of the ADA. 
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Anti-dumping investigations should be transparent.328 Concerned parties must therefore have time 
to view all non-confidential information that will be used by the investigating authorities in an 
anti-dumping investigation.329 Furthermore, parties must be given time ‘to prepare presentations 
on the basis of this information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases’.330 Therefore, if 
information is not falling in the bracket of confidentiality in Article 6.5, investigating authorities 
should make such information accessible to interested parties when it is practical to do so.  
Where confidential information is concerned, interested parties are required to furnish non-
confidential summaries of such confidential information to authorities.331 The details of the 
summaries should be sufficient to permit a reasonable understanding of the material submitted in 
confidence.332  Where such information is not susceptible of summary due to exceptional 
circumstances, reasons of why summarisation is impossible must be provided.333 
During the course of an investigation, the ADA requires investigating ‘authorities to satisfy 
themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties upon which their 
findings are based’.334 However, where any interested party refuses authorities access to necessary 
information, or otherwise does not provide, such information ‘within a reasonable period or 
significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or 
negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available’.335 
Before making a final determination there is need for investigating authorities to ‘inform all 
interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision 
whether to apply definitive measures’.336 Parties need to be given an opportunity to defend their 
interest; as such, the disclosure should be made in sufficient time.337 
                                                            
328Van den Bossche P & Zdouc W (2013) 717. 
329See generally Article 6.4 of the ADA. 
330See generally Article 6.4 of the ADA. 
331Article 6.5.1 of the ADA. 
332Article 6.5.1 of the ADA. 
333Article 6.5.1 of the ADA. 
334Article 6.6 of the ADA. 
335Article 6.8 of the ADA. 
336Article 6.9 of the ADA. 
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2.5.3 Imposition of provisional measures 
The imposition of provisional anti-dumping measures by a Member may be done after 
investigating authorities have examined data as prescribed by the ADA. Article 7 of the ADA 
regulates when provisional measures may be applied, and the form of the provisional measures. 
They may only be applied if an investigation is initiated in terms of Article 5 and if investigating 
authorities after an initial positive determination of dumping and injury are of the view that anti-
dumping measures are a necessary tool in preventing injury in the domestic industry taking place 
during the investigation.338 The imposition of provisional anti-dumping measures to prevent injury 
directly supports Raju’s theory that anti-dumping measures are necessary to remedy unfair trade 
practices.339  
As provisional anti-dumping measures, a Member may impose a ‘provisional duty or, preferably, 
a security - by cash deposit or bond - equal to the amount of the anti-dumping duty provisionally 
estimated’ but the amount may not be larger than the interim dumping margin.340  Whether the 
provisional measure takes form of a security or provisional duty, it can only be imposed after 60 
days from the date the investigation was initiated.341 Normally, the application of interim measures 
should not be longer than four months.342 However, it can be six months when authorities agree to 
a request to extend which is made by exporters indicating a great percentage of trade involved.343 
In addition, if a duty is deemed lower than the dumping margin and sufficient to remove injury, 
these periods may be six months with normal situation and nine months where exporters request 
is concerned.344 
2.5.4 Price Undertakings 
After an initial determination of dumping and injury in the domestic industry, the investigation 
does not necessarily need to take the route of imposing provisional measures or enacting anti-
dumping duties. A price undertaking is an alternative remedy and can only be sought after a 
preliminary positive determination of dumping, injury and causality.345 Article 8.1 provides that 
                                                            
338See generally Article 7.1 (i) - (iii) of the ADA. 
339Raju KD (2008) 7. 
340See generally Article 7.2 of the ADA. 
341See generally Article 7.3 of the ADA. 
342See generally Article 7.4 of the ADA. 
343See generally Article 7.4 of the ADA. 
344See generally Article 7.4 of the ADA. 
345See generally Article 8.2 of the ADA. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
58 
 
anti-dumping investigations may be deferred or terminated without provisional measures or anti-
dumping duties being enacted.346 This may happen when investigating authorities on receiving 
satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any exporter willing to stop exporting at dumped prices, 
are satisfied that the undertaking has the effect of eliminating injury.347   
However, investigating authorities need not accept voluntary offers to revise prices or to stop 
exporting at dumped prices if their acceptance is considered impractical.348 If however the 
undertaking is accepted, investigation can still be completed if one or of both exporters and 
authorities wishes the investigation to be completed.349 Besides a voluntary offer from exporters, 
price undertakings may be taken when initiated by importing country’s authorities if exporters are 
not forced to accept such offer.350  If exporters do not accept the undertaking, the refusal should 
not prejudice their case but authorities can make a determination that a threat of injury may develop 
to material injury if dumping continues.351 
It is important to note that price increases relating to undertakings should be limited to those that 
are necessary to eliminate the margin of dumping, and where increases are sufficient to eliminate 
injury in the domestic industry price increases it is desirable that it be less than the dumping margin.352 
If there is no price, undertaking members may sometimes proceed to enact anti-dumping duties. 
2.5.5 Imposition, Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties and Retroactivity 
Article 9 of the ADA contains rules on enactment and collection of anti-dumping duties. The 
decision on whether or not to impose anti-dumping duties fall exclusively in the ambit of importing 
countries’ investigating authorities.353 In EC-Bed Linen, the Appellate Body held that the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties pursuant to Article 9 flows from the determination of dumping, 
injury and causality as provided in Article 2, 3 and 3.5, respectively.354 However, even if all 
                                                            
346See generally Article 8.1 of the ADA. 
347See generally Article 8.1 of the ADA. 
348See generally Article 8.3 of the ADA. 
349See generally Article 8.4 of the ADA. 
350See generally Article 8.5 of the ADA. 
351See generally Article 8.5 of the ADA. 
352See generally Article 8.1 of the ADA. 
353See generally Article 9.1 of the ADA. 
354Appellate Body Report EC-Bed Linen para 123. 
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requirements for the imposition of anti-dumping duties have been fulfilled, the authorities may 
elect not to impose anti-dumping duties.355  
It is therefore clear that WTO does not force members to enact anti-dumping duties; as such, the 
theory that anti-dumping duties counter unfair trade practices356 cannot be sustained because if 
they are not imposed, they will not necessarily counter unfair trade because effects of dumping 
may still be felt. With that in mind, it can be strongly argued that anti-dumping duties can be used 
as a strategic weapon serving political interests.357 To illustrate this, if South Africa for example 
dumps its products in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwean authorities may elect not to impose anti-dumping 
duties because South Africa and Zimbabwe have good international relations. On the other hand, 
if goods from USA are dumped in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe may impose anti-dumping duties because 
it may have a strained relationship with USA. Assuming that the effect of dumping by either 
countries is similar, anti-dumping duties will not be used to counter unfair trade, but as a strategic 
weapon or out of spite against USA. 
If, however, the importing country’s authorities elect to impose anti-dumping duties, they have to 
do so in accordance with the ADA. The amount of the anti-dumping duty may not exceed the 
dumping margin or can actually be less than the dumping margin, if such lesser duty is sufficient 
in eliminating injury in the domestic industry.358 
Generally, both provisional anti-dumping measures and final anti-dumping duties may only be 
applied to products that enter for consumption after the imposition of provisional measures and 
enactment of anti-dumping duties has been concluded.359 However, the ADA realises that during 
investigation injury could have taken place, or ‘exporters may have taken actions to avoid the 
imposition of an anti-dumping duty’.360 Anti-dumping duties may then be imposed retroactively 
in accordance with Article 10 of the ADA to remedy the effect that of dumping that could have 
taken place during the investigation. 
                                                            
355See generally Article 9.1 of the ADA.  
356Raju KD (2008) 7. 
357See Raju KD (2008) 7; Lindsey B &Ikenson D (2003) 18. 
358See generally Article 9.1 of the ADA. 
359WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2015) also see Article 10.1of ADA. 
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2.5.6 Duration and Review of Anti- Dumping Duties 
Article 11 provides the rules for duration, termination and review of both anti-dumping duties and 
price undertakings. Where anti-dumping duties have been imposed, they remain in force up to the 
time that they would have countered the dumping that caused the injury.361 ADA contains four 
reviews that can be utilised, namely: expiry, interim, new shipper, and judicial.362   
Article 11 regulates expiry review (sunset review) and interim reviews. Where expiry review is 
concerned, expiry of definitive anti-dumping duties is usually after five years from the date they 
came in force.363 However, the duty may remain in force pending an outcome of a review which 
authorities on their own initiated or  
‘upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a 
reasonable period of time preceding the expiry that the expiry of a duty is likely going to lead to 
continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury’.364  
Whilst expiry review is after five years, interim reviews derive from the fact that during the five-
year period, authorities of the importing country on their own accord can review definitive anti-
dumping duties, or they can review upon request by any interested party who submits affirmative 
data supporting the need for review.365 The request should however have been made after a 
reasonable period has passed since the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty.366  
Interested parties are allowed to request for examination whether the continued imposition of the 
duty is necessary to offset dumping, or whether the injury is likely to continue or recur if the duty 
is removed or varied, or both as such the measures may stay in imposed awaiting outcome of 
review.367 In Us — Drams, the panel held that  
                                                            
361See generally Article 11.1 of the ADA. 
362Murigi (2013) 28. 
363Article 11.3 of the ADA. 
364United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Training Module on the WTO Agreement on Anti-
Dumping (2004) 36. Also, see generally Article 11.3 of the ADA. 
365See generally Article 11.2 of the ADA. 
366See generally Article 11.2 of the ADA. 
367UNCTAD Training Module On The WTO Agreement On Anti-Dumping (2004) 36 also see generally Article 11.2 
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‘the mere fact of three years and six months findings of no dumping does not require the 
investigating authority to, in addition, self-initiate a review of “whether the injury would be likely 
to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied”’.368 
This means that a request to review by interested parties does not automatically terminate the anti-
dumping duty; the importing country’s authority has discretion whether or not to remove duty 
before outcome. 
Article 13 of the ADA regulates judicial review. This type of review is reserved for WTO Members 
who have adopted anti-dumping legislation. Since Zimbabwe is one such Member, the ADA 
requires ‘independent judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose of 
prompt review of administrative final and review determinations’ to be maintained where anti-
dumping legislation is adopted.369 
During the investigation period, if a producer has not exported products to the importing country, 
he may request the importing member’s authorities to calculate margin dumping that is specific to 
him, because if not he will be subject to the anti-dumping duty rate which was imposed in the 
original investigation.370  
However, the new producer should provide evidence that no relations exist between him and any 
exporters in their home countries who are under anti-dumping duties on the product.371 Unlike 
interim reviews, new shipper review warrants that anti-dumping duties will not be levied on these 
producers during review. Appraisement may however be withhold by authorities in the importing 
country or exporters may provide guarantees that if dumping is determined on the new producers, 
anti-dumping duties can apply retroactively to the new exporters.372 
2.5.7 Publication of the Notice 
Importantly, where procedural requirements for legislating anti-dumping measures is concerned, 
publication of notices is as important as imposing an anti-dumping duty. Article 12 of the ADA 
                                                            
368United States – Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (Drams) Of One 
Megabit or above from Korea WT/DS99/R para6.59. 
369See generally Article 13 of the ADA. 
370United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Trade Organisation: Anti-dumping Measures 
(2003) 43; See generally Article 9.5 of the ADA. 
371See generally Article 9.5 of the ADA. 
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provides detailed requirements on how investigating authorities should publish public notices for 
initiation of investigations, initial and final determinations, and price undertakings.373  
Article 12 contains different requirements for publication at different stages of the investigation. 
Generally, the notice must disclose information that is non-confidential relating to names of 
parties, product at issue, dumping margin, ‘facts revealed during the investigation, and the reasons 
for the determinations made by the authorities, including the reasons for accepting and rejecting 
relevant arguments or claims made by exporters or importers’.374 Lastly, requirements for 
publication increase transparency of determinations, and help to demonstrate that investigations 
are mainly based on fact and solid reasoning rather than unsubstantiated accusations.375 
2.6 CHALLENGES WITHIN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION ANTI-DUMPING 
RULES 
Although WTO anti-dumping rules as contained in the ADA shows the efforts of Members to 
draft the rules in a way that  counters unfair trade practices there are still loopholes within the 
ADA. As mentioned under Section 2.2 negotiations and proposals have been tabled by some 
WTO Members, which emphasises the need to improve the ADA.376 Many difficulties arise in 
determining dumping because in some instances the ADA gives the investigating authority too 
much leeway in determining how a particular principle applies.  
Different scholars have written many articles on problems involved in injury margin 
calculations.377 Therefore, this thesis will not engage further in that discussion as recommendations 
on the issues have already been tabled. However, it is essential to highlight some other problems 
                                                            
373WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2017). 
374WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2017); see generally Article 12 of 
the ADA. 
375Van den Bossche P & Zdouc W (2013) 717. 
376An informal group of 15 participants (Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; 
Korea; Mexico; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; and Turkey) calling themselves 
“Friends of Anti-Dumping Negotiations” (FANs) has called for the reform of the current Anti-Dumping Agreement’ 
see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/rules_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2018). 
377See generally Brink G ‘Dumping and Injury Margin Calculation Methods: Ten Major Problems in South Africa’ 
(2007) Global Trade and Customs Journal; Vermulst E & Horlick G ‘Problems with Dumping and Injury Margin 
Calculations in Ten User Countries’ (2013). See also Dascalescu FD 'Threat of Injury in Anti-dumping 
Investigations: Some Comments on the Current Practice at EU and WTO Level' (2011) 45 (4) Journal of World 
Trade 877–900; Irwin DA ‘Causing Problems? The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in U.S. 
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facing the ADA concerning the determination of injury. The ADA leaves many things unexplained 
which is problematic because it creates loopholes and a gateway for abuse. If one does an analysis 
of why some cases end up at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) where determination of injury is 
concerned, the main problem relates to interpretation of issues left unexplained by the ADA. In 
most cases, the complainants argue that the interpretation is unfair.378 
Amongst the unexplained issues is what the basic methodological approach to injury analysis is; 
mostly authorities proceed ‘without care’, relying on simple correlations and some economically 
disputed methods in establishing causality between dumping and injury.379  
Still on the issues of interpretation, the ADA does not define what material injury, threat of material 
injury and material retardation is. This is problematic because it may lead to different 
interpretations that may result in uncertainty. WTO prides itself on transparency and where 
agreements lead to uncertainty, transparency can be compromised. Moreover, as indicated under 
2.4.2.3.3 the ADA does not give guidelines in establishing material retardation and this is 
problematic because it can lead to abuse, due to the complexity of the ADA. Anti-dumping is a 
complex subject on its own and leaving issues hanging does not help investigating authorities in 
reaching decisions that are fair and equitable. 
Horlick and Vermulst have also identified a number of issues that are abounding in anti-dumping 
laws – both procedurally and substantively.380 Procedurally, they note that, in practice, parties are 
deprived of a meaningful way to defend their interests as too much information is classified as 
confidential in terms of the ADA.381 They suggest a possible remedy as being the disclosure of 
information under a protection order. In the same vein, they also contend that the sunset review 
clause, pursuant to Article 11.3 of the ADA is not adequately functional, as the expiry of the anti-
dumping duty would lead to further injury.  
                                                            
378See generally European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed-Linen from India - 
Appellate Body Report and Panel Report Pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU - Action by the Dispute Settlement 
Body WT/DS141/19 and WTO ‘Dispute by Agreement’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm (accessed 24 July 2018). 
379Sykes AO ‘Trade Remedy Laws’ (2005) John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 240 41. 
380Horlick G & Vermulst E ‘The 10 Major Problems With the Anti-Dumping Instrument: An Attempt at Synthesis’ 
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Besides issues of interpretation, the ADA also does not adequately address issues of competition 
and public interest.382 Anti-dumping law and competition law enjoy a special relationship.383 There 
are many over-laps between these two specialised areas of the law.384 Despite these links, the study 
also notes that anti-dumping law does not adequately address competition issues. This is because 
despite a common origin, these two areas diverge on legal and economic grounds.385 Practices, 
which are loathed in competition law such as quantitative trade restrictions and price undertaking, 
are permitted in anti-dumping law.386 Anti-dumping has been labelled the most restricting device 
post Uruguay round.387 As such, there is a danger that the increase in the use of anti-dumping 
measures may erode the efforts of trade liberalisation achieved in different multilateral 
negotiations.388 
Resultantly, there have been debates, to broaden the scope of the WTO anti-dumping rules to 
include competition issues.389 Other advocates have gone as far as calling for the replacement of 
anti-dumping laws with competition law.390  The study, however, suggests that there is a need to 
just harmonise some of the competition issues affecting trade law, in this particular instance, anti-
dumping. This may minimise cases where anti-dumping measures are used for protectionism rather 
than remedying unfair trade.  
Public interest should be a key consideration in determining any anti-dumping matter because in 
most anti-dumping cases the issues also affect the public. Sibanda argues that anti-dumping rules 
                                                            
382 See generally Lloyd PH ‘Anti-Dumping and Competition Law’ in Appleton AE & Plummer MG (ed) The World 
Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis Volume I (2007) (hereafter Lloyd PH (2005). 
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OECD Trade and Competition Policies for Tomorrow (1999) 17.  
390Interface Between Anti-dumping and Competition Law’ available at 
https://researchersclub.wordpress.com/2013/10/24/interface-between-antidumping-and-competition-law-a-critical-
analysis/ (accessed 17 November 2017).  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
65 
 
should be amended to include public interest considerations when imposing anti-dumping 
measures.391 Public interest should also be considered on whether or not an investigation should 
be initiated.392 Sibanda notes that, in competition policy, public interest considerations are clearly 
articulated, however, this has not been the case in anti-dumping laws.393 However, Sibanda 
acknowledges that it may not be feasible, in all instances, to factor in the interests of the public, as 
there may be more appropriate measures to achieve the same objectives.394 
The discussion for the inclusion for a mandatory public interest clause in WTO anti-dumping law 
is not new. In the Uruguay round of negotiations, Members extensively discussed this option.395 
The recommendations against its inclusions were largely due to its unintended consequences in 
some instances, which may have severe implications on the economy.396 To mitigate these effects, 
it is recommended that a clause be drafted into the ADA which  prescribes that, where appropriate, 
and on a case by case basis, the importing state may consider  the interests of the public where the 
consideration of such interests do not lead to market negatives or absurd results in the national 
economy. Issues to be considered as being of public interest would include the competitive 
situation, the interests of consumers or any other economic circumstances of interest.  
The next section will discuss the process involved in solving anti-dumping disputes in WTO. 
2.7 WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The central pillar of the WTO is its dispute settlement system.397 A dispute is usually caused by 
the adoption of trade policy measure by a WTO member state and such a policy measure fails to 
meet WTO obligations or breaches WTO agreements.398 Instead of taking unilateral action, WTO 
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Practice’ (2015) 14(5) International Business and Economics Research Journal 735.  
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395Kotsiubska V Public Interest Consideration in Domestic and International Antidumping Disciplines (unpublished 
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members now use a multilateral system of settling disputes against those who violate trade 
rules.399  
Article 2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) established the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB),400 which consists of representatives who act on behalf of all WTO member states.401 Its 
main mandate is to have supervisory oversight on WTO dispute settlement process.402 In order to 
effectively achieve its mandate, the DSB must establish panels that adjudicate these dispute 
cases.403 This also includes the DSB’s power to accept or reject findings and reports by other panels 
and the Appellate Body.404 In addition, the DSB has a duty to monitor the implementation 
of rulings and recommendations, including the power to authorise retaliation when a WTO 
member state fails to comply with its ruling.405 
Apart from the DSB, other parties such as the affected parties, third parties to the case, DSB panels, 
the WTO Secretariat, the Appellate Body, arbitrators, independent experts and several specialised 
institutions are also involved in dispute settlement processes.406 The expertise involved in solving 
cases warrants excellence and quality of the results in the matters. Decisions according to the DSB 
are done by consensus, which is to say that all countries present during a dispute settlement must 
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402Schoenbaum TJ ‘WTO dispute settlement: praise and suggestions for reform’ (1998) 47(3) International & 
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Collins SM & Rodrik D (Eds) Brookings Trade Forum (2000) 185. 
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agree with the decision.407 This implies that if any WTO member that is present at the meeting 
objects to the passing of a decision, the decision will not be adopted because there will be no 
consensus.408 However, there are three exceptions to the system of consensus where the DSB can 
act without consensus.409 The system of consensus is beneficial to developing countries, such as 
Zimbabwe, because they can still make decisions even if they do not have a financial muscle. 
If Members have an anti-dumping dispute, they need to follow processes of dispute settlement.410 
There are four stages involved in WTO disputes; namely consultation, panel stage, appeal and 
enforcement.411 Each stage has procedures that have to be adhered to. Importantly this thesis will 
discuss the panel stage, as it is the most complex amongst the stages due to selection criterion of 
panelists.412 It is also important because it is the first stage where WTO makes concrete decisions 
in the dispute process.  
If a consensus cannot be reached in consultation stages, a Member can request the WTO to 
establish a panel.413 In the panel, stage panels are usually composed of three panelists who are 
nominated by the Secretariat.414 There are no permanent panelists in the WTO, panels are created 
for each individual dispute and possible candidates must meet a certain requirement in terms of 
proficiency and independence regarding the dispute at hand.415 WTO Members may sometimes 
propose names of qualified people to be considered as panelists.416 However, a party to a dispute 
                                                            
407Ehlermann CD and Ehring L ‘Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the 
World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade?’ (2005) 
8(1) Journal of International Economic Law 55. 
408Bartels L ‘The separation of powers in the WTO: How to avoid judicial activism’ (2004) 53(4) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 863. 
409For a full discussion on these situations see generally WTO A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
(2017). 
410Triggs G ‘Dispute Settlement under the World Trade Organisation: Implications for Developing Countries’ 
(2003) 15(2) Bond Law Review 44. 
411WTO ‘The process — Stages in a typical WTO dispute settlement case’ available at 
 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s1p1_e.htm (accessed 16 March 2018). 
412For a detailed discussion of these stages, see generally Triggs G ‘Dispute Settlement under the World Trade 
Organisation: Implications for Developing Countries’ (2003) 15(2) Bond Law Review. 
413See generally Wethington OL ‘Commentary on the Consultation Mechanism under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding during Its First Five Years’ (2000) 31(3) Law and Policy in International Business.  
414For a detailed discussion on operation of panels in dispute settlement, see generally Kingery J ‘Commentary: 
Operation of Dispute Settlement Panels’ (2000) 31(3) Law and Policy in International Business.  
415See generally Busch ML & Pelc KJ ‘Does the WTO need a Permanent Body of Panelists?’ (2009) 12(3) Journal 
of International Economic Law. See generally also Davey WJ ‘The case for a WTO permanent panel body’ (2003) 
6(1) Journal of International Economic Law. 
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may not challenge the Secretariat’s choice of panelists except for compelling reasons.417 When a 
dispute is between a developing country Member and a developed country Member the panel must, 
upon request by the developing country Member, include at least one panelist from a developing 
country Member.418 
The panel is required to receive written and oral submissions of the parties involved and then to 
make findings and conclusions based on the submissions, which will then be presented to the 
DSB.419 Its main function is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities.420 Regarding the 
issue of the burden of proof, it lies with the defending party.421 This was confirmed in the EC — 
Hormones the Appellate Body, held that ‘the party complained against generally bore the burden 
of proof that its measures complied with the Agreement, unless they were based on international 
standards’.422  
Looking at the panel procedure one can say that Article 12.2 of the DSU emphasises the 
importance of flexibility to obtain high quality panel reports.423 Parties are given at least two 
opportunities to provide written submissions because normally two meetings take place amongst 
the panel and the parties involved.424 Usually the complaining party makes the first submission so 
that the responding party’s submission will contain a response to that previously submitted paper 
by the complaining party.425 These written submissions are treated as confidential to the extent 
that only members may disclose what is in the submissions publicly and the stakeholders have no 
                                                            
417Davey WJ ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism’ available at 
https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/DAVEY_WTO-Dispute-Settlement-Mechanism.pdf (accessed 16 
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https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c11s1p1_e.htm (accessed 16 March 2018). 
419Distefano M ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding Review: What Future for the Appellate Stage?’ in 
Boschiero N et al (eds) International Courts and the Development of International Law (2003) 701-709.  
420Prusa TJ & Rubini L ‘United States–Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea: 
It's déjà vu all over again’ (2013) 12(2) World Trade Review 414.  
421United States–Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea, WT/ DS402/R paras 7 
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422EC Measures concerning meat and meat products (Hormones) WT/DS26/29AB/R para 104. 
423See generally Stewart RB & Sanchez Badin MR ‘The World Trade Organization: multiple dimensions of global 
administrative law’ (2011) 9(3-4) International journal of constitutional law.  
424Trebilcock MJ & Howse R (3ed) The Regulation of International Trade (2005) 75.  
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direct access to the submissions that can affect them.426 This in a way falls far short of the 
transparency and publicity norms that are found in most if not all institutions of the WTO. 
Regarding the people that can represent a government before the panels, during the GATT era 
government officials could come before the panels.427 This was to the detriment of the developing 
countries which in most cases did not have trade experts therefore this disadvantaged them in 
pursuing complaints.428 By allowing non-governmental counsel to appear before the panel one can 
say that this is a positive development since it reduces the control of the process by the 
governments.  
Either party of the dispute can appeal to a panel’s decision and in some cases both parties appeal 
together.429 The appeals must be based on points of law such as legal interpretation therefore the 
panel cannot reexamine existing evidence or examine new issues.430 Each appeal is heard by three 
members of a permanent seven-member Appellate Body set up by the DSB and broadly 
representing the range of WTO membership.431 
Within 30 days after the ruling of the panel, the losing party must inform the DSB of the steps it 
intends to take to implement the recommendations and rulings adopted.432 In cases in which 
immediate compliance cannot be achieved fast, the losing party will be given a reasonable period 
to adjust and comply with the ruling made by the panel.433 Compensation and suspension of 
                                                            
426Article 18(2) of the DSU holds that:  
‘Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as confidential, but shall be made available 
to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing 
statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential information submitted by another 
Member to the panel or the Appellate Body, which that Member has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute 
shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its 
written submissions that could be disclosed to the public’. 
See also Marceau G & Hurley M ‘Transparency and public participation in the WTO: Report card on WTO 
transparency mechanisms’ (2012) 4(1) Trade, Law and Development 25. 
427Reitz C ‘Enforcement of the general agreement on tariffs and trade’ (1996) 17(2) University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Economic Law 582.  
428Garcia FJ ‘Trade and inequality: Economic justice and the developing world’ (2000) 21(4) Michigan Journal of 
International Law 977.  
429See generally, Chapter 9 in Gutner T International Organizations in World Politics (2016).  
430Saleem S Business Environment (2006) 501; Van Calster G ‘International Trade Agreements’ in Schwabach A 
and Cockfield AJ (ed) International Law and Institutions (2009) 145.  
431Shukla S International Business (2008) 311; WTO Understanding the WTO (2008) 57.  
432Trebilcock M, Howse R & Eliason A (4ed) The Regulation of International Trade (2013) 209.  
433See generally Peng S ‘How much time is reasonable the arbitral decisions under article 21.3(c) of the DSU’ 
(2008) 26(1) Berkeley Journal of International Law.  
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concessions are available to the complaining party if the adopted panel is not implemented within 
a reasonable period.434 
Besides the DSB being regarded efficient, it has been accused of lacking transparency and that it 
is very costly for the developing countries.435 Developing countries often call upon the assistance 
of the law firms of major developed countries which charge hefty fees in WTO disputes because 
the former lack trade experts.436 The developing countries would therefore not be as prompt and 
willing to initiate the dispute settlement process for exercise of their rights, as would a developed 
country.437 It is therefore submitted, that there is need to level the playing field for the developing 
countries in the WTO system by enabling them to have a full understanding of their rights and 
obligations under WTO Agreements. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this Chapter was to discuss international framework on anti-dumping. A 
brief history of anti-dumping legislation in the WTO was discussed and it was highlighted that 
some countries such as Canada, Australia and South Africa had anti-dumping legislation before 
GATT 1947. Most importantly, the GATT 1947 rules were modelled on the USA anti-dumping 
rules. The Chapter also highlighted that there are different definitions on what dumping is; 
moreover, some of the definitions are not necessarily a true reflection of what dumping is. In 
general, dumping takes place where there is international price discrimination.438 The problem is 
price discrimination is not always an unfair trade practice as illustrated by the example of cooking 
oil in Zimbabwe and Zambia.439 
The Chapter also discussed an informal and WTO meaning of dumping. What has been observed 
from these definitions, particularly the WTO, is that WTO does not prohibit dumping per se. 
                                                            
434Trebilcock M, Howse R & Eliason A (4ed) The Regulation of International Trade (2013) 210.  
435Waqas M ‘Why Developing Countries are at Disadvantage Position in WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism’ 
(2014) 1(2) International Journal of Social Sciences and Management 60-63; Kessie E & Addo K ‘African 
Countries and the WTO Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding’ (2008) 1 Trade Policy Review 
Volume 65-91. 
436Raghavan C ‘The World Trade Organization and its Dispute Settlement System: Tilting the balance against the 
South’ available at https://www.twn.my/title/tilting.htm (accessed 17 March 2018). 
437WTO's defective dispute settlement process available at 
http://www.thehindu.com/2000/07/06/stories/0606000c.htm (accessed 17 March 2018). 
438See 2.3 Definition of Dumping. 
439See the example as illustrated in 2.3 Definition of Dumping. 
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However, WTO regulates dumping that causes injury to the domestic industry. The Chapter has 
also provided the types of dumping that exist, there are three categories namely sporadic, predatory 
and continuous. Most importantly, the Chapter highlighted that the categories indicate the severity 
of dumping and the likelihood of continuation of dumping.440 
Moreover, there are three main schools of thoughts where anti-dumping duties are concerned. 
These are that duties are a either a response to unfair trade, or a special protection and a strategic 
weapon. Most importantly, a discussion of substantive and procedural requirements of the WTO 
relating to dumping as provided under Article VI of GATT and the ADA was undertaken. These 
rules have been discussed to provide Members with clarity on how the rules work and ensuring 
that if a member enacts anti-dumping laws the provisions of that legislation should comply with 
the ADA.  
The Chapter discussed both substantive and procedural requirements. It has been discussed that 
the ADA does not prevent a Member from enacting additional procedures; however, the additional 
procedures should not deviate from WTO rules. Failure by a member to conform to the ADA may 
result in judicial review of the administrative action against the member. In addition, it was 
highlighted that the field of anti-dumping requires specialised skills in accountancy, law and 
economics.441 In some cases, Members may not have these skills, which may compromise the 
investigation leading to disputes. 
The Chapter has highlighted some of the challenges within the WTO framework. The main 
difficulty pointed out is that the ADA leaves many provisions un-interpreted and at most gives the 
investigating authority power to determine how to apply a particular principle, which may be prone 
to abuse by Members. It also highlighted that currently anti-dumping rules do not adequately 
address issues of competition and public interest.  It was highlighted that if a balanced approach is 
not adopted between competition and anti-dumping, there is a danger of eroding the efforts of trade 
liberalisation.442 
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The Chapter has also highlighted that the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) was 
designed to secure the rule of law within international trade and provide all Members with 
opportunities to exercise their rights under multilateral trade agreements. The Dispute Settlement 
process is well developed and efficient. On the other hand, the DSB lacks transparency and costly 
for the developing countries because they have to hire expertise from expensive law firms in 
developed countries.443  
The next Chapter will look at the use of anti-dumping measures in South Africa. Most importantly, 
the next Chapter will be discussed for purposes of drawing lessons Zimbabwe can take from the 
South African experience. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE USE OF ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa is amongst the earliest users of anti-dumping measures worldwide.1 As shown earlier 
in Chapter 2, Canada became the first country to enact anti-dumping laws in 1904.2 By mid 1920s, 
United States of America (USA), South Africa, Australia, France, New Zealand and Great Britain 
had incorporated anti-dumping rules in their respective national laws.3 This implies that South 
Africa was amongst the first countries that enacted anti-dumping laws before the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 The country promulgated its anti-dumping law, in the 
form of the Customs and Tariffs Act, in 1914.5 Despite the enactment of this Act, South Africa 
only started to apply anti-dumping measures in 1921 when it imposed anti-dumping duties on 
Australian flour and wheat.6 When South Africa imposed these measures, the then Customs 
Department, now the South African Revenue Service (SARS), was responsible for enacting anti-
dumping measures.7 
The anti-dumping system in South Africa has developed over time since 1921 as evidenced by the 
amendments that follow the initial laws. From 1921 onwards, the Board on Trade and Industries 
(BTI) became responsible for investigating dumping and enforcing anti-dumping regulations.8 The 
                                                            
1Zanardi M ‘Anti-dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?’ (2004) 27(3) The World Economy 408.  
2See generally 2.2 Brief history of WTO law on dumping. Niels G ‘What is antidumping policy really about?’ 
(2000) 14(4) Journal of economic surveys 468; Ciuriak Dan ‘Anti-dumping at 100 Years and Counting: A Canadian 
Perspective’ (2005) 28(5) The World Economy 462. 
3See generally 2.2 Brief history of WTO law on dumping. Garcia M & Baker A Anti-dumping in New Zealand: A 
century of protection from" unfair" trade? (2005) 9; Prusa T J ‘Anti‐dumping: A Growing Problem in International 
Trade’ (2005) 28(5) The World Economy 687.  
4Brink G ‘One Hundred Years of Anti-dumping in South Africa’ (2015) 49 Journal of World Trade 325 (hereafter 
Brink G (2015)). Anti-dumping rules found their existence way prior the GATT negotiations because Canada, 
United States of America (USA), South Africa, Australia and France already had anti-dumping rules in their 
national legislation by mid-1920s. For a detailed discussion, see Zanardi M ‘Antidumping: A problem in 
international trade’ (2006) 22(3) European Journal of Political Economy 591-617. 
5Sibanda OS ‘An Assessment of WTO Compliance by the South African Anti-Dumping Regime in Respect of the 
Determination of Causation’ (2013) 76(1) Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 174(hereafter Sibanda OS 
(201)). Sandrey R et al ‘Non-tariff measures inhibiting South African exports to China and India. Working Paper 
6/2008’ (2008) 24. 
6 Brink G A Theoretical Framework for Anti-Dumping Legislation in South Africa (unpublished LLD thesis, 
University of Pretoria 2004) 46 (hereafter Brink G (2004); see also Vinti C ‘A spring without water: the conundrum 
of anti-dumping duties in South African law’ (2016) 19(1) PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 10.  
7Brink G (2004) 80 see also Joubert N ‘Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: The Reform of South 
Africa’s Anti-Dumping Regime’ in Gallagher P, Low P & Stoler AL (eds) Managing the Challenges of WTO 
Participation: 45 Case Studies (2005) 518 (hereafter Joubert N (2005). 
8Sibanda OS (2013) 174. Meng T Dumping and antidumping regulations with specific reference to the legal 
framework in South Africa and China (unpublished LLM Thesis, University of the Free State 2006) 19. 
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Board on Tariffs and Trade (BTT) replaced the BTI in 1992.9 The Department of Trade and 
Industry then established a Directorate of Dumping Investigations.10 The Directorate of Dumping 
Investigations conducted ‘anti-dumping and countervailing investigations’ on behalf of the BTT.11 
This system was replaced in 2003 when the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 
(ITAA) came into force.  
Where anti-dumping jurisprudence is concerned in Africa, South Africa provides the best practices 
Zimbabwe can learn. This is because, amongst other things, it has courts that have had the 
opportunities to apply anti-dumping regulations and develop anti-dumping jurisprudence.12 
Although the number of anti-dumping investigations has decreased since the enactment of the 
ITAA, South Africa is still the number one user in Africa.13 Also as mentioned in Chapter 1 South 
Africa is Zimbabwe’s biggest trading partner, accounting for the largest percentage in both import 
and exports.14 An examination of how Zimbabwe can learn from South Africa’s anti-dumping 
regime will be done in Chapter 5 where Zimbabwe will be discussed.  
This Chapter is divided into seven sections; section 3.1 is the introduction; section 3.2 provides an 
overview, section 3.3 discusses the legislative and institutional framework. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 
discuss the substantive and procedural aspects, respectively. Section 3.6 looks at reviews and 
section 3.7 is the conclusion. 
                                                            
9Board on Tariffs and Trade Amendment Act 60 of 1992; see also Brink (2004) 20-21; Joubert N (2005) 519. 
10Brink G Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Investigations in South Africa (2002) 4-5 (hereafter Brink G (2002). 
See also Sibanda OS ‘The South African anti-dumping law: consistency with the GATT Anti-Dumping Code’ 
(2001) 34(2) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 243; V. de Lange C ‘2014's Second 
Trade Centurion: Dumping’ 19 August 2014 available at http://www.thesait.org.za/news/187155/2014s-Second-
Trade-Centurion-Dumping.htm  (accessed 20 June 2017). 
11Brink G (2004) 4-5; Joubert N (2005). 
12See general discussion in Brink G “South Africa: A complicated, unpredictable, long and costly judicial review 
system”, in Yilmaz M Domestic Judicial Review of Trade Remedies (2013) 247-268; Brink G “Anti-Dumping and 
Judicial Review in South Africa: A need for Urgent Reform” (2012) 7 (5) Global Trade and Customs Journal. 
13Brink G (2015) 325. See also a discussion of South African case law dealing with the use of anti-dumping laws in 
Vinti C ‘A spring without water: the conundrum of anti-dumping duties in South African law’ (2016) 19(1) PER: 
Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad. 
14See generally 1.6 Research Methodology. See also, The Southern Times ‘South Africa still ranks high on 
Zimbabwe’s trading partners’ list’ available at https://southernafrican.news/2016/06/29/south-africa-still-ranks-
high-on-zimbabwes-trading-partners-list/ (accessed 20 November 2017); Department of Research and Information 
‘Economic overview: Recent developments in  the global and South African economies (2016) 9. 
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3.2 OVERVIEW 
South Africa was an early anti-dumping user in the world; in addition, it is the largest user of anti-
dumping measures in Africa.15 Its success has been attributed to its amendment of the Board on 
Tariffs and Trade Act in 1995.16 These amendments were in harmony with the Implementation of 
Article VI of GATT 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) because they gave unambiguous 
meaning to words such as ‘dumping’, ‘export price’, ‘normal value’, and ‘fair comparison’.17 This 
has enabled South Africa to achieve compliance with its 1994 GATT obligations. In 2015, Brink 
observed that South Africa had accounted for more the 1000 investigations and the number has 
grown since then.18 Despite these positive attributes, some of South Africa’s trading partners’ raise 
concerns that these numbers indicate that anti-dumping laws are being used as a protectionist 
measure.19 They argue that the highest number do not correlate with fact that South Africa has a 
small market share globally.20 
Dumping has a potential of massive job losses, which in turn affects the standard of living of the 
people of South Africa.21 In 2016, Lovell, the chief executive of the South African Poultry 
Association, worryingly noted that the poultry industry was expecting job losses amounting to 
6000 by the end of that year.22 This is because dumping allows for price undercutting, which may 
lead to local producers driven out of the market.23 Although it is not a crime to dump, scholars 
                                                            
15Brink G (2015) 326. 
16Holden M ‘Antidumping: A reaction to trade liberalisation or ant-competitive/’ (2011) 70(5) South African 
Journal of Economics 924; Edwards L. Anti-Dumping in South Africa: From Proliferation to Moderation (2011) 5 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871948 (accessed 20 June 2017). 
17Sibanda OS (2013) 175. 
18Brink G (2015) 326. 
19Watson W ‘Antidumping Fowls Out: U.S.–South Africa Chicken Dispute Highlights the Need for Global Reform’ 
19 October 2015 available at https://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/antidumping-fowls-out-us-south-
africa-chicken-dispute-highlights (accessed 10 August 2017). See discussion on how protectionism operate by, 
Tharakan PKM ‘Political Economy and Contingent Protection’ (1995) 105(433) The Economic Journal 1550; 
Hansen WL ‘International Trade Commission and the politics of protectionism’ (1990) 84(2) American Political 
Science Review. 
20Hanauer LH The Interpretation And Application Of Gatt's Article Xxiii To Anti-Dumping Law And Practice. 
(unpublished LLD thesis, University Of The Witwatersrand 2016) 225; Evenett S & Fritz J ‘The tide turns? Trade, 
protectionism, and slowing global growth: 18th Global Trade Alert Report (2015) 94-97. Business Day ‘SA most 
‘protectionist’ country when it comes to poultry, says IPC’ available at https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/business-
and-economy/2017-08-30-sa-most-protectionist-country-when-it-comes-to-poultry-says-ipc/ (accessed 20 November 
2017). 
21Pieterse A ‘Reviewing South African transnational relations’ (2017) 18 (4) Safundi The Journal of South African 
and American Studies 425. 
22Booysen J ‘SA chicken industry set for huge job losses’(2016) available at https://www.iol.co.za/business-
report/economy/sa-chicken-industry-set-for-huge-job-losses-2074525 (accessed 18 October 2017). 
23See generally Oin U & Vandenbussche H ‘China–GOES (Article 21.5): Time to Clarify the Standard for Price 
Suppression and Price Depression in AD/CVD Investigations’ (2017) 16(2) World Trade Review. 
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such as Mitchell argue that the practice is undesirable in international trade; hence the need for 
WTO to regulate dumping.24 In addition, there are devastating consequences to the end consumer 
because after other producers lose market share, there is no law that prevents the exporter to 
increase its prices.25  
 
As South African courts have the opportunity to develop anti-dumping laws, the country has also 
benefited from scholarly publications on the issue of anti-dumping.26 There are also institutions 
such as the Trade Law Centre (TRALAC) that develops ‘technical expertise and capacity in trade 
governance across Africa’, which is situated in South Africa.27 South Africa also benefits from 
workshops done by WTO that help in technical assistance and capacity building.28 In developing 
expertise in anti-dumping South Africa has continued to engage and visit for learning purposes 
and building capacity. 29 
 
3.3 THE LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
3.3.1 Legislative Framework 
Anti-dumping regime in South Africa has gone through a number of changes bringing along a 
better system generally compliant with World Trade Organisation (WTO) laws. Currently anti-
dumping in South Africa is mainly dealt with in terms of the ITAA.30 The ITAA repealed the 
Board on Tariffs and Trade Act, which had been in operation since 1992, in 2003.31 However in 
International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd the Constitutional 
Court32 held that where appropriate the ITAA was to be read in conjunction with the Board of 
                                                            
24Mitchell AD Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (2008). 
25Falade Obalade TA ‘Analysis of Dumping as a Major Cause of Import and Export Crises’ (2014) 4(5) 
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 234. 
26Throughout the whole Chapter, the author engages with publications written by scholars that have helped in 
developing the country’s anti-dumping system for instance authors such as Brink G, Sibanda OS, Joubert N, Ndhovu 
L and Khandeira S. 
27See generally https://www.tralac.org/about.html (accessed 24 July 2018). 
28See generally Doha WTO Ministerial adopted 14 Nov. 2001: Ministerial Declaration para 38 available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#cooperation (accessed 12 June 2018). Also 
see Ikeagwuchi GA Implementing effective trade remedy mechanisms: A critical analysis of Nigeria’s Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Bill, 2010 (unpulished LLM thesis University of Pretoria 2014) 85. 
29Brink G (2004) 692-693. 
30Brink G ‘One Hundred Years of Anti-dumping in South Africa’ (2015) 49 Journal of World Trade 325 (hereafter 
Brink G (2015); see generally Khanderia S ‘The determination of injury in South African anti-dumping 
investigations: recent approaches’ (2016) 49(2) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa. 
31Association of Meat Importers v ITAC (769, 770, 771/12) [2013] ZASCA 108 (13 September 2013). 
32South Africa’s constitutional court is the highest court in South Africa. 
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Tariffs and Trade Act, 198633 (BTT Act).34 The reason for that was to close gap, which was created 
when, a number of the ITAA provisions have not come into operation.35   
Apart from it being a national framework, the ITAA is also applicable to the regional block of the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU).36 It provides ‘within the framework of the SACU 
Agreement continued control of import and export of goods and amendment of customs duties: 
and to provide for matters connected therewith.’37 The ITAA is also the statute that created the 
International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC); it also provides for functions and 
regulation of the ITACs procedures.38 
More importantly, the ITAC has the duty to carry out anti-dumping investigations.39 In doing so, 
South Africa promulgated the Anti-Dumping Regulations (ADR 2003) to assist the ITAC in 
efficiently carrying its duties.40 The close working relationship between the ITAA and the ADR 
2003 ensures the maintenance of South Africa’s general compliance with the WTO while 
preserving its best practices on anti-dumping.41 As stated in Chapter 2, WTO Members have an 
obligation to notify WTO if they enact anti-dumping regulations.42 South Africa fulfilled this 
obligation in January 2004 when it formally notified the WTO’s Committee on Anti-Dumping 
                                                            
33Board of Tariffs and Trade Act 107 of 1986. 
34International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd (CCT 59/09) [2010] ZACC 6; 
2012 (4) SA 618 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 457 (CC) (9 March 2010). 
35International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd. 
36Members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland.   
37Preamble of the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 (ITAA). 
38Section 7 of the ITAA; see also Hanauer LH (2016) 227. 
39International Trade Administration Commission ‘An Overview of ITAC’ available at 
http://www.itac.org.za/pages/about-itac/an-overview-of  (accessed 06 September 2017). Section 33 of ITAA, 
Section 2 of  the ADR 2003 and part B of the proposed Anti-Dumping Regulations; Ndlovu L ‘South Africa and the 
World Trade Organization Anti-Dumping Agreement nineteen years into democracy’ (2013) 28(2) Southern African 
Public Law 289. 
40International Trade and Administration Commission ‘An Overview of ITAC’ available at 
http://www.itac.org.za/pages/about-itac/an-overview-of  (accessed 06 September 2017). Ndlovu L ‘South Africa and 
the World Trade Organization Anti-Dumping Agreement nineteen years into democracy’ (2013) 28(2) Southern 
African Public Law 287.   
41It is general compliance because there are articles written about ITAC’s procedures not adhering to the relevant 
WTO obligations. See Brink G ‘X-Raying Injury Findings in South Africa’s Anti-Dumping Investigations’  (2015) 
23 (1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law; Brink G ‘New directions by the Panel in Russia—
Commercial Vehicles and the implications for South African antidumping investigations’ (2017) 50(3) Comparative 
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 417-441. 
42See generally Chapter 2. See also, Kufuor KO ‘The Growing Problem of Intra-Developing Country Anti-Dumping 
Actions in World Trade’ in Debroy B and Chakraborty D (eds) Anti-dumping: global abuse of a trade policy 
instrument (2007) 95. 
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Practices about the ITAA and the ADR 2003.43 The two statutes were defended successfully before 
WTO in the same year they were notified. 44 Members have to defend some of their statutes 
affecting trade in the WTO, as ‘national policies should not discriminate between nationals and 
foreigners or between foreigners of different origin’.45 The WTO makes rules on the way domestic 
policy objectives can be achieved and as such, there are some instances where limitations on what 
governments can do in domestic policies are placed.46 However, the WTO does not make rules 
about the domestic policy objectives of Members.47  
Besides the ITAA and the ADR 2003, the Customs and Excise Act 1964 imposed anti-dumping 
duties on dumped imports.48 The imposition of provisional anti-dumping measures is made at the 
request of ITAC. This request is done when anti-dumping investigations have been concluded and 
included in such request is the level and duration of the duty.49 However, definitive measures are 
based on a recommendation by the ITAC to the Minister of Trade who, if he agrees, requests the 
Minister of Finance to impose the duty.50  
The Constitution of South Africa ‘is the supreme law of the Republic’.51 This requires that all laws 
must be compatible with the supreme law.52 The provisions in the Constitution which are of 
relevance to anti-dumping investigations are those that are concerned with access to information, 
                                                            
43On notification to the WTO in 2004 see WTO Notification of Laws and Regulations under Articles 18.5 and 32.6 
of the Agreements – South Africa, G/ADP/N/1/ZAF/2G/SCM/N/1/- ZAF/2 (20 January 2004). 
44Sibanda OS (2013) 180. 
45WTO Director-General WTO Policy Issues For Parliamentarians A Guide To Current Trade Issues For 
Legislators 4. 
46WTO Ministerial Conference The WTO …Why It Matters A Guide For Officials, Legislators, Civil Society And All 
Those Interested In International Trade And Global Governance (2001)18. 
47WTO Ministerial Conference The WTO …Why It Matters A Guide For Officials, Legislators, Civil Society And All 
Those Interested In International Trade And Global Governance (2001)18. 
48Khanderia S ‘The Compatibility of South African Anti-Dumping Laws with WTO Disciplines’ (2017) 
25(3) African Journal of International and Comparative Law (hereafter Khanderia S (2017). 
49Ndlovu L ‘An Assessment of the WTO Compliance of the Recent Regulatory Regime of South Africa’s dumping 
and anti-dumping Law’ (2010) 5(1) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 5 (hereafter Ndlovu 
L (2010) 5. See also, Khanderia S ‘Price Comparisons under the South African Anti-dumping Laws: The Faux Pas 
Continues?’ (2017) 52(1) Foreign Trade Review 30-47. 
50Ndlovu L (2010) 5. 
51Section 2 of the Constitution; Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 30. 
52Davis DM ‘Twenty Years of Constitutional Democracy: A Preliminary Reflection’ (2015) 60 (1) New York Law 
School Law Review 52. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
79 
 
administrative action and those of good public administration.53 These provisions promote 
transparency, which is amongst the core pillars of anti-dumping investigations at a WTO level.54 
Other relevant laws are the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA), which was 
enacted as a result of the ‘constitutional right of access to any information held by the State and 
any information that is held by another person required in exercising or protecting any rights’.55 
The PAIA is a landmark piece of legislation that provides South African people an opportunity to 
leave ‘a culture of secrecy and bureaucracy to a culture of transparency and accountability’.56 Thus, 
in anti-dumping investigations the PAIA embed the values of how an investigation should be 
‘clothed’. 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000 (PAJA) is also an important piece of 
legislation that affects anti-dumping investigations. Section 3 of the PAJA requires that the 
commission give all relevant parties adequate notice about an administrative action that is 
proposed.57 In addition, all parties should have a reasonable opportunity to make representations, 
notice of the review mechanism and the right to request reasons.58  As stated in Chapter 2, adequate 
representations and reasonable time to provide evidence are key components in anti-dumping 
investigations as they help in ensuring that the process is not always abused.59 It is important to 
note that the PAJA only prescribes how powers given to administrators by other statutes should be 
exercised; it does not provide powers to administrators.60 
                                                            
53See Section 32-33 and 195 of the Constitution; see also Brink G (2004) 698-709; Brink G ‘Anti-dumping in South 
Africa’ (2012) (hereafter, Brink G (A-D in SA 2012) 2-4. 
54See generally 2.4.1.3 Comparison of Normal Value and Export Price. 
55Preamble of Promotion of Access To Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA). 
56Mass C ‘Section 4 of the AJA and Procedural Fairness in Administrative Action Affecting the Public: A 
Comparative Perspective’ in Lange C and Wessels J (eds) The Right to Know – South Africa’s Promotion of 
Administrative Justice and Access to Information Acts (2004) 63. See also, Dick AL ‘Power is information: South 
Africa’s Promotion of Access to Information Act in context’ (2005) 23(1) Mousaion 6; Arko-Cobbah A ‘The right 
of access to information: Opportunities and challenges for civil society and good governance in South Africa’ 
(2008) 34(2) IFLA journal 188. 
57Section 3 of Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000 (PAJA). See also a commentary of section 3 
of PAJA in Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 390-397. 
58See Currie I et al The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act bench book (2001) 133-149. 
592.5.2 Conduct 
60 International Trade Administration Commission ‘Trade Remedies’ available at 
http://www.itac.org.za/upload/Trade_Remedies.pdf  (accessed 06 September 2017). Muller G ‘Conceptualising 
“meaningful engagement” as a deliberative democratic partnership’ (2011) 22(3) Stellenbosch Law Review 747.  
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Although South Africa is a signatory of both GATT and the ADA, these agreements do not form 
part of its municipal law.61 However, the Constitution requires that when interpreting, legislation 
courts should interpret it in a reasonable manner that is consistent with international law rather 
than in an inconsistent manner.62 This entails that an interpretation that favours international law 
should be adopted, rather than the one, which is against it.63 Therefore, South Africa has an 
obligation to honour its international obligations (WTO included), including where anti-dumping 
is concerned, despite the fact that the agreements are not part of municipal law. 
Although case law decisions are not legislation in the literal sense, decisions of the courts also give 
insights on anti-dumping matters. Judicial decisions are one of the fundamental sources of law.64 
Although the doctrine of stare decisis (meaning the court’s decision stands) does not strictly apply 
in anti-dumping rulings, court decisions ‘provide insight into whether [in future it] would uphold 
or strike down a member’s procedure’.65 Thus, all the above statutes and decisions have a 
significant role on how investigations should be conducted. As such, the ITAC should be guided 
by legislature that applies in anti-dumping matter when dealing with an investigation. 
3.3.2 Institutional Framework 
As noted above, one of mandates of the ITAA is to establish the ITAC. Before it was established, 
anti-dumping investigations were under the BTT and BTI, which dates back to 1921.66 As a result, 
the establishment of the ITAC sought to streamline, rationalise and modernise an institution with 
                                                            
61Brink G ‘Anti-dumping and China: three major Chinese victories in dispute resolution’ (2014) 47(1) Comparative 
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 9. 
62Section 233 of the Constitution. See a detailed analysis on the applicability of international law in South Africa, in 
Smit L ‘The relationship between the access of individuals to WTO law and the socio-economic rights in the South 
African Constitution’ (2007) 40(3) 350-394. Also see generally, Scholtz W & Ferreira G ‘The interpretation of 
section 231 of the South African Constitution: A lost ball in the high weeds!’ (2008) 41(2) The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 324-338. 
63Ferreira G& Snyman F ‘The Incorporation of Public International Law into Municipal Law and Regional Law 
against the Background of the Dichotomy between Monism and Dualism’ (2014) 17 (4) Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 1478. 
64Barratt A & Snyman P ‘Researching South African Law’ Hauser Global Law School Programme available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/South_Africa1.html (accessed 30 August 2017). 
65Brink G ‘X-raying injury findings in South Africa’s anti-dumping investigations’ (2015) available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/52019/Brink_XRaying_2015.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 23 
November 2017). 
66Brink (2004) 20; ITAC ‘Briefing by ITAC to NEDLAC Trade and Industry Chamber’ available at 
http://agbiz.co.za/uploads/AgbizNews17/170317_NEDLAC_Presentation.pdf (accessed 30 August 2017); Sibanda 
OS ‘An Assessment of WTO Compliance by the South African Anti-Dumping Regime in Respect of the 
Determination of Causation’ (2013) 179. 
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a history, which goes back to 1921. Its creation was also motivated by the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) objective to improve its efficiency by isolating its implementation from other 
functions, as well as fulfilling its purpose.67 Although ITAC is independent, it is a Council of Trade 
and Industry (COTI) partner of the DTI.68 
The ITAC’s jurisdiction is not limited to South Africa but extends regionally to SACU.69 The 
South African Constitution binds the operations and directives of the ITAC, as envisaged by the 
ITAA.70 The ITAA requires the ITAC to perform its duties with impartiality and without fear or 
favour.71 This enables the ITAC to fulfil its vision of facilitating a system that is both efficient and 
effective in the administration of international trade.72 
The ITAC has three main divisions, which specifically deal with, firstly, tariff investigations, 
secondly, import and export control; and lastly, trade remedies, which is also the most relevant in 
to this Chapter.73 The last division also consists of ‘two investigation units with twenty-one 
investigating officers plus support staff’.74 As noted above, the ITAC is responsible for all aspects 
of investigations from receiving application through to conducting verification visits.75 Once 
investigations are complete, the Minister of Trade makes the final decision, after taking into 
consideration recommendations from the Commission.76 After the final determination, the 
implementation of the final decision falls under the Minister of Finance.77 Within this context, it 
becomes important to discuss the early processes that take place before the imposition of an anti-
dumping duty. 
                                                            
67International Trade Administration Commission ‘An Overview of ITAC’ available at 
http://www.itac.org.za/pages/about-itac/an-overview-of  (accessed 06 September 2017). 
68This places it at the same level as the IDC, the Registrar of Companies and the Competition Commission. 
69Preamble of the ITAA. 
70 Section 7 (2) (a) (i) of the ITAA see also Feris J ‘International Arbitration’ (2017) 1-4.  
71Section 7 (3) of the ITAA; see generally the submission by the Association of Meat Importers and Exporters to the 
Portfolio Committee of Trade and Industry available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/121128amie_0.pdf (accessed 07 September 2017). 
72Section 2 of the ITAA see also Tregenna F & Kwaramba M ‘A Review of the International Trade Administration 
Commission’s Tariff Investigation Role and Capacity’ (2014) 4. 
73See generally Brink G (2015). 
74See generally Brink G (2015). 
75ITAC ‘Briefing by ITAC to NEDLAC Trade and Industry Chamber’ available at 
http://agbiz.co.za/uploads/AgbizNews17/170317_NEDLAC_Presentation.pdf (accessed 30 August 2017). 
76International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd (CCT 59/09) [2010] ZACC 6; 
2012 (4) SA 618 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 457 (CC) (9 March 2010) para 3. 
77International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd CCT 59/09) [2010] ZACC 6; 
2012 (4) SA 618 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 457 (CC) (9 March 2010) para 3. 
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3.4 SUBSTANTIVE PROCEDURES 
Dumping in South Africa takes place when goods are exported to South Africa or the Common 
Customs area of SACU at a price, which is lesser than what the goods are sold for in the exporting 
country.78 When conducting investigations, the ITAC should follow all processes in accordance 
with the ITAA and the ADR 2003. In order for anti-dumping measures to be imposed, the 
Commission should have concluded that dumping which has caused injury to a domestic industry 
has occurred. In order to come to such a determination, the ITAC follows a process. The following 
section discusses the substantive procedures that are taken into consideration. The section will 
discuss determination of dumping first and under it the following will be discussed; normal value, 
export price, fair comparison and dumping. After determination of dumping, the study will then 
discuss determination of injury.  
3.4.1 Determination of dumping 
Normal Value 
In determining if dumping has taken place, the Commission must ascertain what the normal value 
of the goods being investigated is. This is because there is a prima facie (at first sight) case of 
dumping if goods are sold below the normal value. The ITAA defines normal value as the 
‘comparable price paid or payable in the ordinary course of trade for like goods intended for 
consumption in the exporting country or country of origin’.79 In the ITAC v SATMC and Others, 
the court held that if the goods in question were exported into South Africa or SACU at a price 
lower than the ordinary price in the country of origin, dumping would have taken place.80 It is 
important to note that within SACU, most of the exports are bound for South Africa and South 
Africa is the main exporter within the region.81 Hence, as most trade is centred upon South Africa, 
one can conclude that the notion of domestic industry is still largely centred on South Africa.82 
                                                            
78Section 1 of ITAA. Also see discussion in Tao M Dumping and antidumping regulations with specific reference to 
the legal framework in South Africa and China (unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Free State, 2006) 16. 
79Section 32 (2)(b)(i) of the ITAA. 
80The International Trade Administration Commission and Another v SA Tyre Manufacturers Conference (Pty) Ltd 
and Others (738/2010) [2011] ZASCA 137 (23 September 2011) para 9. 
81Edwards L & Lawrence R ‘South African Trade Policy and the Future Global Trading Environment’(2012) South 
African Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper No 128 24. 
82Mastara S Anti - Dumping or Protection: An analysis of competition issues in dumping investigations (unpublished 
Mphil Law thesis, University of Cape Town 2015) 21. 
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In ascertaining what the normal value is, the Commission must first identify what the ‘like product’ 
is in order to ascertain its price in the ordinary course of business. The ADR 2003 defines a ‘like 
product’ as a product that is alike in all respects to the product under investigation.83 Thus, a ‘like 
product’ has identical features with the one being dumped; however, in some cases there is no such 
product that is identical in all aspects. The regulations provide that in such absence the ITAC can 
identify a ‘like product’ as one that although not identical, has characteristics closely resembling 
those of the product being investigated.84  
In order to identify such a product, the Commission should look at the various factors listed in the 
ADR 2003.85 This is not an exhaustive list since the Commission is given the liberty to add any 
factor they deem fit.86 It can, however, be argued on one hand that giving the Commission so much 
power can lead to abuse of the processes. On the other hand, having a closed list may also lead the 
process to be unfair as it prevents analysing various factors that could help in identifying the 
product in question. 
If the exporting country has a ‘like product’, the Commission has to do an ordinary course of trade 
test. This four-prong test includes the 5 per cent test, related party test, sales at a loss test and lastly 
government intervention.87 This test echoes similarities to the WTO ordinary course of trade test 
discussed in Chapter 2.88 The 5 per cent test looks at whether the volume of total sales in the 
domestic market account for at least 5 per cent of the volume of total export sales to SACU.89 If 
the answer to this is in affirmative, then the Commission can use the domestic price to calculate 
normal value.90 If the answer is in the negative, the ITAC considers whether sales can still be seen 
                                                            
83Section 1(f) of the ADR 2003. 
84Section 1(f) of the ADR 2003. 
85The factors to be considered are ‘(i) The raw materials and other inputs used in producing the products; (ii) The 
production process; (iii) Physical characteristics and appearance of the product; (iv) The end-use of the product; (v) 
The substitutability of the product with the product under investigation; (vi) Tariff classification; and/or (vii) Any 
other factor proven to the satisfaction of the Commission to be relevant.’ 
86See generally Section 1 of the ADR 2003. 
87 The ITAC ‘Dumping Margin Calculation’ available at 
http://www.itac.org.za/upload/Dumping%20Margins%20Calculations.pdf (accessed 18 September 2017). 
88See generally 2.4.1.1 Determination of Normal Value. 
89The ITAC ‘Dumping Margin Calculation’ available at 
http://www.itac.org.za/upload/Dumping%20Margins%20Calculations.pdf (accessed 18 September 2017). 
90The ITAC ‘Dumping Margin Calculation’ available at 
http://www.itac.org.za/upload/Dumping%20Margins%20Calculations.pdf (accessed 18 September 2017). 
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as sufficient despite them not amounting to 5 per cent.91 If not, other forms of calculating normal 
value can be used.92 
Coming to the related party test, it looks at whether sales in the exporting country originate from 
parties who are related and if inclusion of the related party sales will result in the prices being 
unreliable.93 This test has nothing to do with the percentage volume of the export sales; it only 
looks at interference of relations. If the answer is positive, then the Commission is required to use 
constructed normal value or the export price to a third country.94  
Besides the related party test, the Commission may also do the sale at a loss test. The Commission 
compares the cost per unit to selling price per unit (per model).95 If more than 20 per cent of the 
sales are below cost (on a per model basis), the ITAC may disregard them in calculating normal 
value.96 The existence of such sales in the market indicates that sales are not conducted in the 
ordinary course of trade.97 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the WTO does not prevent Members from enacting anti-dumping 
legislation.98 Members are at liberty of adding more provisions than those in the ADA, if they do 
not conflict with principles in the ADA.99 One such provision is in the ITAA, which provides that 
sales may not be in the ordinary course of trade:  
‘When the Commission, in evaluating an application concerning dumping, concludes that the 
normal value of the goods in question is, as a result of government intervention in the exporting 
country or country of origin, not determined according to free market principles, the Commission 
                                                            
91The ITAC ‘Dumping Margin Calculation’ available at 
http://www.itac.org.za/upload/Dumping%20Margins%20Calculations.pdf (accessed 18 September 2017). 
92The ITAC ‘Dumping Margin Calculation’ available at 
http://www.itac.org.za/upload/Dumping%20Margins%20Calculations.pdf (accessed 18 September 2017).  
93World Trade Organisation Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices Working Group on Implementation Article 2.3 
– Constructed Export Price (2011) Paper by South Africa G/ADP/AHG/W/190. 
94World Trade Organisation Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices Working Group on Implementation Article 2.3 
– Constructed Export Price (2011) Paper by South Africa G/ADP/AHG/W/190.  
95Fillis JB Assessing the Determination of Constructed Normal Value in the 2000 USA Anti-Dumping Poultry case 
in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria 2016).  
96Section 8(2) (i) of the ADR 2003. 
97Lindsey B &  Ikenson D Anti-dumping Exposed: The Devilish Details of Unfair Trade Law (2003)165 
98See generally 2.4 WTO Treatment of Dumping. 
99See generally 2.4 WTO Treatment of Dumping. 
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may apply to those goods a normal value of the goods, established in respect of a third or surrogate 
country’.100   
In the ITAC v SATMC and Others, the court held that this provision requires ITAC to only goods 
look at from a particular source, not the whole country or even a definite enterprise.101 Moreover, 
the calculation of normal value from country of origin may only be departed if the ITAC discovers 
during its investigations ‘that the country of origin normal value is not determined according to 
free market principles as a result of government intervention’.102 When China assented into the 
WTO in 2001, it was classified as a non-market economy.103 This is an economy where ‘the 
government has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic 
prices are fixed by the State’.104  
Because of the classification, China’s trading partners were allowed, to use a special framework 
to determine ‘whether China's exports are being sold at unfairly low prices’.105 If that is found to 
be the case they were permitted to apply additional anti-dumping duties.106 This provision can no 
longer be applied to Chinese products.107 This is because China’s 15-year transitional period ended 
on December 11, 2016.108 As such, South Africa cannot classify goods from China as goods 
originating from non-market economy, as it will be in violation of the WTO rules. 
The ITAC may depart from using the country of origin in calculating normal value if, in its 
investigations, it concludes that the ‘like product’ did not pass the ordinary course of trade test.109 
                                                            
100Section 32(4) of the ITAA. 
101The International Trade Administration Commission and Another v SA Tyre Manufacturers Conference (Pty) Ltd 
and Others (738/2010) [2011] ZASCA 137 (23 September 2011) para 35. 
102The International Trade Administration Commission and Another v SA Tyre Manufacturers Conference (Pty) Ltd 
and Others (738/2010) [2011] ZASCA 137 (23 September 2011) para 34. 
103Trachtman J ‘Is China a Non-Market Economy, and Why Does It Matter?’ (2017). 
104 WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2018). 
105 Watson W ‘It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy Treatment’ available at 
https://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/its-time-dump-nonmarket-economy-treatment (accessed 12 
September 2017). 
106Trachtman J ‘Is China a Non-Market Economy, and Why Does It Matter?’ (2017). 
107Noël S & Zhou W ‘Replacing the Non-Market Economy Methodology: Is the European Union's Alternative 
Approach Justified Under the World Trade Organization Anti-Dumping Agreement?’ (2016) 11(11) Global Trade 
and Customs Journal 561. 
108Watson W ‘It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy Treatment’ available at 
https://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/its-time-dump-nonmarket-economy-treatment (accessed 12 
September 2017). 
109The ITAC may depart from using the country of origin in calculating normal value if in its investigations 
concludes that the ‘like product’ did not pass the ordinary course of trade test  
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It is important to highlight that Brink avers that the Commission does not only revert to using 
alternative methodologies, when there is no or insufficient sales in the ordinary course of trade, 
but can also use constructed value where information on such prices is unavailable.110 There are 
two alternatives to calculating normal value. The Commission may use constructed normal value 
or they may adopt normal value of a surrogate country.111 Adoption of a surrogate country only 
relates to imports from a non-market economy and not in other cases where there are insufficient 
domestic sales in the ordinary course of trade.112 Both ways will inevitably lead to a higher anti-
dumping duty because the calculations amount to higher domestic selling prices making the normal 
value higher than the export price.113  
The ITAA unlike the ADA provides for the constructed normal value as the primary alternative 
over the price of the ‘like product’ exported to an appropriate third or surrogate country.114 When 
using constructed normal value, the Commission creates a cost of production and they add 
reasonable costs for administration, selling, general and profit to the goods in the country of origin 
when they are for domestic consumption.115 This method of calculating the normal value was 
disputed by India in South Africa - Pharmaceutical Product.116 
The Indian government requested consultation, alleging that South Africa’s definition and 
calculation of the normal value was flawed and inconsistent with the provisions of the WTO.117 In 
US – OCTG (Korea), the panel clarified the issue of using constructed normal value.118 It held 
that:  
                                                            
110Brink G (A-D in SA 2012) 18; see also Section 32(2)(b)(ii) of the ITAA. 
111Trade Law Chamber in association with Geldenhuys Jourbert Attorneys’ Supreme Court of Appeal overturns 
earlier decision on market economy status’ available at https://tradelawchambers.com/raxo-what-s-on/82-supreme-
court-of-appeal-overturns-earlier-decision-on-market-economy-status.html  (accessed 12 September 2017). 
112 Brink G (2004) 772. 
113Trade Law Chamber in association with Geldenhuys Jourbert Attorneys’ Supreme Court of Appeal overturns 
earlier decision on market economy status’ available at https://tradelawchambers.com/raxo-what-s-on/82-supreme-
court-of-appeal-overturns-earlier-decision-on-market-economy-status.html  (accessed 12 September 2017). 
114See generally Section 32(b) (i)(aa) and (bb) of  the ITAA. 
115Section 32(b) (i)(aa)of  the ITAA. 
116South Africa - Anti-dumping Duties on Certain Pharmaceutical Products from India - Request for Consultations 
by India WT/DS168/1 G/L/303 G/ADP/D17/1. 
117South Africa - Anti-dumping Duties on Certain Pharmaceutical Products from India - Request for Consultations 
by India WT/DS168/1 G/L/303 G/ADP/D17/1. 
118United States – Anti-Dumping Measures On Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods From Korea WT/DS488/R 
(hereafter Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea) 
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..Identification of low-volume sales acts as a trigger for an investigating authority to use an 
alternative to the price of those sales for normal value determination but not necessarily to exclude 
the components of the price pertaining to those sales from that determination. If an investigating 
authority opts to construct normal value, nothing in Article 2.2 suggests that it is required to, or 
may, exclude data derived from the rejected low-volume sales from that construction.119 
This suggests that the ADA does not require investigating authorities to exclude data from rejected 
low sales from construction. The author opines that where authorities completely disregard low- 
volume sales in constructing normal value and uses construction as primary alternative, it is 
erroneous as in most cases it leads to higher anti-dumping duties.120 This in turn acts as 
protectionism instead of being a direct reaction to counter unfair trade. Accordingly, the study 
argues that if this method is adopted, in many cases it may lead to market abuse. 
The other alternative to calculating normal value is to use ‘the highest comparable price of the like 
product when exported to an appropriate third or surrogate country,’ provided that price is 
representative.121 When choosing an appropriate third country the ITAC uses the methodology 
prescribed in the ADR 2003 and after that the Commission performs an ordinary course of trade 
test for the ‘like product’ in the third country.122 The Commission has used this alternative when 
they could not calculate normal value using the primary method.123 
When China and India were accused of dumping graphite electrodes for use in furnaces, the ITAC 
had to use an appropriate third country in finding a prima facie case of dumping.124 In the case of 
China, the domestic selling price was determined using the United States of America (USA) as the 
appropriate third country.125 Whilst for India the highest comparable price was determined based 
                                                            
119 Panel Report US – OCTG (Korea) para 7.45. 
120A typical example of how the methodology used in constructing normal value leads to higher anti-dumping duties 
can be seen in the USA Anti -Dumping Poultry case of 2000 when South Africa Board constructed the normal value 
and manipulated costs in order to protect a malfunctioning SA poultry industry. 
121Section 32(b) (i)(bb)of the  ITAA. 
122See generally Section 8(2) of the ADR 2003. 
123See Government Gazette Notice: 37037 of  2013Notice of initiation of an investigation into the alleged dumping 
of graphite electrodes for use in furnaces originating in or imported from the People’s Republic of China (China) 
and India .  
124Notice of initiation of an investigation into the alleged dumping of graphite electrodes for use in furnaces 
originating in or imported from the People’s Republic of China (China) and India GN No. 37037 of 22 November 
2013. 
125There were adjustments that were made to accommodate transport and arrive at the net ex-factory normal value. 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) statistics were used to determine China’s export price. ‘An adjustment for 
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on the export price from India to Canada.126 The author is of the view that using an appropriate 
third country to calculate normal value is better than using constructed normal value. This is 
because the Commission will be dealing with figures, which are already in the market rather than 
coming up with their own figures. However, others may argue that the conditions of sale are 
different from those in the SACU but this can be rectified in adjustments.  
The problem in using a third country is that both the ITAA and the ADR 2003 do not clarify what 
an appropriate third country is. This may be challenging because although the Commission does 
an ordinary course of trade test for ‘like products’ in an appropriate country, the prices may already 
be dumped. The process may also be abused if the Commission colludes with a third country, 
especially where anti-dumping laws are used as a political tool. After determining the normal 
value, the ITAC has to determine the export price and do a fair comparison of the two values. 
Export Price 
The ITAA defines export price as the actual price paid or ‘payable for goods sold for export, net 
of all taxes, discounts and rebates actually granted and directly related to that sale’.127 The 
Commission, in determining the export price, uses official SARS import statistics.128 However, 
where statistics cannot be depended upon because of its inclusiveness of products not under 
investigation under the same tariff subheading, they should not be relied on.129 In cases where the 
commission decides to use SARS statistics, there is need to adjust the export price to the net ex-
factory level.130 This is important because it enables proper comparison with the normal value.131  
                                                            
freight was made to the f.o.b. import price to calculate the ex-factory export price’ see GN No. 37037 of 22 
November 2013. 
126Adjustments were made to accommodate transport and arrive at the net ex-factory normal value. South African 
Revenue Service (SARS) statistics were used to determine India’s export price. ‘An adjustment for freight was made 
to the f.o.b. import price to calculate the ex-factory export price’ see GN No. 37037 of 22 November 2013. 
127Section 32(a)of the  ITAA. 
128The ITAC Report 476: Investigation into the alleged dumping of disodium carbonate (soda ash) originating in or 
imported from the United States of America (USA): Final Determination. 
129See Colesky T A Comparative Study on Customs Tariffs Classification (unpublished LLD thesis, University Of 
Pretoria 2014) a clear analysis of what SARS is mandated to do by ITAC is given. 
130International Trade Administration Commission Anti-dumping Application Form 
A substantiated adjustment should be made for movement expenses and costs from the f.o.b. to an ex-factory level 
in the exporting country. 
131See World Trade Organisation South Africa – Anti-Dumping Duties On Frozen Meat Of Fowls From Brazil 
Request For Consultations By Brazil (2012) WT/DS439/1 G/L/990 G/ADP/D92/1. One of the reasons why Brazil 
requested consultation was that South Africa failed to make a fair comparison because they did not do necessary 
adjustments to the export price. 
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Companies and the Commission can also use solutions such as Stratalyze, which is a database with 
statistics for any tariff code, and the material can then be used in the application for anti-dumping 
application to prove a prima facie export price.132  However, if the Commission bases its findings 
on information from a secondary source, it has to do so with caution as that information may not 
be correct. There is the need to verify the information and where practical, check the information 
from other independent sources at ‘their disposal, such as published price lists, official import 
statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained from other interested parties 
during the investigation’.133 
In instances where the export price is unavailable or its reliability, for whatever reason, is 
questioned, the basis for calculating the export price should be founded on the price at which the 
imported goods are first resold to an independent buyer.134 This should also be done where the 
export price is unreliable, because of arrangements compensatory in nature with respect to the 
export price between the concerned parties, or where the parties are related.135 If the price is 
unreliable, reasons should be clearly stated and additional information related to costs should be 
given.  
This price will then be ‘constructed backwards by subtracting all relevant costs and profits to arrive 
at an ex-factory price in the country of origin’.136 Essentially, this is the difference between the 
exporter's ex-factory prices and the first independent resale price. The relevant costs to be 
subtracted in a constructed export price situation are therefore twofold: firstly, costs incurred in 
the SACU and secondly, costs incurred in getting the product to the SACU.137 
In constructing such, evidence should be given that supports the construction; this should include 
a clear breakdown of the deductions made.138 The regulation also gives the Commission authority 
to construct export price on reasonable basis in a case where product is not resold to an independent 
                                                            
132 XA International Trade Advisors ‘Initiating an anti-dumping case’ available at   http://xa.co.za/strategy-for-
initiating-an-anti-dumping-case/  (accessed 19 September 2017). 
133ITAC Report 168 Investigation into the alleged dumping of unframed glass mirrors of a thickness of 2 mm to 6 
mm originating in or imported from India and Indonesia: Final determination 11. 
134Section 32(5) of the ITAA. 
135Section 32(6)(b) of  the ITAA. 
136WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices Working Group on Implementation Article 2.3 – Constructed 
Export Price (2011) Paper by South Africa G/ADP/AHG/W/190. 
137WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices Working Group on Implementation Article 2.3 – Constructed 
Export Price (2011) Paper by South Africa G/ADP/AHG/W/190. 
138Section 10.2(a) and (b) of the ADR 2003. 
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buyer or where conditions of sale are different.139 This is commendable, as the legislature 
reasonably foresaw that if such a provision was not included, the Commission was going to face 
difficulties if faced with such a situation. After the ITAC determines both export price and normal 
value, there is the need for it to make a fair comparison.  
Fair Comparison 
As noted in Chapter 2, the ADA requires a fair comparison to be made after determination of 
normal value and export price.140 Where normal value and export price are not compared at the 
same level, it can lead to higher export price making dumping margin much higher than it should 
be. Both the ITAA and the ADR 2003 requires the Commission to make a ‘fair comparison’ 
between the normal value and the export price.141 The Commission is required to make such 
comparison at the ex-factory level and concerning sales, which belong to the same level of trade.142 
When comparing at same level of trade, the ITAC is required to include delivering, packaging and 
payment terms.143 In South Africa –Frozen Meat of Fowls, Brazil requested for consultation 
alleging that South Africa had failed to make a fair comparison by not bringing normal value and 
export price at the same level, therefore imposing an unreasonable burden on exporters.144 
When the Commission compares normal value and the export price, it is normally, on a weighted 
-average- to -weighted- average basis, but in some circumstances it can be done on a transaction-
by-transaction basis if so requires.145 The Commission can compare normal value founded on a 
weighted average with individual export transactions if it is of the opinion that a pattern of export 
prices are considerably different  amongst different purchasers, regions or time periods.146 In cases 
where weighted average-to-transaction is used the Commission has to indicate reasons for such 
                                                            
139See generally Section 10.4 of ADR 2003 
140See generally 2.4.1.3 Comparison of Normal Value and Export Price. 
141See generally Section 32(3) of the ITAA and Section 11 of the ADR 2003.   
142Section 11 (3) of the ADR 2003. 
143Section 11 (4) of the ADR 2003. 
144South Africa – Anti-Dumping Duties On Frozen Meat Of Fowls From Brazil Request For Consultations By Brazil  
WT/DS439/1 G/L/990 G/ADP/D92/1(hereafter South Africa –Frozen Meat of Fowls). 
145Theron N ‘Anti-dumping procedures: Lessons for developing countries with special emphasis on the South 
African experience’ in Debroy B and Chakraborty D (eds) Anti-dumping: global abuse of a trade policy instrument 
(2007) 74. 
146See Article 2.4.2 of the ADA.  
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comparison in all subsequent reports.147 In US — Washing Machines, the panel held that if one 
chooses this method, the transaction must fall within a relevant pricing pattern.148 
In addition to the export price and the normal value being on a similar basis and level of trade, 
they should also be on the same level concerning physical characteristics of the product, the 
quantities sold, and the terms and conditions of sale.149  However, if the export price and normal 
value are not on a comparable basis, allowance should be made for any differences.150 Brink notes 
that in making such adjustments the Commission needs to be in a place where it can verify the 
value of the adjustment in the financial documentation provided.151 In support of Brink, the author 
argues that using information that is verified speaks volume on the integrity of how the 
investigations are conducted. In South Africa –Frozen Meat of Fowls, one of the issues Brazil 
alleged was South Africa had not verified deductions between normal value and export price.152 
This shows that where information cannot be verified, it will be difficult to have a comparison that 
is fair and just. Moreover, using unverified information goes against WTO principles of fairness 
and transparency discussed in Chapter 2.153 
When making adjustments for differences in physical characteristics, the differences should be 
clearly stated.154 Besides, there is the need to quantify the extent that the differences have on the 
price and cost of production of the product.155 For taxation, any form of tax that is not part of 
export sales should be indicated stating conditions why tax is paid, the rate and how it affects 
normal value.156 Where the product is exported to SACU at terms of trade that are different, terms 
                                                            
147Section 11(7) of the ADR 2003see also, WTO Dispute Settlement Reports 2003, Volume 6 (2005) 2619. 
148United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea 
WT/DS464/R para 7.188. 
149Finger JM ‘Making sense of GATT/WTO provisions allowing for import restrictions’ in Hoekman BM, Mattoo A 
& English P (eds) Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook, Volume 1 (2002) 201. 
150Andersen H EU Dumping Determinations and WTO Law (2009) 219. New York: Kluwer Law International 
151Brink G ‘Farm Frites v International Trade Administration Commission Case 33264/14 GN’ available at  
https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwi
Y2bXxgdLXAhXqJsAKHevjCqwQFghcMAk&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.saflii.org%2Fza%2Fjournals%2FDEJUR
E%2F2015%2F17.rtf&usg=AOvVaw3D0RnikkrxLlotyrVyx79e (accessed 22 November 2017). 
152See generally South Africa –Frozen Meat of Fowl para 2. 
153See generally Article 2.4 of the ADA. 
154WTO Dispute Settlement Reports 2003, Volume 5 (2005) 2189. 
155WTO National Treatment’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/n1_e.htm 
(accessed 24 November 2017). 
156Hinkelman EG Dictionary of International Trade: Handbook of the Global Trade Community Includes 21 Key 
Appendices (2005) 73. 
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at which the product is exported, should be indicated.157 In addition, the effect of how the terms of 
trade affect price and cost of production should be indicated.158 Where other differences affect fair 
comparison all details should be stated and a ‘substantiated estimate of the allowances to be made 
for each of the differences’.159 
The purpose of having a fair comparison of the normal value and the export price is in the end for 
the determination of the dumping margin and to ascertain the likeliness of dumping recurring. In 
the Notice of initiation of the sunset review of the anti-dumping duty on unframed glass mirrors 
originating in or imported from Indonesia, it was laid out that prima facie proof that dumping 
would continue.160 The allegation of continuation was founded on the comparison between the 
normal values and the export prices.161 
Dumping margin 
Dumping margin is the margin by which the normal value exceeds the export price after allowance 
has been made for any differences affecting price comparability.162 Dumping margin is critical in 
the imposition of anti-dumping duties; it is likely that the greater the margin, the higher the anti-
dumping duty. In calculating dumping margins, there are different formulas applied dependent on 
the product under investigation. Where anti-dumping investigation involves more than one product 
the Commission needs to determine the margin of dumping separately for products that can be 
identified by SARS.163 If products cannot be identified separately by SARS calculation of dumping 
margin must be done separately for each product and weighted average margin of dumping  must 
be determined for all products on the ‘basis of the individual export volume of each product’.164 
Brink has engaged in a detailed discussion on the problems South Africa face in the calculation on 
dumping margins. To summarise the problems, he cites that there is lack of transparency because 
of no access to information of applicant consultants on how calculations are done and the way 
                                                            
157ITAC Anti-dumping Application Form 24. 
158ITAC Anti-dumping Application Form 24. 
159See generally Section 11 of the ADR 2003 also see the ITAC Anti-dumping Application Form 24-26. 
160Notice of initiation of the sunset review of the anti-dumping duty on unframed glass mirrors originating in or 
imported from Indonesia GN No 40621 of 17 February 2017(hereafter GN No 40621 of 17 February 2017) 
161GN No 40621 of 17 February 2017. 
162Part A of ADR 2003. 
163Section 12 (2) (a) of the ADR 2003. 
164Section 12(2) (b) of the ADR 2003. 
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adjustments and calculation are done is mostly incorrect and Commission sometimes use 
unverified information which disadvantages exporters.165 It can also be submitted that the 
provision that deal with dumping margin in the ADR 2003 is not comprehensive like that of the 
ADA; thus, giving investigating authorities so much power in interpreting the legislation. It is then 
correct to say that although South African anti-dumping regime is developed as evidenced in the 
way the Legislature clarifies issues of normal value and export price, but there are still problems 
that need to be addressed such as transparency. 
3.4.2 Determination of Injury 
In Chapter 2, it was stated that the determination of dumping is an initial step in determining 
whether a country should enact anti-dumping measures.166 WTO requires that Members show that 
their domestic industry is ‘materially injured’ or if there is threat of material injury from the 
dumped imports.167 Material injury is such an important element and can be termed cornerstone, 
without it, no anti-dumping measures can be imposed. In South Africa, the Commission cannot 
initiate an anti-dumping investigation without having prima facie evidence of material injury.168 
The regulation defines material injury to mean three things unless it can be implied otherwise from 
the context.169 The three things are the ‘actual material injury, a threat of material injury or that 
the establishment of a domestic industry is materially retarded.170 As in the ADA, South Africa 
also does not define the word ‘material’ but the Commission is given guidelines on what it should 
consider in its determination of material injury.171 One can argue that the word material can be 
inferred from the guidelines to mean harm that is considerable enough to affect the domestic 
industry. 
Actual Material Injury 
                                                            
165See full discussion in Brink G ‘Dumping and Injury Margin Calculation Methods: Ten Major Problems in South 
Africa’ (2007) Global Trade and Customs Journal. 
166See 2.4.1.1 Determination of Normal Value. 
167See generally Article 3.4 of the ADA.  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Dispute Settlement in International Trade: Anti-
Dumping Measures (2003) 21. 
168Section 24 of the ADR 2003. 
169Section 1of the ADR 2003. 
170Section 1of the ADR 2003. 
171See generally Article 3.1 of the ADA. 
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In determining material injury to the SACU industry, the Commission is required to look at 
whether there has ‘been a significant depression and/or suppression of the SACU industry’s 
price’.172 This position is similar to that of WTO in Chapter 2.173 Price depression is defined as a 
situation where there is decrease of the price in SACU’s industry’s ex-factory when the 
investigation is being conducted.174 Ex-factory is not defined in the Act but generally, it refers to 
prices at the factory without any other charges such as delivery and subsequent taxes attached to 
it.175 On the other hand, price suppression arises ‘where the cost-to-price-ratio of the SACU 
industry increases, or where the SACU industry sells at a loss during the investigation period or 
part thereof.’176  
When looking at whether there has been price suppression or depression the Commission is only 
required to look at information that relates to the ‘like’ SACU product that is affected by the 
alleged unfair trade practice.177 However, where separation is impossible because of the available 
data, evidence should be based on the narrowest identifiable product group that includes the ‘like’ 
SACU product being the subject of the application.178 Brink points out that the wording used in 
this section is wrong because the product under investigation is the dumped product but the 
intention of legislature is clear, it is clear that only the domestic ‘like product’ is to be 
considered.179 
An investigation of injury can never be initiated if less than 25 per cent of all producers by volume 
do not support the application.180 Furthermore, a preliminary or final determination of injury is 
made only if all evidence relating to ‘a major proportion’ of the SACU industry has been 
considered. The Commission should also consider the factors listed in the regulation to determine 
                                                            
172Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices & Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ‘Notification of 
laws and regulations under Articles 18.5 and 32.6 of the Agreements: South Africa’ (2004) 55.  
173See generally Article 3.2 of ADA. 
174Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices & Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ‘Notification of 
laws and regulations under Articles 18.5 and 32.6 of the Agreements: South Africa’ (2004) 55. 
175Business Directory ‘Ex-Factory’ available at http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/ex-factory.html  
(accessed 21 September 2017). 
176Section 1 of the ADR 2003. 
177Ngoma LL A critical analysis of the use of anti-dumping regulation in Southern African Customs Union (SACU): 
a case of Botswana (unpublished thesis, University of Pretoria 2010) 56. 
178Section 13(4) of the ADR 2003. 
179Brink G ‘X-raying injury findings in South Africa’s anti-dumping investigations’ available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/52019/Brink_XRaying_2015.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 23 
November 2017). 
180Section 7(3) (a) of the ADR 2003. 
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injury. It should consider whether there have been significant changes in the domestic performance 
of the SACU industry in respect of the following  
‘sales volume;  profit and loss; output; market share; productivity; return on investments; capacity 
utilisation; cash flow inventories; employment; wages; growth; ability to raise capital or 
investments; and  any other relevant factors placed before the Commission.’181 
Investigative report and application forms of ITAC ‘provide only the summarised indications to 
each factor of the injury determination, referring to indexed data such as tables’ the effect is that 
only data is provided and this fails to meet the ADA criteria of making an evaluation of the facts.182 
Brink avers that whilst the ADA requires that analysis of these factors with regard to its bearing 
on the state of the industry, the regulations limit the factors to the domestic performance of the 
industry.183  
Both the ADR 2003 and the ADA provide that a case of injury cannot be based by only looking at 
one or several factors.184 However, Brink is of the opinion that in many investigations there are 
two factors, which play a critical role in the determination; these are price injury or volume 
injury.185 This is because where competition is stiff due to dumped imports, SACU ‘industry can 
either reduce prices to maintain volumes, thereby decreasing its profit margin, or it can hold prices 
and lose volumes, thereby also experiencing reduced profit’.186  
The author concurs with Brink because if one looks at factors such as wage cuts or retrenchment 
due to dumped imports it is mainly dependent upon price injury. If profit margins decrease, it is 
likely that the employer may not be able to maintain the salaries given to employees when business 
                                                            
181Section 13(2) of the ADR 2003. 
182Brink G‘South Africa’ in Nakagawa J Anti-Dumping Laws and Practices of the New Users (2007) 221. 
183Brink G ‘X-raying injury findings in South Africa’s anti-dumping investigations’ available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/52019/Brink_XRaying_2015.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 23 
November 2017). 
184 See the factors in Section 13(2) of ADR 2003. 
185Brink G ‘A nutshell guide to anti-dumping action’ (2008) available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8445/Brink_Nutshell%282008%29b.pdf?sequence=1   accessed 
28 September 2017) 263. 
186Brink ‘A nutshell guide to anti-dumping action’ (2008) available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8445/Brink_Nutshell%282008%29b.pdf?sequence=1   accessed 
28 September 2017) 263. 
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was at peak.187 It is important to state that there is no set decision on which factors to use or leave 
out when determining injury. In addition, it is undeniable that South African researchers and 
publishers writings on anti- dumping issues in the country has helped in strengthening the anti-
dumping systems through highlighting the strengths and shortfalls in the regime.188 
Threat of material injury 
Material injury also means threat of material injury as such a threat is suffice in proving a prima 
facie proof of injury. However a determination of threat of material injury should be based on 
facts, mere allegations are not enough.189 In Threaded Rods, the ITAC made a preliminary 
determination on the threat of material injury by looking at all the facts.190 Amongst them, it looked 
at the fact that the European Union had enacted anti-dumping duties on Chinese goods, leaving 
Chinese companies with no option but to look for markets elsewhere.191 The Commission also 
looked at the fact that a significant increase in the dumped goods would eventually lead to closure 
of the SACU industry.192 Thus, the Commission’s findings were consistent with WTO rules insofar 
as known that a country cannot deduce a threat of injury because of a mere allegation.  
When considering a threat of material injury the Commission has to look at additional factors from 
the ones provided Section 13. They have to consider if the dumped imports have significantly 
increased in the domestic market of the SACU.193 When the Commission imposed anti-dumping 
duties on cement from Pakistan, it held that threat of material injury was present because there was 
a significant increase in the dumped Pakistan cement in SACU.194  Mohale held that Pakistan’s 
                                                            
187Ozyasar H ‘The Impact of Margin Decrease on Financial Statements’ available at 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/impact-margin-decrease-financial-statements-39347.html accessed 28 September 
2017). 
188The Chapter engages with scholarly articles on South Africa and each article has contributed in highlighting 
strengths and weaknesses of the South African anti-dumping system. 
189Narayanan P ‘Injury Investigations in "Material Retardation" Antidumping Cases’ (2004)25(1) Northwestern 
Journal of International Law and Business 45. 
190ITAC Report 400: Investigation into the alleged dumping of screw studding (rods threaded throughout) of 
stainless steel and steel (commonly known as threaded rods) originating in or imported from the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC): Preliminary Determination Report (hereafter Threaded Rods). 
191Threaded Rods 37.  
192Threaded Rods 39; Also see general discussion on effects of dumping in McCarthy C ‘African Regional 
Economic Integration: Is the Paradigm Relevant and Appropriate?’ in Herrmann C & Terhechte JP (eds) European 
Yearbook of International Economic Law (2011) 345-368.  
193Section 14.2(a) of the ADR 2003. 
194Dawn ‘South Africa imposes duties on cement’ available at https://www.dawn.com/news/1182231 (accessed 23 
November 2017). 
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exports to its traditional markets were declining and imports from Pakistan into the SACU region 
increased by over 600% between 2010 and 2013’.195  
In 2013, the Commission initiated anti-dumping investigation on poultry originating from 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.196 Southern African Poultry Association in 
its application indicated that there was a greater probability of increase in volume of alleged 
dumped imports in future.197 This was expected due to the fact South Africa had a free trade 
agreement with the European Union (EU) which meant that the landing costs would have 
decreased as the import duty was expected to be zero.198 Therefore, the existence of a free trade 
agreement did indicate a fact rather than a mere remote possibility of threat. 
Besides the increase of dumped imports in the domestic markets, the Commission must also 
consider other factors. These include whether there has been ‘sufficiently freely available, or an 
imminent substantial increase in, capacity of the exporter’; ‘the availability of other export markets 
to absorb additional export volumes’.199 It should also look at whether products entering SACU 
market have prices that will have a substantial ‘depressing or suppressing effect on SACU prices; 
and the exporter's inventories of the product under investigation’.200 
Material retardation 
The last part of material injury is concerned with material retardation of the establishment of an 
industry. When proving injury in a case of material retardation the proposed industry should 
provide the Commission with a comprehensive business plan in order for them to initiate an 
investigation.201 The plan should indicate the establishment of the proposed industry in the absence 
of dumping.202 In Grinding Balls China, an investigation was initiated after the Commission 
                                                            
195ITAC Staff Reporter ‘Stiff anti-dumping duties imposed on Pakistani cement’ available at  
http://www.itac.org.za/news-headlines/itac-in-the-media/stiff-anti-dumping-duties-imposed-on-pakistani-cement 
(accessed 28 September 2017). 
196Astral Foods ‘Astral Integrated Annual Report’ (2013) 20. 
197Astral Foods ‘Astral Integrated Annual Report’ (2015) 20. 
198Cronje J ‘Anti-dumping investigation on chicken imports from the EU’ (2013) available at 
https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5343-anti-dumping-investigation-on-chicken-imports-from-the-eu.html 
(accessed 03 October 2017). 
199Section 14.2(b) of the ADR 2003. 
200See generally Section 14(2) of the ADR 2003. 
201Section 15(1) of the ADR 2003. 
202Section 15(1) of the ADR 2003 see also Barringer WH and Dunn CA ‘Antidumping and Countervailing Duties 
Investigations under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979’ (1979) 14 Journal of International Law & Economics 7. 
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‘considered that there was sufficient evidence to show that the subject product was being imported 
at dumped prices, causing material retardation of the establishment of the SACU industry’.203 
However, the investigation was terminated, as there was no causal link between the dumped 
imports injury experienced by the applicant.204 The termination of investigation highlights the fact 
that the subject of material retardation is more complex and perhaps should be relooked at as 
suggested by Egypt in 2006.205  
In Chapter 2, it was stated that many subject of material retardation is not greatly researched and 
reliance on material retardation to apply anti-dumping duties is scarce.206 The author opined that 
this may be because the issue of material retardation affects mostly developing countries.207 
Interestingly although South Africa has emerging markets, material retardation is not as researched 
as it can be. The reason for under research may be alluded to inexperience on the issue because 
the WTO does not provide guidelines for Members to use. 
3.4.3 Causal Link 
The establishments of a causal link between dumped imports and material injury is very important 
in anti-dumping investigations.208 Before the Commission recommends imposition of anti-
dumping duties, the element of causation should be established. This can be done by looking at all 
relevant factors.209 The list is not a closed list and the Commission has discretion to add other 
factors as the regulations clearly state that the factors under section 16 are not limited.210  
Generally, causation is determined with reference to trends in quantities and prices of the dumped 
imports together with price undercutting or suppression and depression.211 Brink makes an analogy 
                                                            
203Government Gazette Notice: 2844 of 2004Termination of Investigation Into The Alleged Dumping of forged or 
Stamped, But Not Further Worked, Grinding Balls and Similar Articles For Mills Originating In Or Imported from 
the People's Republic Of China (PRC) (hereafter Government Gazette Notice: 2844 of 2004Grinding Balls China). 
204Government Gazette Notice: 2844 of 2004 Grinding Balls China. 
205See generally 2.4.2.3.3 Determination of Material retardation. 
206See generally 2.4.2.3.3 Determination of Material retardation. 
207See generally 2.4.2.3.3 Determination of Material retardation. 
208See discussion on Causality under WTO on 2.4.3 Causality. 
209These factors are ‘(a) the change in the volume of dumped imports, whether absolute or relative to the production 
or consumption in the SACU market; (b) the price undercutting experienced by the SACU industry vis-a-vis the 
imported products; (c) the market share of the dumped imports; (d) the magnitude of the margin of dumping; and (e) 
the price of un dumped imports available in the market’. See generally Section 16 of the ADR 2003. 
210See generally Section 16 of the ADR 2003. 
211Guillermo Erasmus & Keith Hendry ‘The Limits of the Use of Anti-Dumping Measures’ 
available at http://www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/the-limits-of-the-use-of-anti-dumping-measures/ (accessed 03 
October 2017). 
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between causation and material injury pointing out that in causation, two factors normally provide 
decisive guidance.212 However, analysis of factors where causation is concerned to establish 
reasons for trends identified.213  
As in the ADA, the ADR 2003 also contains a non-attributed provision.214 The ITAC is required 
to give into consideration all the important factors that may have contributed to injury in SACU 
which are not attributable to dumping.215 On the list of factors, it is a positive step that the 
legislation does list trade restrictive trade practises of competition between the foreign and SACU 
producers as a non- attributable factor.216 This is because in Chapter 2, it was averred that anti-
dumping rules should include issues of competition at a WTO level to minimise abuse of anti-
dumping laws and protectionism.217 If injury is because of such other factors, it may not be linked 
to dumping, if the interested party gave the information of such factors to the Commission.  
3.4.4 Public Interest Considerations  
Currently the ADA does not contain provisions on public interest except as provided in Article 
6.12 and 9.1 of the ADA. Article 6.12 encourages national governments to give consumers and 
intermediate users the opportunity ‘to provide information relevant to the investigation and the 
determination of dumping’.218 Although this is good, one can strongly suggest that it is not enough 
to consider public opinion through providing of information only. Imposition of anti-dumping 
duties on foreign goods can seriously affect the welfare of people in the importing country as such; 
public interest should also influence how duties are imposed. 
It is important to note that Article 9.1 may seem to consider public interest through application of 
lesser duty however, application is not mandatory.219 In the ADR 2003 there is no comprehensive 
provision for consideration of public interest before enactment of anti-dumping duties.220 Despite 
                                                            
212The first factor makes a comparison between landed cost of the imported product and ex-factory price of the 
domestic industry if landed lost is lower causation is likely. The second factor looks at market share loss of domestic 
industry as a direct result of dumped products. 
213See generally Brink G (2015). 
214See discussion in 2.4.3 Causality. 
215Section 16 (5) of the ADR 2003. 
216 Section 16 (5) of the ADR 2003. 
217See generally 2.6 Challenges within World Trade Organisation Anti- Dumping Rules. 
218Article 6.12 of the ADA.  
219See generally Article 9.1 of the ADA. 
220Sibanda OS ‘Public Interest Considerations in the South African Anti-Dumping and Competition Law, Policy, 
and Practice’ (2015) 14(5) International Business & Economics Research Journal 738. 
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the non-existence of the provision, the issue of public interest has been under discussion by 
different scholars for a long time and their views are similar.221 In so far as dumping is done by 
private companies and governments only react where such dumping is materially injuring the 
domestic industry,222 the consumer also suffers. Consumers can be negatively and positively 
affected by dumping and anti-dumping duties. It is therefore of paramount importance that their 
rights be heard. Generally, public interest refers to the privilege of giving ordinary citizens a voice 
in matter, which can affect them.223 
Brink’s definition of public interest in anti-dumping investigations includes the assessment that 
the ‘imposition of anti-dumping duties may have on interested parties, being the domestic industry 
producing the like product, upstream producers of inputs for the domestic industry, the 
downstream users of the product and consumers’.224 Although South Africa does not have an 
express provision on public interest, it can be inferred from some of its reports and conduct that 
the Commission has considered public interest in reaching some of its decisions.225  
In Semi-refined paraffin wax (candle wax), the Board did not impose anti-dumping duties although 
the dumping had been found to be injurious to the domestic industry.226 The imposition would 
have been detrimental to consumers as price of candles would have risen to around 40 per cent and 
as a result, the Board held that the requirement of causality was not met.227 The author also suggests 
that when South Africa provided the USA with an anti-dumping duty-free quota on chicken 
imports after being threatened by former President Obama with exclusion from the Africa Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA), public interest considerations may have played a role.228  This is 
                                                            
221See generally Sibanda OS (2015); Brink G (2009); Brink G (2005); Moens Paul IA Public Interest Issues in 
International and Domestic Anti-Dumping Law: The WTO, European Communities and Canada (1998). 
222See generally 2.4 World Trade Organisation Treatment Of Dumping. 
223International Trade Centre Business Guide to Trade Remedies in Brazil: Anti-dumping, countervailing and 
safeguard legislation, practices and procedures (2009) 31. 
224Brink G ‘National Interest In Anti-Dumping Investigations’ (2009) 126 South African Law of Journal 327 Brinks 
explain that interests which may be considered include competition law through application of lesser duty rule. 
225 See generally Brink G (2015. 
226See generally Brink G (2015).  
227See Board Report 3492 (1994) as stated in Brink G (2015). 
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because maintaining higher anti-dumping duties at the expense of being excluded from AGOA 
would have affected the people of South Africa.229 
3.5 PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
In Chapter 2, procedural requirements that need to be complied with when WTO members are 
conducting anti-dumping investigations were discussed. It was made clear that WTO member are 
not prevented from adding procedural requirements in their national legislation that supplement 
ADA. In South Africa, the ITAA mandates the ITAC to conduct anti-dumping investigations 
where a prima facie case of dumping has been established.230 During the investigative process, all 
interested parties should be given reasonable time to respond as required by PAJA. The next 
section is going to discuss will discuss the procedures the Commission must conform to when 
handling anti-dumping investigations. There are three legs to this investigation namely pre-
initiation, initiation and preliminary phase, and the final investigation phase.  
3.5.1 Pre-initiation Phase  
An anti-dumping investigation can be initiated by an interested party through a written application 
by SACU or on behalf of SACU.231 The Commission may also initiate an investigation in the 
absence of such a written application from an interested party, if it has sufficient evidence of 
dumping, material injury and causation.232 An interested party should complete the Commission’s 
relevant application in order to initiate the investigation.233  
It is the duty of the Commissioner’s trade remedies unit to check with SACU industry that that the 
information submitted for the application is correct and if it is in the required format.234 If an 
                                                            
229The access of South Africa to USA markets has created an estimated 62 000 jobs, the economy has extensively 
benefited from the arrangement. Vehicle exports saw a tremendous  growth from zero in 2000 to average around 
$1.7 billion per year,  the citrus industry has also gained a comparative advantage and as results jobs have been 
created see Ebrahim S ‘SA AGOA benefit in peril? available at https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/sas-
agoa-benefits-in-peril-1941087 (accessed 22 October 2017). 
230See generally Part B Functions of Commission of the ITAA. 
231Section 21(1) of the ADR 2003, see also Sibanda OS ‘The South African Anti-Dumping Law: consistency with 
the GATT Anti-Dumping Code’ (2001) 34(2) The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
253. 
232Section 21(2) of the ADR 2003. 
233Section 21(2) of the ADR 2003. 
234See generally Brink G ‘10 Major Problems with the Anti-Dumping Instrument in South Africa’ (2005) 39 (1) 
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application is not properly documented the Commission is obliged to return application to 
applicant.235 
For initiation purposes, the applicant is required to submit all reasonably available information as 
concerning the normal value of the dumped product.236 As such, the application is required to 
submit proof that can be in form of invoices, quotes, international publications or any other 
reasonable proof.237 If applicant constructs normal value or uses price of export to a third country 
because they could not get hold of information on normal value, applicant is required to state its 
efforts to obtain such price.238 
Though the Commission is required to check that information provided by the applicant is accurate 
and adequate, deficiencies or inaccuracies should not result in delay of initiation if they do not 
undermine a prima facie establishment case of injurious dumping.239 This in turn saves time, by 
avoiding unnecessary delays. Where the Commission comes to a decision that the application by 
the applicant does not warrant enough merit to initiate investigation, it has to notify the 
applicant.240 Moreover, it has to provide substantial reasons for its decision for negative merit 
assessment.241  
After verifying information and conclusion of a prima facie case of injurious dumping the 
Commission is required to notify the representative of the country of the dumped product that it 
has received a properly documented application against their product.242 This notification should 
be done prior to initiation and it should be the only way to publicise the application before the 
investigation commences.243 The author strongly supports this as making the issue may lead to an 
assortment of problems being forwarded, which may be detrimental where the Commission decide 
not to initiate the investigation. However, once the notice of initiation has been publicised in the 
                                                            
235Section 21(1) of the ADR 2003 see also Brink G ‘A nutshell guide to safeguard action’ (2008) 551 available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8422/Brink_Nutshell%282008%29c.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed
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236See generally Section 23 of  the ADR 2003; Mavroidis PC et al (ed) The Law and Economics of Contingent 
Protection in the WTO (2010) 135. 
237Section 23(2) of the ADR 2003. 
238See generally Section 23 of the ADR 2003. 
239Section 25 of the ADR 2003. 
240Section 26 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
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Government Gazette all known interested parties may be supplied with a non-confidential version 
of the application.244  
3.5.2 Initiation and Preliminary Phase  
The initiation phase is provided under Section 28 of the ADR 2003. It prescribes that for 
investigation to formally commence a notice should be published in the Government Gazette.245 
The contents of the notice must include all the three elements of dumping, injury and causality.246 
It also should contain evidence of the alleged dumping, together with basis of factors of which 
injury was concluded.247 Besides these elements, the notice shall also contain names of the 
applicant, detailed description of dumped product inclusive of the tariff subheading, which applies 
to the product; and the country or countries under investigation.248 Lastly, the notice should include 
the expected period for response by interested parties and their addresses to which representations 
should be directed.249 
The publication of notice of initiation in the Government Gazette signifies that all interested parties 
have received the notice.250 As such, deadline extension based on ignorance of the investigation 
will not be considered because ignorance does not equal good cause.251 However in S v De Blom, 
the court held that the rule ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ does not apply without qualification 
if one can prove that ignorance was reasonable and excusable ignorance may be excused.252  It is 
also unlikely that the Commission will excuse ignorance of initiation where interested parties were 
formally notified of the application received in terms of Section 27 (1) of the ADR 2003. 
The preliminary investigation commences when relevant questionnaires are sent to importers, 
exporters and foreign producers.253 Importantly, parties are deemed to be in receipt of 
                                                            
244Section 27 (3) of the ADR 2003. 
245Section 28 of the ADR 2003. 
246Section 28 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
247ITAC Anti-dumping Application Form 26. 
248See generally Section 28 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
249Czako J, Human J and Miranda J A Handbook on Anti-Dumping Investigations (2003) 339. 
250Where it is practical the Commission should inform all known interested parties of the initiation of the 
investigation and give them all relevant documentation with regard to the investigation. 
251Section 28 (4) of the ADR 2003. 
252See generally S v De Blom 1977 (3) SA.513 (A). 
253 Section 29 of the ADR 2003. 
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questionnaires 7 days after the dispatch by the Commission.254 When responding to the 
Commission the parties are required to use the relevant Commission questionnaires and such 
response must be done within 30 days of receipt.255 The Commission’s trade remedies unit should 
receive the responses before 15h00 on the date indicated in the letters accompanying the 
questionnaires.256 Where parties were not directly informed of the investigation, a response should 
be tendered 40 days from the date of the initiation in the Government Gazette. 257 It is important 
to note that where no other agreement with the Commission exits all submissions must be in both 
hard and electronic copy and failure may result in deficient in accordance with Section 31.258 
In the event that exporters do no co-operate in the investigations within the specified deadlines, 
the Commission may use available facts and request that provisional anti-dumping duties be 
imposed immediately.259 However, where some exporters cooperate whilst others do not the 
Commission may make findings using the best information available, this can only be for non-
cooperating exporter’s producer or producers.260 The Commission may choose to separate 
cooperating from non-cooperating exporters to speed up proceedings.261 
The imposition of provisional measures can only be done 60 days after initiation of an investigation 
of which the normal period for imposition is six months.262 However, on request by any interested 
exporter provisional payments validity may be extended to nine months.263  
The Commission is required to make a preliminary report on its investigations and the non-
confidential report must be accessible within ‘seven days of the publication of its preliminary 
finding’.264 It is important to note that after the preliminary report is released a price undertaking 
can be entered into with an exporter. If the price undertaking is satisfactory investigation may be 
suspended or terminated thus there will not be a need to apply definite anti-dumping duties.265 The 
                                                            
254Section 29 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
255Section 29 (3) of the ADR 2003. 
256Section 29 (3) of ADR 2003. 
257Section 29 (4) of the ADR 2003. 
258See generally Brink G (2015). 
259Murigi WC (2013) 70. 
260Section 32 (2) of the ADR 2003, see also Brink G (2008) 266.   
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ITAC has never accepted price undertakings maybe because of the administrative burden in 
administering such undertakings.266 In cases where an undertaking is violated, the Commission 
may immediately request SARS to impose provisional anti-dumping duties.267  
3.5.3 Final Phase 
The final stage commences after publication of the preliminary report. After the preliminary report 
is published, interested parties are given 14 days to comment in writing on the report;268 extension 
may be allowed on good cause.269 If parties want to bring new information after the preliminary 
report they can only do so in terms of Section 35(5). This section applies to parties who corrected 
their deficiencies before the deadline of 14 days. They are therefore deemed cooperating and as 
such, their information will be considered in the Commission’s final finding.270 The Commission 
may be requested to extend the validity of a provisional measure to 9 months in its consideration 
of new information where deficiencies were not addressed within the deadline271 
The imposition of definite anti-dumping duties by the Minister of Finance only takes place after 
the Commission makes a final report.272 They remain in place for a period of five years ‘unless 
otherwise specified or unless reviewed prior to the lapse of the five year period.’273 They may also 
be imposed with a retroactive effect.274  The use of anti-dumping duties has helped to increase 
‘manufacturing output, and recapture the domestic market’.275 In the case of PFG Building Glass 
88 per cent of jobs were retained and manufacturing output was increased.276 The ITAC reckons 
this would have not been possible if anti-dumping duties had not been imposed. Maytex and 
Sheraton (textile companies) have also immensely benefited from anti-dumping duties imposed 
on foreign textiles as they also retained jobs and increased output.277 
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In cases where both elements for imposition of anti-dumping duties are present, the Commission 
can choose to impose lesser duty. Lesser duty is defined as the ‘provisional payment or anti-
dumping duty imposed at the lesser of the margin of dumping or the margin of injury, and which 
is deemed to be sufficient to remove the injury caused by the dumping’.278 This provision is similar 
to Article 9 of the ADA, and like in the ADA, application of lesser duty is optional in South Africa. 
Brazil, Hong Kong, China, India and Japan have called for amendment of Article 9 of the ADA, 
requesting that application be mandatory.279 The members proposed that ADA should provide 
several core disciplines, which deal with the establishment and maintenance of the lesser duty, for 
reasons of ensuring orderly application to the compulsory application of the rule.280   
The shortfall in both the ADA and the ADR 2003 is that neither regulations specify how to 
calculate the lesser duty. Brazil and friends in their proposal to amendment of Article 9 of the 
ADA, mentioned that ‘methodologies for calculating the injury margin, procedural requirements, 
and guidance regarding the extent to which rule applies in reviews, should be clearly stated’.281 
Abdelwahab points out outcomes where lesser duty is applied.282 She avers that application of the 
rule improves the welfare of consumers as compared to the adoption of full dumping margins. It 
also helps to lessen the impacts of misrepresentations, which are created when full anti-dumping 
duties are imposed.283 South Africa only considers imposition of lesser duty where both the 
exporter and importer responded fully.284 It is therefore submitted that South Africa should be 
commended for including a provision for lesser duty in its legislation. This is so because in many 
of its investigations the Commission has recommended a lesser duty be applied.285 This strongly 
suggests that anti-dumping duties are being used as response to unfair trade rather than a 
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protectionist measure promoting anti-competitive behaviour.286 However, the application is 
optional and is dependent on the Commission, which is similar to Article 9 of the ADA. In the 
above paragraphs, the study mentioned that there have been calls at a WTO level to make the rule 
mandatory. 
3.6 REVIEWS  
Re-evaluation of anti-dumping duties is essential because duties are not meant to be permanent, 
but should be put it in place they to counter the dumping that caused the injury.287 The ADR 2003 
prescribes procedure that parties should follow in order to utilise the different reviews that are 
available. The types of reviews that may be used are interim reviews, sunset reviews, anti-
circumvention reviews, new shipper reviews and judicial reviews as discussed more fully below. 
In order for any of the above reviews to be initiated, a notice should be published in the 
Government Gazette.288 The notice should contain all the necessary information such as identity 
of applicant, product to be reviewed, investigation periods for both dumping and injury, anti-
dumping measures that are in force, review scope and basic information on review basis.289 
Besides these requirements, initiation of sunset reviews has additional requirements that also 
apply, which will be referred to later.290 
Once a review in initiated, the Commission is required to notify and supply the government 
concerned and interested parties with all the relevant non-confidential information.291 It is essential 
for applicants to apply for a review that applies to their circumstances. 
Interim reviews 
Interim reviews are also referred to as change of circumstance review due to their nature. The 
Commission can only initiate them if circumstances of an applicant have changed significantly.292 
Cases where importers, exporters or foreign producers are willing to provide information, which 
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287See generally Article 11.1 of the ADA. 
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they failed to co-operate previously, do not qualify as significant change.293 Therefore, these 
parties cannot bring an application for interim reviews just on their current willingness to provide 
information previously withheld. The application for interim reviews cannot normally be 
considered before 12 months lapse from the date of publication of final findings of the original 
investigation.294 It can also not be considered before 12 months from a previous review.295   
The procedure for interim reviews is governed by Section 46 and consists of a single investigation 
phase,296 subject to interested parties being informed of essential facts considered by 
Commission.297 The Commission may verify any information submitted by interested parties for 
purposes of interim reviews if it deems it necessary.298 As such, there is no prohibition from 
applying for both an interim and sunset review for purposes of expanding or limiting the scope of 
‘application or level of any anti-dumping duties’.299 
When an interim review is conducted, an anti-dumping duty may either remain in place, decrease 
or increase depending on the circumstances of each case.300 
Sunset reviews 
Section 53 of the ADR 2003 prescribes that enacted anti-dumping duties remains in force for a 
period ‘not exceeding 5 years from the imposition or the last review thereof’.301 The Commission 
needs to publish a notice in the Government Gazette 6 months before the five-year period ends, 
showing that an anti-dumping duty will lapse on a specific date unless a sunset review is 
initiated.302 If there is need for anti-dumping, duties to continue after the five-year period, a sunset 
review should be initiated before the end of an anti-dumping duty. If a sunset review is initiated 
the anti-dumping duty remains operational until the finalisation of the sunset review.303  
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297See generally Section 46 and 43 of the ADR 2003. 
298Section 46 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
299Section 45 (3) of the ADR 2003. 
300See a discussion on interim reviews by Brink G (A-D in SA 2012) 38-40. 
301Section 53 (1) of the ADR 2003; Brink G (2004) 921. 
302Section 54 (1) of the ADR 2003. 
303Section 53 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
109 
 
When a notice for lapse of anti-dumping duty is published, the Commission must inform interested 
parties of the imminent lapse of the anti-dumping duties.304 If interested parties want to request a 
sunset review, they have 30 days from the publication of the notice to do so.305 When a SACU 
industry wants the anti-dumping duty to continue, it must hand in a proper application to the 
Commission, containing the necessary information.306 The information must be able to prove a 
prima facie case that there is likelihood of continuation or a recurrence of injurious dumping if the 
anti-dumping duty is removed.307  
If the Commission decides to initiate a sunset review, a notice should be published in the 
Government Gazette in accordance with Section 41; such publication should be done before an 
anti-dumping duty lapse.308 Such notice shall contain all the information as contemplated in section 
41. 
The issue of what constitutes five years has been brought before the Constitutional Court and there 
is a landmark ruling on sunset reviews.309 Although the case is landmark in South Africa, to other 
Members of the WTO it may be persuasive and not binding, because it constitutes foreign law 
rather than international obligations. The background of the landmark case before the court 
summarises as follows, the ITAC conducted an investigation in 2000 after SCAW South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd (SCAW) made an application for anti-dumping duties to be imposed on stranded wire, 
rope and cables originating in or imported from China, Germany, India, Korea, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. Anti-dumping duties were then imposed in 2002, United Kingdom. Bridon 
International Limited (Bridon) was found to be dumping its products and as a result an anti-
dumping duty of 42, 1% was imposed.310 Bridon applied for interim reviews in 2006, and the ITAC 
decided that the anti-dumping duty should be maintained as there were no change of 
circumstances, and duties were to expire on the 28th of August 2007.311  
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More than 6 months before the 28th of August 2007, interested parties were informed about their 
right to apply for sunset reviews of which failure would result in lapsing of the anti-dumping 
duty.312 SCAW took heed and submitted an application for sunset reviews. The ITAC, after 
investigations, held that anti-dumping duties should be increased in some cases, whilst those 
imposed against Bridon were to be removed.313 SCAW then sought an interdict to the effect of 
preventing the Commission from recommending its decision of removing duties against Bridon to 
the Minister of Finance.314 The interdict was granted and it was to remain in force pending the 
finalisation of a review instituted by SCAW.315  
The ITAC sought an appeal in the constitutional court before it had finalised the review by SCAW. 
The court set aside the interdict and held that the ‘interdict improperly breached the doctrine of 
separation of powers which is an integral part of our Constitution’.316 The order had an effect of 
overlapping into the powers of the national executive function without appropriate justification.317 
Most importantly, the court held that the interdict extended the lifespan of anti-dumping duties 
beyond what the legislation allows.318 
 It held that dumping duties were only to remain in place for five years after date of imposition, 
reviews are to be finalised in 18 months.319 It is important to note that South Africa may not be 
consistent with the WTO when it comes to the finalisation of reviews within 18 months because 
the ADA in Article11.4 prescribes that reviews need to be finalised within 12 months of the date 
of initiation of the review. In South Africa – Certain paper, Indonesia challenged the fact that an 
anti-dumping duty remained in place whilst a sunset review had been ongoing for nearly 3 years.320 
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314See generally International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd (CCT 59/09) 
[2010] ZACC 6; 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 457 (CC) (9 March 2010). 
315See generally International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd (CCT 59/09) 
[2010] ZACC 6; 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 457 (CC) (9 March 2010). 
316International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd para 110 
317Trade Law Chambers ‘Constitutional Court trumps anti dumping practices’ available at 
https://www.tradelawchambers.com/raxo-what-s-on/63-constitutional-court-trumps-anti-dumping-practices.html 
(accessed 30 October 2017). 
318See generally International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd. 
319See generally International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd. 
320South Africa – Anti-Dumping Measures on Uncoated Woodfree Paper Request for Consultations by Indonesia 
WT/DS374/1 2. 
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SA then promptly withdrew the measure and importers could ‘obtain refunds of any anti-dumping 
duties paid after 27 November 2003’.321 
In International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd it was held  that 
if a matter is referred for judicial reviews, the delays in the court systems might extend duties 
beyond the prescribed lifespan.322 In addition, the lapsing of an existing duty should not be stopped 
because of a pending court case, as this would result in extension of anti-dumping duties beyond 
what the law permits.323 It held that a ‘court should be slow to override mandatory legislative 
provisions buttressed by international obligations’.324 Thus, even if South Africa did not adopt the 
ADA in its national legislation, it respects international law and interprets cases in line with 
international principles. 
Circumvention reviews 
Another review provided by the ADR 2003 is the circumvention reviews. Circumvention refers to 
situations where payment of anti-dumping duty is avoided through structuring the transaction in a 
manner that avoids payment.325 Anti-dumping measures are increasingly being used and many 
exporters may look for ways to bypass them.326  The ADA contains no provisions on 
circumvention. In South Africa, there are different scenarios where circumvention is outright 
illegal and in such situations, a complaint should be lodged with SARS.327 In situations where it is 
not outright illegal, South Africa protects itself extensively through Section 60 of the ADR 2003. 
                                                            
321South Africa – Anti-Dumping Measures on Uncoated Woodfree Paper Communication from Indonesia 
WT/DS374/2. 
322See generally International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd (CCT 59/09) 
[2010] ZACC 6; 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 457 (CC) (9 March 2010). 
323 See generally International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd (CCT 59/09) 
[2010] ZACC 6; 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 457 (CC) (9 March 2010). 
324See generally International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd (CCT 59/09) 
[2010] ZACC 6; 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 457 (CC) (9 March 2010). 
325European Commission ‘Reviews’ (2013) available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_151019.pdf  (accessed 30 October 2017). 
326Theron N ‘Anti-Dumping Procedures: Lessons for Developing Countries with Special Emphasis on South African 
Experience’ in Debroy B & Chakraborty D (eds) Anti-dumping: Global Abuse of a Trade Policy Instrument (2007) 
81. 
327‘Situations where circumvention is outright illegal are where companies change their tariff code, which is 
associated with a dumped product just to circumvent payment of duty.’ ‘Companies can also fraudulently lower the 
value of the goods for duty purposes or change the declaration of origin of the goods, whilst the real origin remains 
the same.’ see generally Liu K ‘Anti-dumping Duty Circumvention through Trade Re-routing: Evidence from 
Chinese Exporters’ (2016). 
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The section lists different scenarios where circumvention takes places.328 The regulation specifies 
that both situations may amount to circumvention but if one is present it will be enough to prove 
circumvention.  
The different types of circumventions are: country hopping, minor modifications of the products; 
improper declarations of the value, origin, nature or origin of the product; assembly operations in 
a third country or within the SACU; and absorbing the duty.329 If any of these activities are present 
a domestic industry may request an anti-circumvention review.330 An investigation should be 
conducted where a request for anti-circumvention is lodged with SARS under Section 60 (2) (a) 
of the ADR;  however, this request does not prohibit the ITAC from taking anti-dumping action 
provided that information on the ITAC’s disposal warrants such action.331 
Injury information needs not to be updated if the anti-circumvention complaint is submitted to the 
Commission before or within one year of the Commission’s publication of its final 
determination.332 The final recommendations where circumvention has taken place may result in 
the anti-dumping duties being increased in order to compensate absorption. Scope of anti-dumping 
duties may also be extended to ‘apply to parts, components or substitute like products, new models 
and the like.’333 The Commission may also extend  
 ‘anti-dumping duties, at the required level, to the supplier in the country from which the product 
is exported subsequent to the imposition of the original provisional payments or anti-dumping 
duties or the initiation of the original investigation, including to parts, components or substitute like 
products, new models and the like’.334 
                                                            
328Circumvention is deemed to takes place where there is a  
‘change in the pattern of trade between third countries and South Africa or the common customs area of the 
Southern African Customs Union; (i) which results from a practice, process or work; (ii) for which there is 
no or insufficient cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the anti-dumping duty’ 
Circumvention also takes  where’(b) remedial effects of the anti-dumping measure are being undermined in 
terms of the volumes or prices of the products under investigation; (c) dumping can be found in relation to 
normal values previously established for the like or similar product’ See Section 60 (1) of  the ADR 2003. 
329See generally Section 60 of ADR 2003. 
330 See generally Section 60 of ADR 2003. 
331Section 60 (3) of the ADR 2003. 
332See generally Section 60 of the ADR 2003. 
333Section 63 of the ADR 2003. 
334Section 63 of the ADR 2003. 
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Murigi has questioned the consistence of South Africa’s rules relating to anti-circumvention with 
the ADA because there is no provision that allows Members to impose the circumvention.335 It is 
however argued, that it does not mean that rules are inconsistent with the WTO because the ADA 
does not provide for them. The ADA does not prevent enactment of provisions that supplement it; 
however, the WTO should look into amending the ADA to include provisions of circumvention to 
allow uniform application of the rules. 
New shipper reviews 
New shipper reviews are available only to those exporters that did not export to SACU during the 
original investigation period.336 The request for this review can only be considered after definitive 
anti-dumping duties have been imposed.337 Sufficient information that proves that the exporter 
applying for the reviews is and was not related to any exporter whom anti-dumping duties were 
applied needs to be submitted.338 The new exporter should provide the ITAC with enough 
information on normal value, export price and any other information deemed necessary by the 
Commission and should submit such information in the correct format. 339 If the exporter had not 
exported any products to SACU during the period under review, it should also provide the 
Commission with the required information in the prescribed format.340  
On initiation of a new shipper review, there is a simultaneous withdrawal of the anti-dumping 
duty.341 The SARS Commissioner may be requested by the ITAC to impose provisional payments 
at the same level as the anti-dumping duties con-currently when the anti-dumping duty is 
withdrawn.342 This payment is valid for the whole period of the review.343 The dumping margin of 
the exporter will be deemed as the difference between the export price to South Africa and normal 
value.344 Where export price cannot be established, the Commission has discretion either to use 
                                                            
335Murigi WC The Development of a Successful Antidumping Regime In Kenya (unpublished LLM thesis, University 
of the Western Cape 2013) 76. 
336Section 48 (1) of the ADR 2003. 
337Section 48 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
338Section 48 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
339Section 49 (1) of the ADR 2003. 
340Section 49 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
341Section 50 (1) of the ADR 2003. 
342Section 50 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
343Section 50 (2) of the ADR 2003. 
344Section 52 (a) of the ADR 2003. 
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new shipper's export price to an appropriate third country or any other reasonable basis.345  When 
the review procedure is concluded, the final anti-dumping duty imposed may be equal to an anti-
dumping duty or lower than the margin of dumping if dumping is proved.346 If no dumping is 
found, the Commission must recommend that the provisional payment be terminated.347  
Judicial reviews 
Where judicial reviews are concerned, they are available to interested parties where they wish to 
challenge preliminary or final decisions made by the Commission.348 These decisions may only be 
taken on review if the Commission held decisions, which were contrary to the provisions of the 
ITAA or the ADR 2003.349 The complaining party should prove prejudice because of the 
Commission’s conduct and the prejudice should not be able to be remedied by the Commission’s 
future final decision.350 
Judicial reviews takes place after ITAC’s final recommendations have been made.351 A 30-day 
notice should be given before interested parties file for judicial review. Unsurprisingly anti-
dumping judicial reviews are not a special case scenario. Judicial reviews should be lodged using 
correct court rules and channels.352 The Pretoria High Court has jurisdiction over anti-dumping 
matters because the ITAC is located in Pretoria.353 Where parties are not satisfied with ruling of 
the High Court they can apply for leave to appeal, and if granted they may appeal their matter in 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.354 However, if constitutional matters are involved, the matter can 
be taken to the Constitutional Court.355Courts in South Africa have been refereed to have a vibrant 
                                                            
345Section 51 (3) of the ADR 2003. 
346Section 52 (a) of the ADR 2003. 
347Section 52(b) of the ADR. 
348Section 64 (1) of the ADR 2003. 
349Section 64 (1) of the ADR 2003. 
350Section 64 (1) (a) of the ADR 2003. 
351Section 64 (1) (b) of the ADR 2003. 
352Brink G ‘South Africa, A Complicated, Unpredictable, Long and Costly Judicial Review System’ in Yilmaz M 
Domestic Judicial Review of Trade Remedies: Experiences of the Most Active WTO Members (2013) 253.  
353See Discussion on Courts in South Africa available at http://www.justice.gov.za/about/sa-courts.html (accessed 25 
July 2018). 
354See Discussion on Courts in South Africa available at http://www.justice.gov.za/about/sa-courts.html (accessed 25 
July 2018). 
355See Discussion on Courts in South Africa available at http://www.justice.gov.za/about/sa-courts.html (accessed 25 
July 2018). 
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understanding and active participation in trade related matters, which contributes in the 
development of the anti-dumping regime.356  
3.7 CONCLUSION  
This Chapter highlighted that South Africa is the largest anti-dumping user in Africa. Its anti-
dumping jurisprudence is established and its laws have gone through a process of transition since 
1914. The Chapter also demonstrated that substantive and procedural requirements as contained 
in the ITAA and the ADR 2003 are more clear and reliable. The ADR 2003 clarifies on issues that 
the ADA does not explain, clear guidelines on what to look at and how to analyse injury in 
domestic industries is given. Importantly, South African courts have made a landmark ruling in 
International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd, concerning 
sunset reviews helping in strengthening its anti-dumping jurisprudence.  
Although the Chapter discussed that the current legislation in the country does not have a 
mandatory public interest clause, which is ideal for anti-dumping laws, the Commission has 
applied the principle in some of its decisions.357  South Africa has made provision for lesser duty, 
which highlights its efforts in using anti-dumping laws as a response to unfair trade rather than 
using them as a form of protectionism, which is against WTO pillars.358 
South Africa’s anti-dumping experience cannot be separated from the effectiveness of the ITAC 
and function of a competent judicial system. The Chapter also showed that the ITAC has a clear 
mandate on how to conduct anti-dumping investigations and the country has invested in 
developing expertise in anti-dumping matters. It was highlighted that in 2016 the poultry industry 
indicated that they were to experience job losses because of dumping.359 The country has in the 
textile industries benefited from application of anti-dumping duties. It was discussed that textile 
companies Maytex and Sheraton boosted their capacities because of application of anti-dumping 
duties.360 This shows that anti-dumping measures protect the domestic industries from unfair trade. 
                                                            
356Ikeagwuchi GA Implementing effective trade remedy mechanisms: A critical analysis of Nigeria‟s Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Bill, 2010 (unpulished LLM thesis University of Pretoria 2014) 82. 
357See generally 3.4.4 Public Interest Considerations where Semi-refined paraffin wax (candle wax) and the poultry 
situation with President Obama were discussed. 
358See generally 3.5.3 Final phase. 
359See generally 3.2Overview. 
360See generally 3.5.3 Final Phase. 
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Moreover, their application boosts capacity and job creation helping to improve the welfare of the 
people of South Africa. 
Despite these positive attributes, there still are shortfalls in its anti-dumping regime as highlighted 
in the Chapter. The Chapter highlighted that although South African national anti-dumping laws 
largely resemble those of the ADA, the country has been criticised in the way they construct their 
normal value as it leads to irregularities and higher anti-dumping duties. Also worrying is the fact 
that the Commission has never accepted any undertaking that makes one question the motive for 
application of anti-dumping duties. There are also shortfalls in the way dumping margin 
calculations are done, as there is no transparency, because some documents are not accessible to 
people who need them. The ADR 2003 is also inconsistent with the WTO because it prescribes 
that reviews need to be finalised in 18 months and the ADA provides 12 months. 
Bearing this in mind, the next Chapter will discuss the use of anti-dumping laws in the European 
Union EU). 
.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE USE OF ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Anti-dumping legislation has existed in the European Union (EU) since 1968 when the community 
merely codified the 1967 Kennedy rules.1 When compared to other players such as the United 
States of America (USA) and Australia, the EU was a late player in enacting anti-dumping 
regulations.2 It has however continuously replaced the 1968 anti-dumping legislation, with each 
amendment bringing important changes.3 Since becoming a user of anti-dumping measures, there 
has been a steady increase on the number of anti-dumping members applied to the non-EU 
countries.4 
The EU has been a Member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 1 January 1995.5 As 
such, in the evolution of anti-dumping framework, the EU has always made clear its intention to 
abide by WTO anti-dumping rules.6 However, there have been accusations levelled against the EU 
Commission of monopolising information in anti-dumping investigations; thereby, inviting leaks 
and abuse.7 This suggests the fact that even successful organisations that intend to comply with 
the WTO framework may also have loopholes in the way they handle anti-dumping investigations.  
Despite the loopholes, there have been great efforts made in developing the anti-dumping regime 
in the EU. It has benefited from scholarly publications in developing its anti-dumping regime, 
which is similar to South Africa in Chapter 3.8 The EU courts have also had vast opportunities in 
                                                            
1Great Britain Board of Trade The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations, 1964-67 1967 5; the Kennedy rules were 
negotiated during the Kennedy Round which was the sixth round of negotiations under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and took place between 1964 and 1967. 
2See generally Brief History of World Trade Organisation. 
3These Regulations will be discussed in 4.3.1 Legislative Framework. 
4The relationship of China and EU mostly has been put under a microscope. Members and scholars have started 
conversations that seek to re-evaluate EU’s free trade policies citing that it is making EU prone to dumping. See 
Lopez J ‘With protectionism on the rise the EU struggles with free trade principles’ in ICIS Duty and Regulatory 
Bulletin (2017). 
5WTO ‘Member Information: The European Union and the WTO’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (accessed 12 October 2018). 
6Luo Y Anti-dumping in the WTO, the EU, and China: The Rise of Legalisation in the Trade Regime and Its 
Consequences (2010) 107 (hereafter Luo Y (2010). 
7Luo Y (2010) 119. 
8Authors such as Davis L ‘Ten years of anti-dumping in the EU: economic and political targeting’ (2009) ECIPE 
Working Paper • No. 02/2009 6, Jackson JH & Vermulst EA, Antidumping Law and Practice, A Comparative Study 
(1989), Luo Y Anti-dumping in the WTO, the EU, and China: The Rise of Legalisation in the Trade Regime and Its 
Consequences (2010), Van Bael I & Bellis JF EU Anti-Dumping and Other Trade Defence Instruments (2011) have 
all written books and peer reviewed articles on EU anti-dumping regulation. 
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interpreting anti-dumping laws therefore clarifying on issues and paving way for reform in anti-
dumping.9  
Zimbabwe initiated its anti-dumping legislation decades after the EU had already put in place anti-
dumping regulations.10 Thus, Zimbabwe can draw lessons since the EU has vast experience in 
utilising anti-dumping measures. In addition, the connection between Zimbabwe and the EU was 
discussed in Chapter 1.11 It was highlighted that the EU used to be the major export destination for 
Zimbabwe, accounting for two-thirds of total exports.12 In addition, the EU has been cited as a 
respondent in 15 WTO anti-dumping cases.13 Thus, it becomes important to investigate how 
countries that allegedly dump products protect their own domestic industries.  
Within this context, this Chapter discusses the use of anti-dumping measures in the EU, with the 
aim of drawing lessons that Zimbabwe can learn. An examination of how Zimbabwe can learn 
from the EU’s anti-dumping regime will be done in Chapter 5, where Zimbabwe will be discussed. 
This Chapter is divided into seven main sections. Section 4.1 is this introduction. Section 4.2 
provides an overview. Section 4.3 discusses the legislative and institutional framework. Sections 
4.4 and 4.5 discuss the substantive and procedural procedures, respectively. Section 4.6 looks at 
reviews. The last section concludes the Chapter. 
4.2 OVERVIEW 
Currently, the EU anti-dumping regulation, Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries 
                                                            
9See anti-dumping cases heard by the Court of Justice  available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?pro=&lgrec=en&nat=or&oqp=&dates=&lg=&language=en&jur=C%
2CT%2CF&cit=none%252CC%252CCJ%252CR%252C2008E%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C
%252C%252C%252Ctrue%252Cfalse%252Cfalse&td=%3BALL&pcs=Oor&avg=&page=1&mat=or&jge=&for=
&cid=145932 (accessed 25 May 2018). 
10Currently the European Union (EU) has 28 member countries that have pledged full support to the Union together 
with their citizens. Amongst the 28 the United Kingdom (UK) held a referendum to exit the EU and it was 
successful. The exit process has not been finalised as such all rights and obligations continue to fully apply to UK, 
as it is still a full member of the EU. See European Commission The European Union Explained: How the European 
Union Works, Your guide to the EU institutions (2013) 3-38. 
11See generally 1.6 Research Methodology. 
12Zimbabwe National Trade Policy 2012-16. 
13WTO ‘Dispute Settlement: The Disputes; Disputes by agreement (as cited in request for consultations) available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (accessed 12 October 2018). 
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not members of the European Union (Regulation (EU) 2016/1036),  regulates the procedure for 
the imposition of anti-dumping duties. 
The EU has exclusive competence in terms of Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).14 Exclusive competence means that only the EU can act.15 It is, however, 
important to highlight that in most policy areas where the EU can act, ‘the European Commission 
is also empowered to submit a proposal for a legal act’.16 There are exceptions to this, where 
common foreign and security policy is concerned, the Commission does not hold such power.17The 
European Commission is the executive branch of the union, guided by the Treaty on the function 
of the European Union (TFEU), which gives it power to enforce the treaty, implement and execute 
all duties as specified by the treaty.18  
The EU 
‘applies uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff 
and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy 
and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies’.19  
As such, anti-dumping measures can only be imposed against non-EU Members.20 This is because 
in the Union, uniform rules with regard to tariff rates apply.21 In addition, individual Members do 
not have the jurisdiction to apply anti-dumping measures against non-Members and amongst 
                                                            
14Article 3 of the TFEU states that 
‘1.The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: 
(a) customs union; 
(b)  the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market; 
(c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro;   
(d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; 
(e) common commercial policy. 
      2.   The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its 
conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope’. 
15European Commission ‘European Citizens Initiative’ available at http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/competences/faq#q1(accessed 12 October 2018).  
16European Commission ‘European Citizens Initiative’ available at http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/competences/faq#q1(accessed 12 October 2018).  
17European Commission ‘European Citizens Initiative’ available at http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/competences/faq#q1(accessed 12 October 2018).  
18Saurombe A ‘The European Union as a model for regional integration in the Southern African Development 
Community: A selective institutional comparative analysis’ (2013) 7 Law Democracy & Development 467. 
19Article 133 of the Treaty on the European Union as amended by The Treaty of Nice. 
20See generally Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
21Article 133 of the Treaty on the European Union as amended by The Treaty of Nice. 
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themselves.22 This is because anti-dumping rules exclusively fall within the competence of the 
EU.23 
When it comes to application of anti-dumping measures, the EU mainly, enact anti-dumping 
measures to products originating from mostly Asian countries, including China.24 In this regard, 
China has urged the EU to comply with WTO rules when conducting anti-dumping 
investigations.25 This mainly concerns viewing China as a non-market economy, ignoring China’s 
15-year transitional period, which ended on December 11, 2016.26 Despite these calls, the EU 
continues to tighten its laws against Chinese products.27 China has declared the move as a 
protectionist measure meant to reduce exports from its country.28 The EU counter argues that any 
amendment to its regulation does not target specific counties, but to protect the interests of the 
Community at large.29 
Currently there are 170 WTO cases on anti-dumping against the EU or some of its Member 
States.30 This is minimal compared to over 199 investigations from 2003 against non-EU 
Members.31 Specifically in the first half of 2018, there have been ‘97 provisional and definitive 
anti-dumping measures (which were subsequently extended in 29 cases).’32 Such statistics show 
                                                            
22Davis L ‘Ten years of anti-dumping in the EU: economic and political targeting’ (2009) ECIPE Working Paper • 
No. 02/2009 6 (hereafter Davies L (2009). 
23Article 3 of the TFEU. 
24Davis L (2009) 6.  
25Scimia A ‘Trumpian Europe toughens anti-dumping rules against China’ (2017) available at 
http://www.atimes.com/trumpian-europe-toughens-anti-dumping-rules-china/ (accessed 09 November 2017).  
26See discussion on how China’s products should not be subjected to this methodology in 3.4.1 Determination of 
dumping: Normal Value 
27Scimia A ‘Trumpian Europe toughens anti-dumping rules against China’ (2017) available at 
http://www.atimes.com/trumpian-europe-toughens-anti-dumping-rules-china/ (accessed 09 November 2017). 
28Scimia A ‘Trumpian Europe toughens anti-dumping rules against China’ (2017) available at 
http://www.atimes.com/trumpian-europe-toughens-anti-dumping-rules-china/ (accessed 09 November 2017). 
29Scimia A ‘Trumpian Europe toughens anti-dumping rules against China’ (2017) available at 
http://www.atimes.com/trumpian-europe-toughens-anti-dumping-rules-china/ (accessed 09 November 2017). 
30European Commission ‘Cases’ available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/actions-against-eu-exporters/cases/index.cfm 
(accessed 13 October 2018). 
31For statisctics before 2003 see European Commission ‘Investigations’ available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/completed.cfm accessed 13 October 2018). 
32European Commission Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy, Safeguard Statistics Covering the First 6 Months of 2018 
(2018). 
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that the EU has vast experience in the use of anti-dumping measures. This cannot be separated 
from its trade defence system, which was recently modernised by Regulation (EU) 2018/825.33 
4.3 THE LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
4.3.1 Legislative Framework 
The EU’s key anti-dumping legislation, regulating the procedure for the imposition of anti-
dumping duties, is Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.34 This legislation is based on Implementation of 
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement (ADA) as specified in Section 3.35 As such, interpretation that is consistent with the 
ADA should be adopted in investigations.36 This position differs slightly with that of South Africa, 
discussed in Chapter 3.37 In South Africa, neither the GATT nor the ADA  form part of its 
municipal law.38 However, South Africa’s Constitution requires that when interpreting legislation, 
courts should interpret it in a reasonable manner that is consistent with international law rather 
than in an inconsistent manner.39 Thus where its anti-dumping’s legislation is also concerned, 
interpretation that favours the GATT and the ADA, should be adopted.40 This position is similar 
to that of the EU.  
The roots of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 trace back from Regulation 459/68 of 5 April 1968, which 
protected Members against dumping from non-Members of the European Community.41 Despite 
                                                            
33Regulation (EU) 2018/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amends Regulation 
(EU) 2016/1036 on Protection against Dumped Imports from Countries not Members of the European Union and 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European 
Union.  
34Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 should be read together with the amendment namely Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 (Regulation (EU) 2017/2321). 
35See Section 3 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
36See generally Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
37See 3.3.1 Legislative Framework. 
38Brink G ‘Anti-dumping and China: three major Chinese victories in dispute resolution’ (2014) 47(1) Comparative 
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 9. 
39Section 233 of the Constitution. See a detailed analysis on the applicability of international law in South Africa, in 
Smit L ‘The relationship between the access of individuals to WTO law and the socio-economic rights in the South 
African Constitution’ (2007) 40(3) 350-394. Also see generally, Scholtz W & Ferreira G ‘The interpretation of 
section 231 of the South African Constitution: A lost ball in the high weeds!’ (2008) 41(2) The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 324-338. 
40Ferreira G& Snyman F ‘The Incorporation of Public International Law into Municipal Law and Regional Law 
against the Background of the Dichotomy between Monism and Dualism’ (2014) 17 (4) Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 1478. 
41See generally Regulation (EEC) No 459/68 of the Council of 5 April 1968 on protection against dumping or the 
granting of bounties or subsidies by countries, which are not members of the European Economic Community. 
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this, the EU continuously amends and/or repeals the Regulation so that it reflects the changing 
interests within the Community.42 For instance, Regulation 459/68 of 1979 improved much on 
determination of injury and tried to solve problems with previous regulations.43 The 1984 
Regulation also improved much on production costs calculation and ordinary course of trade 
treatment of sales.44  
In 1987, there were other amendments made on products of companies associated with an exporter 
subject to the duties.45 In 1988, Regulation 2433/88 was born which had many changes on 
discounts, anti-absorption duty and treatment of trading companies among others. The EU also 
amended Regulation 2433/88 in 1994.46 This trend has continued to date, which is commendable 
because trade issues keep changing every time, and amending the law to accommodate these 
changes is necessary. Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 repealed Council Regulation (EC) No 
1225/2009 and, with it, brought amongst others, a new way of calculating the margin of dumping 
for imports from countries outside the region on the basis of ‘significant market distortions’.47 
As the basic the EU regulation on anti-dumping measures, Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 provides 
all the rules and regulations followed by the EU in anti-dumping investigations. In this piece of 
legislation, there are set rules written down on the determination of dumping.48 It also provides 
rules on initiation, procedural rules, imposition of duties, duration as well as review of anti-
dumping measures and confidential treatment of information concerning anti-dumping 
investigations.49 The current legislation has changed the decision process when compared to its 
predecessors.50 
                                                            
42For example, each regulation reflects the amendments it brings.   
43Sheng Z EU Anti-Dumping Policy: A study in the CTV Case (unpublished Master of European Affairs, Lund 
University 2004) 62. 
44See generally Regulation 2176/84, 1984 and Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan. 
45See generally Regulation 1761/87. 
46 Wim K Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Enlargement: Report of the High Level Group 
(2004) 17.  
47Bridges ‘EU Institutions Sign Off on Draft Changes to Anti-Dumping Legislation’ (2017) Bridges Volume 21 - 
Number 3. 
48See generally Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
49See generally Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
50 The Commission is now solely responble for decision making in anti-dumping matters which was not always the 
case as it used to share some of this responsibility with the European Council see Cornelis J & Graafsma F 
‘Commission Proposal for Certain Targeted Amendments to the Basic Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy 
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It is also important to highlight that Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation (EU) 2018/825 
have amended Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. The former significantly changes the methodology for 
calculating anti-dumping duties.51 On the other hand, the latter,  
‘aims to modernise EU’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules to reflect current global economic 
challenges and (ii) create an expedited, simple framework for anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
investigations.’52 
The enactment of Regulation (EU) 2018/825 is not shocking even though it was enacted barely six 
months after Regulation (EU) 2017/2321.53 This is because in September 2017, President of the 
European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker was quoted as follows: ‘let me say once and for all: 
we are not naïve free traders. Europe must always defend its strategic interests.’54 This gave the 
impression that the EU is now more ‘focused on ensuring that international trade is fair, undistorted 
and balanced’.55 It is submitted that the continual EU’s amendments of anti-dumping legislation 
is a positive welcome. This is because there is always a need to regulate the changing aspects of 
cross border trade.56 
The next section discusses institutions involved in anti-dumping investigations. 
4.3.2 Institutional Framework 
Previously in Section 4.2, it was held that the European Commission is the executive branch of the 
union.57It is also the key institution in anti-dumping matters. The European Commission promotes 
                                                            
Regulations’ (2017) available at https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-international-trade-law-review-edition-
3/1148535/european-union (accessed 15 October 2017). 
51Sidley ‘European Union Introduces Additional Reforms to Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Rules’ (2018) 
available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b81d240c-288b-4c82-a210-fd2d8ef59595 (accessed 13 
October 2018). 
52Sidley ‘European Union Introduces Additional Reforms to Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Rules’ (2018) 
available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b81d240c-288b-4c82-a210-fd2d8ef59595 (accessed 13 
October 2018). 
53Sidley ‘European Union Introduces Additional Reforms to Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Rules’ (2018) 
available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b81d240c-288b-4c82-a210-fd2d8ef59595 (accessed 13 
October 2018). 
54European Commission - Press release The State of the Union 2017: Catching the wind in our sails (2017). 
55Ruessmann L& Beck J ‘Trade & Customs: European Union’ (2018) available at 
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/51/jurisdiction/10/trade-customs-european-union/ accessed 13 October 
2018). 
56Singh G Subsidies in the Context of the WTO's Free Trade System: A Legal and Economic Analysis 
(2017) 220. 
57Saurombe A ‘The European Union as a model for regional integration in the Southern African Development 
Community: A selective institutional comparative analysis’ (2013) 7 Law Democracy & Development 467. 
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the general interest of the EU and makes appropriate decisions to that end.58 It also ensures 
enforcement of the Treaties and ‘oversees the application of Union law under the control of the 
Court of Justice’.59 In addition, it ‘exercises coordinating, executive and management functions, 
executes the budget and manages programmes’.60 There are twenty-eight Members of the 
Commission, one from each Member State.61 This was not always the case, previously, the 
European Commission comprised of Member representatives from mostly bigger states.62 It had a 
composition of twenty members, two from each bigger states and one from each smaller states.63 
This was the case until May 2004 when the Treaty of Nice was signed.64 
The governance system of the European Commission is unique.65 There is a clear division of 
political and administrative oversight structures as well as clear defined lines of responsibility and 
financial accountability.66 It can be argued that the clear definitions of responsibilities help to 
promote predictability through avoiding unnecessary misunderstandings caused by blurred lines 
of responsibilities. The College of Commissioners represents the head of this style and are 
responsible for the political work of the Commission.67 Operational implementation is the 
responsibility of Directors General and Heads of Service, thus leading the administrative 
structure.68 
                                                            
58European Commission Communication to the Commission from President Juncker and First Vice-President 
Timmermans: Governance in the European Commission (2017) 3. 
59European Commission Communication to the Commission from President Juncker and First Vice-President 
Timmermans: Governance in the European Commission (2017) 3. 
60European Commission Communication to the Commission from President Juncker and First Vice-President 
Timmermans: Governance in the European Commission (2017) 3. 
61See generally Article 245 of the TFEU. 
62See generally Article 294 of the TFEU. The bigger states were UK, Spain, Italy, Germany and France. 
63See generally Article 294 of the TFEU.  
64Praha SP ‘Decision-making process after the Treaty of Nice’ (2002) available at 
https://www.epravo.cz/top/clanky/decision-making-process-after-the-treaty-of-nice-20271.html (accessed 10 
September 2017). 
65European Commission Communication to the Commission from President Juncker and First Vice-President 
Timmermans: Governance in the European Commission (2017) 3. 
66 European Commission Communication to the Commission from President Juncker and First Vice-President 
Timmermans: Governance in the European Commission (2017) 3. 
67European Commission ‘Political Work’ available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-
commission/organisational-structure/political-leadership_en (accessed 10 September 2017). 
68 European Commission ‘Political Work’ available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-
commission/organisational-structure/political-leadership_en (accessed 10 September 2017). 
‘As a result, the term 'European Commission' is used to denote both the institution – the College - formed 
by the Members of the Commission, and its administration managed by the Directors-General of its 
departments (and heads of other administrative structures such as services, offices and executive agencies)’. 
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A President who is indirectly elected by the European Parliament via the ‘Spitzenkandidat’ 
(leading candidate) process heads the European Commission.69 The election is made after the 
European Commission receives proposals from the European Council.70 The leading candidate 
process’ was adopted in 2014 as a way of creating at least a veneer of democracy, and to push back 
against critics accusing Brussels of being controlled by unelected bureaucrats’.71 Currently the 
sitting President is Jean-Claude Juncker who took office on 1 November 2014.72 The President 
makes the final decision on the roles of Commissioners and their policy areas.73 He is responsible 
for changing incompetent or reshuffling Commissioners during their office terms.74 He can also 
request a Commissioner to resign provided there are sufficient reasons for him to do so.75 The 
relevant Commissioner for purposes of this study is the one responsible for trade who currently is 
Cecilia Malmström.76 
The College is responsible for establishing the organisational structure of the Commission.77 This 
is composed of a number of Directorates-General and equivalent departments making a single 
administrative service.78 Different Directorate-Generals represent different policy areas, relevant 
to this study, the Directorate-General of Trade deals with trade policies only.79 Currently the 
                                                            
69Herszenhorn DM & Baume M ‘Commission’s Spitzenkandidat process at risk: EU leaders clash over rulebook for 
the 2019 presidential race’ available at https://www.politico.eu/article/spitzenkandidat-jean-claude-juncker-race-
with-no-rules-eu-leaders-brace-for-clash-over-2019-elections/ (accessed 14 October 2018) see also Article 17 of 
the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
70EU Affairs ‘How the president of the European Commission gets elected’ available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20140711STO52254/how-the-president-of-the-
european-commission-gets-elected (accessed 15 November 2017). 
71Herszenhom DM & Baume M ‘Commission’s Spitzenkandidat process at risk: EU leaders clash over rulebook for 
the 2019 presidential race’ available at https://www.politico.eu/article/spitzenkandidat-jean-claude-juncker-race-
with-no-rules-eu-leaders-brace-for-clash-over-2019-elections/ (accessed 14 October 2018). 
72His term: began in November 2014 and ends in October 2019 see European Union ‘EU Presidents – who does 
what?’ available at https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/presidents_en#european-commission-president-
%E2%80%93-jean-claude-juncker (accessed 13October 2018). 
73Sabathil G, Joos K & Kessler B The European Commission: An Essential Guide to the Institution, the Procedures 
and the Policies (2008) 47. 
74Muntean A M ‘The European Parliament’s Political Legitimacy and the Commission’s “Misleading 
Management”: Towards a “Parliamentarian” European Union?’ (2000) 4(4) European Integration online Papers 
available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2000-005.pdf (accessed 22 April 2018). 
75See generally Stamenova S The Latest Eu-Commission President Elections and the Role of the European 
Parliament (2018). 
76European Commission ‘Cecilia Malmström's team’ available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/malmstrom/team_en  (accessed 15 November 2017).  
77Hix S & Høyland B The political system of the European Union 3ed (2011) 36 (hereafter Hix S & Høyland B 
(2011). 
78Hix S & Høyland B (2011) 36. 
79Mandelson P & European Commissioner for Trade Handbook for Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (2006) 
6-61. 
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Director General of the Directorate-General of Trade is Jean-Luc Demarty with anti-dumping 
falling under the responsibility of the Deputy Director General Sandra Gallina.80 
The Trade Directorate is responsible for all anti-dumping investigations that are conducted by the 
EU.81 It controls all substantive elements in a unitary system such as dumping, injury, causation 
and public interest.82  Thus, the European Commission has the authority to initiate and terminate 
anti-dumping investigations, as well as taking measures where possible.83 These measures include 
imposition of anti-dumping duties to offset injurious dumping and accepting undertakings.84 The 
European Commission can only initiate anti-dumping investigation without a written application 
where it has enough evidence of dumping, injury and causality.85 It also deals with all 
administration issues in anti-dumping matters.86  
4.4 SUBSTANTIVE PROCEDURES 
As South Africa in Chapter 3, the EU has Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, which contains the 
substantive elements that the Commission should adhere to when conducting investigations. As 
previously stated, the current legislation has changed the decision process when compared to its 
predecessors. The main improvement of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 has to do with decision-
making, which is now the sole responsibility of the Commission.87 The Regulation applies to 
products which are dumped by non- EU countries.88 The most notable changes are contained in 
Regulation (EU) 2018/825, which amends Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. The amendment 
                                                            
80European Commission ‘Directorate-General Trade’ available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/trade_en 
(accessed 15 October 2018). 
81European Commission ‘Directorate-General Trade’ available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/trade_en 
(accessed 15 October 2018).  
82Kotsiubska V Public Interest Consideration in Domestic and International Antidumping Disciplines (unpublished 
Master of International Law and Economics ,World Trade Institute 2011) 23. 
83European Commission ‘Anti-dumping’ available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-
defence/actions-against-imports-into-the-eu/anti-dumping (accessed 15 November 2017).  
84 European Commission ‘Anti-dumping’ available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-
defence/actions-against-imports-into-the-eu/anti-dumping (accessed 15 November 2017).  
85Article 5 .6 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
86See generally Steele K (ed.) Antidumping Under the WTO: A Comparative Review (1996)  see also Vermulst E 
‘Adopting and Implementing Anti-Dumping Laws – Some Suggestions for Developing Countries (1997) 31 (2) 
Journal of World Trade 5. 
87Cornelis J & Graafsma F ‘Commission Proposal for Certain Targeted Amendments to the Basic Anti-Dumping 
and Anti-Subsidy Regulations’ (2017) available at https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-international-trade-law-
review-edition-3/1148535/european-union (accessed 15 October 2017). 
88See full title of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
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modernises anti-dumping rules, making it relent to the EU as it is modelled on efficiently defending 
EU industries from unfair trade practices.89 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 is modelled on the requirements of the WTO regulations, which are 
drawn from the ADA.90 This leads to the conclusion that since ADA forms the basis for the EU 
regulations, there are generally three conditions to fulfil for dumping to exist. For example, the 
products under investigation should have been dumped and the dumping should have caused or 
threaten to cause material injury to the EU industry.91 There must also be a causal link between 
dumping and the injury experience by the industry.92  
Apart from the three conditions, the EU has an additional requirement to consider before imposing 
an anti-dumping measure. The Commission must also establish that the imposition of measures is 
in the ‘Union's interest’.93 As observed in Chapter 2, the WTO prescribes minimum requirements 
that Members should follow in anti-dumping investigations. However, the WTO does not prohibit 
Members from adding their own requirements, but they should be compliant with WTO 
principle.94 The subsequent section discusses the substantive procedures that the Commission must 
take into consideration when determining dumping by the non-EU countries. 
4.4.1 Determination of dumping 
Normal Value 
The WTO Members must investigate and come up with substantial evidence to prove that dumping 
of a certain product occurred before they can impose anti-dumping measures on the dumped 
products.95 This investigation must also take place in every trade integration union, especially in 
                                                            
89European Commission ‘EU trade defence: stronger and more effective rules enter into force’ (2018) available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1859 (accessed 15 October 2018). 
90Section 2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
91See generally 2.4 WTO Treatment of Dumping. 
92Nedumpara J  Injury and Causation in Trade Remedy Law: A Study of WTO Law and Country Practices 
(2016) 224 see also Lowenfeld AF International Economic Law (2008) 287. 
93 Finger JM ‘Reform’ in Finger JM & Artis NT (eds) Antidumping: How it Works and who Gets Hurt (1993) 71. 
94See generally 2.4 WTO Treatment of Dumping. 
95Venkatesh M. A Handbook on Anti-dumping (2001) 12. 
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the EU as it is a member of the WTO in own right.96 In the EU, dumping takes place when a 
product is sold in the EU at a price below what the producer country sells it in its country.97  
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 defines dumping to be a situation where a ‘product’s export price to 
the Union is less than a comparable price for a like product, in the ordinary course of trade, as 
established for the exporting country’.98 This means dumping takes place when the normal value 
is less than the export price to the Union.99 Normal value refers to the price paid or payable, on the 
dumped product when it is being sold in the exporting country to independent consumers in the 
ordinary course of trade.100 This calculation of normal value is regarded as the standard method 
where there are ‘like products’ in the exporting country.101 
In Goldstar Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities, the court held that the term ordinary 
course of trade is a ‘concept which relates to the nature of sales themselves’.102 Its formulation 
aims to disregard sales whose conditions do not correspond to the ordinary course of trade, 
particularly where prices are below production costs or where there is compensatory 
arrangement.103 Sales can be in the ordinary course of trade if value sales of the ‘like product’ 
constitute more than 5 per cent of the sales volume of the product under investigation.104 If sales 
are less than 5 per cent they can be considered, if prices charged are considered representative for 
the market concerned.105 In addition, sales below 5 per cent can be sufficient if they allow for 
comparison.106 
Selling products at a price lower than the normal value may seem as if the lowering of prices is 
beneficial to consumers, but it causes injury to the producers of like products in the EU.107 As 
                                                            
96WTO ‘Member Information: The European Union and the WTO’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (accessed 12 October 2018).  
97European Commission ‘Investigations’ (2013) 1. 
98Article 1.2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
99Article 1.2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
100Article 2.1 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
101Moens G & Trone J Commercial Law of the European Union (2010) 160 also see discussion in Chapter 2 of what 
constitutes like products at 2.4.2.1 ‘Like product in the importing country’. 
102Goldstar Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities Case C-I05/90 para 2. 
103Goldstar Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities Case C-I05/90 para 2. 
104Article 2.2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
105Article 2.2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
106Article 2.2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
107See generally 2.3.1 Types of Dumping also see generally Wood pulp, Osakeyhtiö and ors v Commission of the 
European Communities, Final judgment, 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85, 125/85, 126/85, 127/85, 128/85, 
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highlighted in Chapter 3, in 2016, South African poultry industry was expecting job losses as the 
local producers failed to fairly compete with dumped imports.108 As discussed in Chapter 2, most 
firms that dump products in export markets do so in order to drive out other players in the same 
market.109 Although this may be the case, the WTO does not need governments to prove the type 
of dumping taking place because any type of dumping will suffice.110 After driving out 
competitors, either the remaining firms will enjoy monopoly power or they will gain a higher 
market share.111 When firms gain greater market share and/or monopoly power, the company can 
then start to increase prices and gain high profits.112 
It is important for every country, union, or integration to lay down clear rules in its anti-dumping 
regulations in terms of calculation of normal value. This helps in investigations, as consistency is 
encouraged. It also minimises cases of discrimination by investigators, as they have adhere to 
certain stipulated rules.  
When calculating normal value, it is desirable to indicate the method used in calculating such and 
the methods used to calculate sub elements such as selling, general and administrative costs and 
the profit margin that should be included in such value.113  Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 explains 
these issues in details as discussed below. It provides alternative methods to use when sales are 
not considered to be in the ordinary course of trade. The alternative is provided for scenarios when 
sales of ‘like products’ are insufficient or where comparison is not possible because of a ‘particular 
market situation’.114 In these circumstances, one should calculate normal value based on the cost 
                                                            
129/85, (1988) ECR 5193, ILEC 035 (CJEU 1988), 27th September 1988, Court of Justice of the European Union 
[CJEU]; European Court of Justice [ECJ]. 
108 See generally 3.2 Overview. 
109See generally 2.3.1 Types of Dumping. 
110See generally 2.3.1 Types of Dumping. 
111This type of dumping is called predatory dumping. It is the most common type of dumping and has dire 
consequences to the domestic industry of the country products are being dumped see Howse R The World Trading 
System: Administered protection (1998) 126. 
112This proves that the initial lowering of prices by firms who will be seeking to drive out competitors is not 
beneficial to consumers, but it is facade used to monopolise the market; see generally 2.3.1 Types of Dumping.   
113Section 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
114The wording particular market situation is deemed to exist ‘when prices are artificially low, when there is 
significant barter trade, or when there are non-commercial processing arrangements’ ;see Article 2 (3) Regulation 
(EU) 2016/1036. 
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of production in the country of origin inclusive of all related costs because of export prices, in an 
appropriate third country in the ordinary course of trade, provided prices are representative.115  
Sales in the appropriate third country may be disregarded in the calculation of normal value if they 
are below unit production costs.116 In addition, there is also need to prove that the sales were made 
within an extended period in significant quantities and recovery of costs cannot be achieved within 
a reasonable period because of their prices.117 An ‘extended period’ normally refers to one year, 
but it cannot be less than six months.118 The European Commission should draw evidence of costs 
for the party that is under investigation from records kept by the party, only if they reasonably 
reflect related costs of production and sale.119 The keeping of these records should be in accordance 
with the generally accepted accounting principles of the country concerned.120 This provision is 
similar to Article 2.2.1.1 of the ADA. In EU — Biodiesel the panel held that:  
‘Article 2.2.1.1 calls for an assessment of whether the costs set out in a producer's records 
correspond – within acceptable limits – in an accurate and reliable manner, to all the actual costs 
incurred by the particular producer or exporter for the product under consideration’.121 
In the EU, if these conditions were not met, costs will be adjusted or calculated using costs of other 
producers belonging to the same country, and if not available, calculations will be based on 
evidence submitted on the proper allocation of costs, if the method has been used historically.122 
If such a method is absent, an annual turnover will get preference but it will not be used when it is 
already used in productions costs.123 
Besides the method above, Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 amended Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 to 
include a new methodology of calculation where there are significant distortions. These are: 
                                                            
115Article 2.3 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
116Article 2.4 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
117Sales are regarded significant when it is established that ‘the weighted average selling price is below the weighted 
average unit cost, or that the volume of sales below unit cost is not less than 20 % of sales being used to determine 
normal value’ see  Article 2.4 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
118Article 2.4 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
119Article 2.5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.  
120Article 2.5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
121European Union – Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina WT/DS473/R para 7.247 (hereafter 
Panel Report EU — Biodiesel. 
122Article 2.5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
123Article 2.5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
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‘distortions which occur when reported prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials and 
energy, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government 
intervention’.124 
When evaluating the existence of significant distortions, regard shall be had, among other things, 
to the potential impact of one or more of elements listed in Regulation (EU) 2017/2321.125  
If significant distortions exist, ‘normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs 
of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, subject to the following 
rules’.126  In the construction, the Commission may use these sources:  
 ‘— corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country with a 
similar level of economic development as the exporting country, provided the relevant data are 
readily available; where there is more than one such country, preference shall be given, where 
appropriate, to countries with an adequate level of social and environmental protection; — if it 
considers appropriate, undistorted international prices, costs, or benchmarks; or — domestic costs, 
but only to the extent that they are positively established not to be distorted, on the basis of accurate 
and appropriate evidence, including in the framework of the provisions on interested parties in 
point’.127 
The study submits that the use of the word may indicate that list is non-exhaustive; as such, the 
Commission may use other sources not listed in the regulation. Van Bael and Bellis have observed 
that this new provision largely places ‘the burden of proof on the exporting producers, who must 
establish that their domestic prices and costs are undistorted’.128 This study agrees with this 
observation because the regulation states that domestic costs may be used ‘only to the extent that 
they are positively established not to be distorted, on the basis of accurate and appropriate 
                                                            
124Article 2.6a (b) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. 
125The elements are ‘the market in question being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under 
the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country; — state 
presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs; — public policies or measures 
discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing free market forces; — the lack, 
discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws; — wage costs 
being distorted; — access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise 
not acting independently of the state’; see Article 6a.b of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2321. 
126Article 2.6a of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. 
127Article 2.6a of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. 
128Van Bael & Bellis The new EU anti-dumping methodology and other upcoming changes to the EU anti - dumping 
rules (2017) 4. 
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evidence’.129 The study further observes that the Commission may know of such undistorted costs 
if they receive evidence from exporting producers. This practically shifts the burden of proof.  
The above observations have led Van Bael and Bellis to aver that, although EU has formally ended 
for the calculation of normal value, based on the difference between market and non-market 
economies, there is not much difference.130 It appears that the added provision of ‘significant 
distortions’ is ‘designed to target China and other countries which the EU previously qualified as 
non-market economies’.131 Tietje and Sacher further argue that this new methodology violates 
Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2 of the ADA as well as Article VI.1 (b) (ii) of GATT.132 In EU — Biodiesel, 
Argentina argued that the EU had acted inconsistently with Article 2.2.1.1 and, because of this 
inconsistency, with Article 2.2 of the ADA and with Article VI.1 (b) (ii) of GATT.133 This is 
because in its determination of the costs of the main raw material in the production of biodiesel, 
soybean oil and soybeans, EU had failed to calculate ‘cost of production of the product under 
investigation on the basis of the records kept by the producers’.134 
The panel held that the reason given by EU that the domestic prices of the main raw material used 
by biodiesel producers in Argentina were ‘artificially lower than the international prices due to the 
distortion created by the Argentine export tax system’ was not legally sufficient under Article 
2.2.1.1 of the ADA.135 Therefore, the European Commission erred in concluding that the 
producers' records in Argentina ‘did not reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production 
and sale of biodiesel’.136 The study submits that it also supports the argument by Tietje and Sacher 
who opines that the new methodology violates Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2 of the ADA. This is because 
of the decision of the panel in EU — Biodiesel, the provision of Article 2.6a of Regulation (EU) 
                                                            
129Article 2.6a of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. 
130Van Bael & Bellis The new EU anti-dumping methodology and other upcoming changes to the EU anti - dumping 
rules (2017) 5. 
131Van Bael & Bellis The new EU anti-dumping methodology and other upcoming changes to the EU anti - dumping 
rules (2017) 5. 
132Tietje C & Sacher V ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union – A Breach of WTO-Law?’ 
(2018) European Yearbook of International Economic Law - Special Issue on "The Future of Trade Defence 
Instruments: Global Policy Trends and Legal Challenges" 17. 
133Panel Report EU — Biodiesel para 7.185. 
134Panel Report EU — Biodiesel para 7.185. 
135Panel Report EU — Biodiesel para 7.248. 
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2016/1036 as amended is similar to what the panel said was not legally sufficient in accordance 
with Article 2.2.1.1. 
Before Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 replaced Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, EU had 
categorised China as a non-market economy.137 This placed a burden on exporters to prove that 
they operated under set market conditions, and if not proven the European Commission used an 
‘analogue country methodology on the basis of the price or constructed normal value in a market 
economy third country’.138 The consequences of this were exaggerated dumping margins and 
higher anti-dumping duties.139 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 realises that China’s protocol of accession to the WTO expired in 
2016 December, which means it cannot be classified non-market economy.140 However, the EU 
laws continue to violate the WTO laws as far as China is concerned because the transitional 
provisions state that pre-existing measures stay in force at least until first review, in spite of the 
changes in legislation.141 In Chapter 3, it was suggested that South Africa can no longer classify 
China as non-market economy as doing so violates the WTO rules.142 
In the case of imports from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan, which are not Members of the WTO, at the date of initiation of the investigation, a 
different set of rules apply when calculating normal value.143 The distinction means that different 
rules apply for WTO Member and non-Members. The Commission should determine normal 
value:  
                                                            
137Noël S & Zhou W ‘Replacing the Non-Market Economy Methodology: Is the European Union’s Alternative 
Approach Justified Under the World Trade Organization Anti-Dumping Agreement?’ (2016) 11(11) Global Trade 
and Customs Law 559.  
138Noël S & Zhou W ‘Replacing the Non-Market Economy Methodology: Is the European Union’s Alternative 
Approach Justified Under the World Trade Organization Anti-Dumping Agreement?’ (2016) 11(11) Global Trade 
and Customs Law 559. 
139Stoler AL ‘Treatment of China as a Non-Market Economy: Implications for Antidumping and Countervailing 
Measures and Impact on Chinese Company Operations in the WTO Framework’ (2003) Presentation to Forum on 
WTO System & Protectionism: Challenges China Faces After WTO Accession Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation 
Centre December 1-2, 2003. 
140 Article 2.6a of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
141Section 9 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2321; see also Tietje C & Sacher V ‘The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of 
the European Union – A Breach of WTO-Law?’ (2018) European Yearbook of International Economic Law - 
Special Issue on "The Future of Trade Defence Instruments: Global Policy Trends and Legal Challenges" 17 
142See generally 3.4.1 Determination of dumping: Normal Value 
143Article 2.7 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. 
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‘on the basis of the price or constructed value in an appropriate representative country, or the price 
from such a third country to other countries, including the Union, or where those are not possible, 
on any other reasonable basis, including the price actually paid or payable in the Union for the like 
product, duly adjusted if necessary to include a reasonable profit margin’.144 
When selecting an appropriate representative country, the Commission should do it in a reasonable 
manner, and due account should be ‘taken of any reliable information made available at the time 
of selection, and in particular of cooperation by at least one exporter and producer in that 
country.145 If there is a country that qualifies as an appropriate representative country, ‘preference 
shall be given, where appropriate, to countries with an adequate level of social and environmental 
protection’, as well as account of time limits.146 If permissible, an ‘appropriate representative 
country which is subject to the same investigation [will] be used’.147 After its initiation of the 
country envisaged, the Commission should promptly inform parties to the investigation and give 
10 days for the concerned parties to comment.148 
Export Price 
When it comes to the determination of export price, the EU explicitly defines export price. It 
defines export price as the price that is ‘actually paid or payable for the product when sold for 
export from the exporting country to the Union’.149  This definition enables the European 
Commission to arrive at the correct costs, without including unnecessary adjustments, which 
should be excluded in the standard calculation of export price. However, the actual definition has 
shortfalls, as it does not take into consideration taxes applied to the products, which must be 
adjusted. The export price can be found in documents such as individual invoiced transactions, 
offers, salesmen reports, or statistics for imports from the country concerned.150 The export price 
should be adjusted to ex-factory level prices to allow fair comparison.151  
                                                            
144Article 2.7 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. 
145Article 2.7 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. 
146Article 2.7 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. 
147Article 2.7 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. 
148Article 2.7 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/2321. 
149Article 2.8 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
150European Commission Guide on How to Draft an Anti-dumping Complaint (2016) 12. 
151Molyneux CG ‘Establishing the Rules of the Game: Domestic Structures and Unfair Trade Instruments’ in Snyder 
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In cases where there are compensatory agreements or no export prices, or unreliable export prices, 
the construction method shall determine export price.152 The constructed price will be the amount 
which products are charged to an independent buyer when they are first resold or the price at which 
they were resold in the same condition in which they were imported.153 In these instances, it is 
important to consider proper adjustments of taxes and all costs such as transportation costs in order 
to come up with an accurate export price at the Community frontier level.154 All costs that were 
borne by the importer and paid by a party inside or outside EU such as transport, handling, loading 
and other costs must accordingly be adjusted.155 
Fair Comparison 
After determination of both export price and normal value, the European Commission has to make 
a fair comparison of the two amounts.156 Thus, determination of export price and normal value 
should have been done using the same method to allow comparison, which is what the WTO also 
requires. A fair comparison of export price and normal value should be done by taking into account 
factors which affect comparability, for sales made  at the same level of trade, as closely as possible, 
and at the same time.157 In order to have a fair comparison of the two, they must have been 
calculated using the same method and the commonly used method is the ex-factory prices 
method.158  
 
If values are not comparable, factors that are likely to affect prices should be taken into 
consideration and adjusted accordingly.159 Adjustments can be made on the following; physical 
characteristics, import charges and indirect taxes, discounts, rebates and quantities, level of trade, 
transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs, packing, credit, after-sales costs and 
currency conversions.160 Adjustments can also be made on all factors that affect prices that were 
                                                            
152Article 2.9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
153Article 2.9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
154Article 2.9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
155Article 2.9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
156Article 2.10 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
157Article 2.10 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
158Lestrade E ‘Market Protection in Europe and Anti-Dumping Law’ (2007) 4. 
159Article 2.10 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
160See generally Article 2.10 (a-j) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
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not mentioned in the regulation if they affect the price comparability and if customers are paying 
different prices on the domestic market because of the difference in such factors.161 
 
Dumping Margin 
After the comparison is complete, the European Commission has to determine the margin of 
dumping.162 Dumping margin indicates the magnitude at which the dumping is taking place. By 
definition, dumping margin is the difference between the export price and the normal value.163 In 
cases where dumping margins differ, calculation may be done using an average price basis called 
a weighted average dumping margin.164 If the complaint concerns more than one country, the 
dumping margin must be calculated for all countries concerned individually.165The calculation of 
dumping margin is subject to the provisions of fair comparison; thus, calculations of dumping 
should be done with the method of comparison used in mind. 
 
Normally dumping margins should be established based on a comparison of a weighted average-
to-weighted average of normal value and export prices, or by a comparison of the individual 
amounts on a transaction-to-transaction basis.166 However, the standard calculations may be 
disregarded if export prices patterns from different regions purchasers or period are significantly 
different, a weighted average normal value will be compared to prices of all individual export 
transactions.167 This method should also be used if the first two methods of calculating dumping 
margin do not reflect the full degree of dumping taking place.168 This is correct insofar as the third 
method is concerned. As noted in Chapter 2, the panel in US — Washing Machines held that the 
‘phrase “individual export transactions” refers to the transactions that fall within the relevant 
pricing pattern, a more limited universe than the export transactions covered when applying the 
symmetrical comparison methodologies foreseen in the first sentence of Article 2.4.2’.169 
                                                            
161Article 2.10 (k) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
162Article 2.11of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
163Article 2.12 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
164Article 2.11 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
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166Article 2.11 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
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To sum up, the determination of dumping in the EU includes determining normal value and export 
price, making a fair comparison and calculating dumping margin 
4.4.2 Determination of Injury 
Anti-dumping measures will not be imposed only on evidence of dumping.170 There should also 
be injury that has been made to the domestic industry.171 The European Commission handles both 
investigations of dumping and injury. Although the Commission allows any interested party to 
submit evidence of injury in support of certain anti-dumping measures, it faces allegations of 
complicating the process of submitting the papers.172 The definition of injury in Regulation (EU) 
2016/1036 is identical to the one given in the ADA. The term injury refers to material injury, threat 
of material injury to the EU industry or material retardation of the creation of such an industry.173 
The unfairness of dumping is because of the injury that dumping causes or threatens to cause to 
the local producers of the ‘like product’ in the importing country.174  
Material Injury 
When determining injury the Commission objectively examines all the positive evidence on the 
volume of dumped imports inclusive of the effect of dumped imports on prices of like products in 
the EU.175 The Commission also determines consequences of imports on things such as domestic 
producer sales and profits, output, market share or employment among others.176  Where volume 
of imports is concerned, the Commission gives into consideration whether or not the increase in 
dumped imports is absolute or relative when compared to production or consumption in the EU.177  
When it comes to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the Commission considers either 
price undercutting or price depression.178 The Commission considers whether there has been a 
price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product in the 
                                                            
170See generally Article 1.1 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
171See generally Article 1.1 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
172See generally Newman S ‘Observations on the European Union Anti-Dumping Regulation’ 2007 Global Trade 
and Customs Journal 87-93. 
173Article 3 (1)of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
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EU.179 This position is similar to that of South Africa discussed in Chapter 3.180 Consideration will 
also be made where there was an intention to depress prices or an intention to prevent price 
increases.181Most importantly decisive guidance is not necessarily based on one or more of these 
factors.182 
In case 2016/C 62/07 concerning imports of certain lightweight thermal paper originating in South 
Korea, evidence was produced that imports under investigation had increased overall in absolute 
terms and their market share.183 Prima facie evidence given by the complainant showed that the 
volume and the prices of the investigated product, among other consequences had a negative 
impact in the EU industry affecting quantities sold, level of prices charged and the market share 
of the EU.184 This adversely affected the overall performance, ‘financial situation and the 
employment situation of the Union industry’.185  
 
In case 2014/C 461/16 concerning imports of silico-manganese from India, enough evidence was 
if the imports have increased in absolute terms and the product had gained market share. 186 The 
quantity of the product increased and the price being charged had a negative effect on the volumes 
being sold by the EU industries causing a decrease in the performance, financial situation and 
employment in the EU.187 The analysis of injury in these cases indicates that the Commission is 
not reliant on one or more factors to determine injury; instead, it considers all facts collectively. 
Hindley argues that the Commission relies mostly on price undercutting when it determines 
injury.188 In his argument, he avers that in a typical investigation, the Commission attempts to 
                                                            
179Article 3.3 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
180See generally 3.3.2 Determination of  Material Injury 
181Article 3.3 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
182Article 3.3 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
183European Commission 2016/C 62/07: Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
certain lightweight thermal paper originating in South Korea. 
184European Commission 2016/C 62/07: Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
certain lightweight thermal paper originating in South Korea. 
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certain lightweight thermal paper originating in South Korea. 
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show that injury facing the EU industry and the onset of dumping and price undercutting are 
simultaneous.189 This is problematic because the notion of price undercutting as used by the 
European Commission implies that identical products sell at different prices in the same market 
which is possible, ‘but it is not a state of affairs to be merely assumed’.190 Thus, despite the 
Regulation stating that not one or more factors should be relied on in determining injury, the 
Commission may not be strictly adhering to this. 
In a case in which the product under investigation is from two different countries, their effects will 
be assessed simultaneously only if their dumping margin is more than prescribed quantities or the 
volume of imports acceptable.191 In addition, 
‘a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports [should be] appropriate in light of the 
conditions of competition between imported products and the conditions of competition between 
the imported products and the like Union product’.192 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 provides factors, which the Commission should examine in its 
assessment of injury caused by dumped imports.193  These indices and factors are economic and 
have a bearing on the state of the industry.194 In EC-Bed Linen, the panel held that evaluation of 
all factors is obligatory.195 This list is not exhaustive but importantly the study commends EU in 
that the Commission is required to consider factors that an ‘industry is still in the process of 
recovering from the effects of past dumping or subsidisation’.196 This correlates with the argument 
given in Chapter 2 that anti-dumping measures seek to level the harm caused by dumped imports 
                                                            
189Hindley B (2009) 3. 
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191Article 3.4 (a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
192Article 3.4 (b) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
193Article 3.5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
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and should stay in place until the time the industry has recovered from injury.197 One must also 
note that in reaching its decision, the Commission could use any one or more of the factors.198 
Threat of material injury 
Besides material injury, injury also means threat of material injury. A threat of injury occurs when 
actual material injury is not present but where factors listed in the Regulation indicate that dumped 
have a potential to injure the domestic industry.199 A threat of material injury should be supported 
by evidence that shows that there was an intention to cause injury and not just an allegation.200 A 
determination of threat of material injury may be based on different factors amongst them whether 
there is likelihood of increased imports due to an increase in dumped imports, or  
‘whether there is sufficient freely disposable capacity on the part of the exporter or an imminent 
and substantial increase in such capacity indicating the likelihood of substantially increased 
dumped exports to the Union, account being taken of the availability of other export markets to 
absorb any additional exports’.201  
 
Other factors to consider are that imports priced at a level that can depress price or prevent price 
increases of like products in the domestic market or that stocks are sufficient to cause dumping.202 
One of the above factors might not be sufficient to support that there is a threat of injury but the 
summation of the factors can lead to a conclusion that there is a threat of injury and that unless 
protective action is taken, material injury will occur.203 Even if the quantity of product is minimal, 
it can be to suffice cause material injury.204 The percentage at which the commission assumes that 
                                                            
197See generally 2.3.2 Schools of thoughts on anti-dumping duties. 
198Article 3.5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
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‘(a) a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the Union market indicating the likelihood of 
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imports do not cause injury due to low volumes is when the market share is 1 per cent or below 
unless if the joint countries contribute 3 per cent to the Union consumption.205 For individual 
exporters, dumping margins are regarded as invalid when they are below 2 per cent.206 
In joined cases C-186/14 P AND C-193/14 P, the court dismissed the allegation made by the parties 
that the General Court207 had erred in law by giving credit to the concept of ‘vulnerability’ an 
independent meaning and importance that the words do not have.208 The parties argued that the 
words are not mentioned in the legislation as a condition for finding a threat of injury.209 The 
appeal court dismissed the arguments stating that although the General court used the words it ‘did 
not regard the vulnerability of the EU industry as a condition enabling a threat of injury to be 
found’.210 However, it was necessary to know the present situation of industry which allows the 
EU institutions to determine whether the ‘imminent increase in future dumped imports will cause 
material injury to the EU industry if no trade defence measure is taken’.211 Thus, evidence should 
show an imminent threat not just a remote possibility.212 
Material Retardation 
The study observes that, Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 does not have a comprehensive provision on 
material retardation. This may be attributed to the fact that most industries in the EU are developed 
and material retardation is applicable to industries that cannot be established because of dumped 
imports.213 In Chapter 3, the study opined that it is unusual that although South Africa has emerging 
markets, material retardation is not as researched as it can be.214 It was suggested that under 
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research might be a result of the WTO not providing enough guidance on the matter.215 As such, 
WTO rules should be amended to provide guidance on the matter.216 
4.4.3 Causal Link 
In the EU, an anti-dumping duty cannot be imposed unless the dumped product whose release for 
free circulation in the Union causes injury.217 As such, dumping should be cause of the injury to 
the Union. The Regulation states that it must be demonstrated ‘that the volume of the dumped 
imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the Union market for like products’ is 
causing injury to the Union.218 This requires an analysis of factors in Article 3.5 of EU Regulation 
(EU) 2016/1036.219 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 also has a non-attributable clause such as the one in the ADA.220 All 
known factors, which are not caused by the dumped imports but are simultaneously causing injury, 
should be examined in order to exclude the possibility of attaching injury to dumped imports.221 
In EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia), the panel held that the EU did not err in its investigations 
when if found that ‘access to raw materials’ did not constitute a ‘known factor’.222 Access to raw 
materials was ‘simply an aspect of the conditions of competition that may be reflected in price 
differences between the imported products from Indonesia and domestic products’.223 
Regulation (EU) 2016/103, however lists, ‘competition between, third country and Union 
producers’ as a ‘known factor’.224 The EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia) illustrates that in anti-
dumping disputes, the matter are decided on case-by-case basis and there in precedence.225 The 
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study observes that although Regulation (EU) 2016/103 list competition as a ‘known a factor’ in 
EU – Fatty Alcohols (Indonesia) it was not considered as; known factor. It is submitted that the 
inclusion of competition as a ‘known factor’ in Regulation (EU) 2016/103 is commendable. As 
discussed in Chapter 3 South Africa also lists competition as a ‘known factor’ which is positive.226 
In Chapter 2, the study argued that anti-dumping rules should include issues of competition at a 
WTO level to minimise abuse of anti-dumping laws and protectionism.227 
4.4.4 Community Interest 
Besides the requirements of dumping, injury and causation, the EU has a fourth requirement, which 
must be met before anti-dumping measures are imposed.228 The fourth requirement is community 
interest; imposing of anti-dumping measures should not be against community interest.229 In other 
regulations, countries and regional agreements consider the interests of the competing parties but 
the EU considers also the interests of the community at large.230 This includes the likely effects of 
consumers in the community as well as industries beyond just the competing industry.231 There 
are only six rejects done so far since the establishment of the EU because of failure to meet 
community interest.232 
Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 is comprehensive and clear on what the European 
Commission should consider when weighing community interest.233 Before Regulation (EU) 
2016/1036 was amended, it referred to authorities as being responsible for deciding whether 
imposition of measures will be in EU’s interest.234 This has recently changed to Commission 
because the European Commission is now the sole authority involved in anti-dumping 
                                                            
2263.4.3 Causal Link. 
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228Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
229Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036; see also 3.4.4 Public interest Considerations, in the section the author 
discussed that the ADA does not have a public interest clause, South Africa’s regulations also do not contain public 
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American University International Law Review 1030 
232 Rovegno  L & Vandenbussche H ‘A comparative analysis of EU Antidumping rules and application’ 
(2011)  IRES Discussion papers ; 2011023  
233See generally Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 and the amendment in Article 1.13 of Regulation (EU) 
2018/825 (hereafter Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended). 
234Article 21.2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
144 
 
investigations.235 The study avers that this change is important as it clearly defines which authority 
has power to decide on the issue of Union interest. Previously the European Council was 
responsible for imposing anti-dumping measures after recommendations from the Commission.236 
All parties including consumers are given a chance within specified time to provide information 
after a notice of initiation of the anti-dumping investigation have been published.237 Regulation 
(EU) 2018/825 has provided for additional interested parties who are eligible to submit information 
to the European Commission.238 These parties are Union producers and trade unions.239 This is a 
positive development because Union producers form part of the Union industry240 and trade unions 
represent a major proportion of the working class.241 Information provided by one party is also 
available to other parties involved so that they can respond.242 After examining the information if 
the European Commission is of the opinion that measures, as determined based on the dumping 
and injury found, is against community interest, the measures should not be applied.243  
EU’s addition of community interest is a good addition to anti-dumping rules. In Chapter 3, the 
study held that although South Africa does not have a public interest provision in its legislation, 
the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) has considered it in some cases.244 
Though this is commendable, in Chapter 2, it was held that it is important to have a mandatory 
public interest clause to create a balancing approach.245 
In determining the elements of dumping, injury and community interest the European Commission 
European Commission should adhere to correct procedures. The next section discusses the 
procedural requirements in an anti-dumping investigation. 
                                                            
235European Commission ‘Directorate-General Trade’ available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/trade_en 
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236 Rovegno L & Vandenbussche H A comparative analysis of EU Antidumping Rules and Application (2011) IRES, 
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4.5 PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS  
4.5.1 Initiation of Proceedings  
Generally, investigations in the EU are initiated through a written complaint.246 An individual or 
legal person or association that does not hold legal personality but acts on behalf of the European 
Industry can write this complaint.247 In addition, complaints may now 
‘also be submitted jointly by the Union industry, or by any natural or legal person or any association 
not having legal personality acting on behalf thereof, and trade unions, or be supported by trade 
unions’.248  
This broadening of the parties that are eligible to submit written complaint can be argued to be 
positive development. This is because it gives parties who may have previously been affected by 
dumping a right to act which they did not previously had. However, the European Commission 
may have to increase its staff capacity to cope with increase in cases that may come with such. 
This has to be done bearing in mind that there is now a duty on the ‘Commission to facilitate access 
to the trade defence instrument for diverse and fragmented industry sectors …through a dedicated 
SME Helpdesk’.249 
There are two ways to submit the complaint: firstly, submitting to a member state that can later 
submit it to the European Commission and secondly, submitting directly to the Commission.250 
Once the European Commission has received the complaint, it sends a copy of the complaint to all 
EU Members.251 Officially, the complaint is lodged on the next official day after receipt is issued 
by the Commission or after delivery of registered mail.252 The European Commission is required 
to give Member states information concerning their analysis of the grievance usually within 21 
days of the date of lodging with it.253 
In the absence of a written complaint, the Regulation requires member states to immediately 
submit evidence of resultant injury to the EU industry and dumping to the European Commission 
                                                            
246Article 5.1 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as amended. 
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if such evidence exists.254 Moreover, the European Commission can initiate an investigation in the 
absence of a written complaint if there is sufficient evidence of all the three elements of dumping, 
once the need to initiate is determined member states should be given information on the 
investigation.255 
When submitting the complaint, it should contain evidence of dumped product, injury caused and 
a causal link between dumped imports and suspected injury.256 In addition, the complaint should 
also contain all information concerning identity of the complainant and all related information 
such as normal value, export price, volume of and value of EU production of the like product 
accounted by the producers.257 Other related information includes a clear description of the 
dumped product, its origins, the names of the exporter and their identities or person importing the 
like product under investigation.258  
On receipt on all required information, the European Commission should investigate its accuracy 
and adequacy in order to determine if evidence is sufficient to warrant an initiation.259 This 
thorough examination of evidence can limit the potential of initiating am investigation that will 
waste time and resources due to its lack of sufficient evidence.260 A complaint, which is supported 
by less than 25%, cannot be initiated, because it lacks sufficient producers supporting the 
application.261 It can be suggested that in the context of the EU, the less number of producers 
supporting the complaint may be indicative of the fact that the complaint is against community 
interest.  
Additionally, if dumped products are from countries whose imports represent a market share of 
below 1 per cent, investigation cannot be initiated unless put together the countries account for 3 
per cent or more of the EU consumption.262 If the European Commission determines that evidence 
is sufficient to start proceedings, initiation must be done through publishing of a notice in the 
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Official Journal of the European Union within 45 days from the date of lodging.263 The notice 
should contain the product under investigation and countries concerned.264 It should also 
summarise all submitted information, and should indicate information that should be given to the 
European Commission.265 The notice should clearly indicate date where parties can air their views 
and whether such views will be taken into account.266 Similar to South Africa, the EU discourages 
the publicising of information before the initiation of an investigation; however, a government of 
the exporting country receives a notice of pending initiation.267 
4.5.2 Investigative Process 
After initiation, an investigation at EU level, coordinated by the European Commission acting in 
co-operation with Member States, begins.268 An investigation covers issues concerning dumping 
and injury at the same time.269 The European Commission sends questionnaires to different parties 
and they have 30 days from the day of receipt to respond.270 However, an exception to the rule is 
that the European Commission can grant an extension if the concerned party or parties provide 
valid reasons for requesting such extension.271 During the investigation, the Commission can 
request information from Member States and they should take necessary steps to comply with such 
request.272 When the Member States requests information, which is of general interest, the 
European Commission can honour that request by providing information that is not confidential.273 
Member States should conduct necessary checks and inspections, amongst different stakeholders 
upon request by the European Commission.274 They should also carry out investigations where 
third countries have given their consent.275 The European Commission will task its officials to help 
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the EU Members in carrying out their duties.276 The study submits that this is a good practice 
because people with expertise in dumping will conduct the investigations and it may minimise the 
chance of procedural errors. 
During the investigation, all interested parties who have been identified in accordance with Article 
5.10 are given chance to are given chances to present their views in front of each other.277 This is 
only done upon a request; however, failure to attend such meetings should not be prejudicial to 
any party.278  If the opportunity to hold meetings is presented, the European Commission takes 
much cognisance in matters of preserving confidential material.279 It is important to note that 
investigations done pursuant to Article 5.9 must be concluded within one year and within 14 
months of initiation, for those done in pursuant to Article 8 and Article 9.280 
The EU has been criticised about its policy on confidentiality in conducting its anti-dumping 
investigations as discussed below. 
4.5.3 Confidentiality 
Since the companies involved in an anti-dumping investigation are competitors, confidentiality is 
of paramount importance to them and other parties thereof.281 As such, exchange of confidential 
information may breach aspects of competition law. Information provided to the European 
Commission is strictly confidential and may be reviewed to other parties only as a summary.282 
The Commission can release confidential information only if authorised by the suppliers of such 
information.283 These summaries are not ideal in terms of WTO and was criticised in EC Iron and 
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Steel Fasteners (China) where it held that the EU had failed to give reasons on why the summary 
could not be provided.284 Thus, issues of access to information may prejudice exporters. 
The most confidential information is one concerning the pricing, shipments and identity of 
purchasers and this information is not available to everyone after being collected by government 
agencies who conduct the investigations.285 Different anti-dumping laws have different regulations 
in terms of the information that can be distributed. In South Africa, although confidentiality should 
be observed, there is a limitation to its application.286 South Africa’s Promotion of Access to 
Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA), was enacted to give effect to a constitutional right of access to 
any information which promotes ‘a culture of secrecy and bureaucracy to a culture of transparency 
and accountability’.287 Under the EU, pertinent data is made available only to those who are 
investigating the matter whereas under US law, legal counsel can have access if they wish to 
(exclude the parties being investigated).288 The European Commission has the most strict 
confidentiality rules that do not allow the free flow of information between parties.289 
The parties that are given information in the EU are the registered parties only, making confidential 
information less publicly available in the EU cases.290 Complaints are not revealed until initiations 
begin.291 In addition, calculations done by the EU are not given to everyone and the soft wares 
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used are complex.292 In a case where data has been provided in the capacity of an individual person 
or employee, it is not treated as confidential as provide for by Article 16 of the Data Protection 
Act.293 It also restricts individuals from using data for personal use or household activities.294 
Personal data maybe used when there has been an authority granted by the controller of the 
software used in EU.295 
4.5.4 Provisional Measures, Undertakings, Termination without Measures and Imposition of 
Definitive Duties  
In Chapter 2, it was stated that when it comes to anti-dumping measures the school of thought that 
best reflects WTO is the one that proposes that anti-dumping measures are necessary to remedy 
unfair trade.296 The EU legislation holds similar sentiments when it comes to the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties. This is because the legislation tries to create balance between general 
competition issues and unfair trade practices.297 
Provisional measures 
In the EU, provisional anti-dumping duties may only be imposed if four conditions are met. The 
imposition is dependent upon initiation in pursuant to Article 5; adequate time for interested parties 
to respond after notice in accordance to Article 5.10; initial positive determination of dumping and 
injury; and imposition should be in the community interest for prevention of injury.298 Imposition 
can only be done 60 days after initiation but not later than seven months from the initiation.299 This 
shortens the period from previous nine months making the system more transparent.300 
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Because anti-dumping measures remedy unfair trade, the amount of the provisional anti-dumping 
duty must not be more than the initially established dumping margin.301 The EU has a mandatory 
lesser duty rule provision, which states that provisional duties must be less than the margin if the 
duty is sufficient to eradicate injury.302 In addition when examining lesser duty, the Commission 
should ‘take into account whether there are distortions on raw materials with regard to the product 
concerned’.303 This leads to the suggestion that in this case EU’s anti-dumping system is a bit 
advanced than that of South Africa because it does not only look at final products in isolation as 
prices of raw materials may also be dumped. Also in South Africa, lesser duty is optional.304 This 
is so despite the benefits of its application in lessening the impacts of misrepresentations that are 
created when full anti-dumping duties are imposed.305  
In the EU, a guarantee should accompany provisional duties for purposes of releasing the products 
for free circulation in the EU.306 Importantly adoption of provisional measures is done in 
accordance to Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.307 The duration for provisional duties is six months 
but an extension of three months may be given, making it nine months in total.308 However, 
imposition for nine months may only be done ‘where exporters representing a significant 
percentage of the trade involved so request or do not object upon notification by the 
Commission’.309 
Undertakings 
Besides provisional anti-dumping duties, undertakings may also be made where a provisional 
affirmative determination of dumping and injury has been made.310 The Commission, following 
the advisory procedure in Article 15.2, may accept undertakings submitted by exporters if satisfied 
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that the undertakings will eliminate the injurious effect.311 Undertakings are voluntary offers made 
by any exporter to stop exporting product at dumped prices or revise its prices to acceptable 
amounts.312  Importantly, the Commission can suggest undertakings to exporters of which refusal 
to accept such an undertaking will not be prejudicial to the exporter.313 In the event that an 
undertaking is accepted and in force, the European Commission cannot apply provisional or 
definitive anti-dumping duties on the same products which undertakings were accepted.314 
The Commission can reject an undertaking submitted by any exporter if it is of the opinion that 
the offer is impractical because of different reasons such as general policy and where there is large 
number of exporters.315 If such offer is rejected, reasons for refusal may be given and the exporter 
may be given a chance to comment, importantly definite measures will set out reasons for 
refusal.316 This suggests that even though it is within the discretion of Commission to provide 
reasons, if reasons are not given it will not be prejudicial since they will later be laid out in the 
definitive measures. 
Investigations terminate upon acceptance of undertakings, as envisaged by Article 15.3.317 
Normally, an investigation of dumping and injury also concludes when a negative determination 
of dumping or injury is made leading to automatic lapse of an undertaking.318 However, 
undertakings may be maintained if the negative determination is because of the undertaking.319 
Undertakings will continue where a positive determination is made.320  
Termination without measures and Imposition of definitive duties  
Anti-dumping investigations can be terminated without measures where termination is not against 
community interest following withdrawal of a complaint.321 This is interesting as ADA is silent on 
the issue of continuing with an investigation after the withdrawal of a complaint. Prusa notes that 
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withdrawal of an anti-dumping petition is not evident of failure of the case but rather comes about 
because of out of court settlement in the form of either a price undertaking or a quantity 
restriction.322 It may, however, be argued that the Commission continues with the investigation 
because withdrawal will lead to further injury of the domestic industry as such it is important to 
continue with the investigation. This is because Prusa’s argument does not hold where 
investigations continue after complaint is withdrawn, continuation paints a picture that a settlement 
was not reached. 
Investigation in the EU can also terminate without measures where dumping margin is less than 2 
per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export price; this position is the same of with what WTO 
requires.323   
Where investigations conclude that the evidence shows that dumping and injury took place, it is 
possible to impose definitive anti-dumping duties if it is in the interest of the community.324 This 
imposition should be no later than one month before expiring of provisional duties where they are 
in force.325 The amount of the duty is non-discriminatory on imports without undertakings and is 
determined on a case-by-case basis.326 Similar to the WTO, the EU regulation encourages that a 
lesser duty be imposed where that lesser duty is sufficient to eliminate injury.327 
4.6 REVIEWS 
After imposition of anti-dumping duties, they remain applicable up to the time that it counters the 
dumping causing injury.328 Generally anti-dumping measures, whether duties or undertakings 
expire after five years from their date of imposition or five years from conclusion of most recent 
review covering dumping and injury.329  
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Chapter 2 identified a number of reviews that can be utilised, dependent on the circumstances, 
after the imposition of anti-dumping duties.330 These reviews are expiry, interim, anti-absorption 
reviews and new shipper.331 The reviews discussed in Chapter 2 are similar to those provided by 
the EU except for anti-circumvention reviews as such the study will engage in the ones’ not 
provided for by the WTO.332 The EU, just like South Africa in Chapter 3, provides for anti-
circumvention reviews.333 The trend of anti-circumvention in national and regional anti-dumping 
legislation seems to justify the authors call for the WTO to regulate circumvention at multilateral 
level in order to create uniform guidelines.334 
Anti-dumping duties already imposed in pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 can also be 
applied to like products imports from third countries that are modified to circumvent measures.335 
The author suggests that this provision is not compliant with the WTO because the WTO advocates 
for transparency and procedural fairness. The extension of measures already in place to third 
countries without initiating an independent investigation to determine the dumping and injury 
seems unfair to the study because the injury caused by these products may differ from that cause 
by the original products. Hence, for them to be subjected to the same duty where dumping margin 
may be different is unjustified.  
Anti- circumvention reviews can be initiated after a year lapsed from the date of extension of the 
measures, any such review shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 11.5 
and this review will be deemed interim.336 It is important to state that all reviews should be in 
accordance to the procedures of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 and mostly these are compatible with 
the WTO except for anti-circumvention as discussed above. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter highlighted that the EU is a leading anti-dumping user with jurisprudence that has 
continued to change dynamically since inception of first anti-dumping laws. It demonstrated that 
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Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 has brought about changes, which are more clear and reliable. 
Amongst the changes there are more clear rules with regards to calculating dumping margin for 
imports from countries outside the region on the basis of ‘significant market distortions’. The 
Chapter highlighted that the EU anti-dumping laws are modelled from the WTO but where 
substantive requirements are concerned, the EU considers community interest as integral in anti-
dumping investigations. In addition, the EU regulations have clear definitions of export price, 
which promotes consistency. 
It is undeniable that the backbone of the EU’s success in anti-dumping experience is its effective 
and functioning institutional structure. It has been shown that all the EU structures have clear 
mandate on their duties when conducting anti-dumping investigations and imposing anti-dumping 
measures. The EU invests in developing expertise and when investigations are conducted by the 
EU Members the European Commission send its experienced team to help with investigations.  
Although the Chapter highlighted that the EU’s anti-dumping laws are similar to those of ADA 
and compatible in most provisions some provisions are inconsistent with the WTO anti-dumping 
rules. The Chapter highlighted that China’s protocol of accession to the WTO expired in 2016 
December and although Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 bought with it changes meant to streamline 
the previous position on China. There is still a burden for China and other non-market countries to 
prove in writing that market conditions exist for them to have the benefit of using the standard 
calculation of normal value until at least the first review. This leads to discrimination and 
protectionism both of which the WTO does not permit. 
The Union has also been criticised in the way they handle issues of confidentiality.  It has also 
been accused of complicating paperwork to an already complex subject. The author also 
highlighted that the provisions on anti-circumvention are in part not compatible to WTO as they 
are procedurally unfair. With this in mind, the next Chapter will discuss anti-dumping laws in 
Zimbabwe.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NEED FOR A SOUND ANTI-DUMPING FRAMEWORK IN ZIMBABWE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Anti-dumping laws are important instruments in trade reform.1 They are also the most invoked 
amongst trade law remedies.2 There are different schools of thoughts that may explain a 
government’s reactions to dumping.3 Among these, the school of thought that best reflects on the 
use of anti-dumping measures in terms of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is the one that 
proposes that anti-dumping measures are a necessary tool in remedying unfair trade.4 In Chapter 
3, the use of anti-dumping duties in South Africa helped increase the ‘manufacturing output, and 
recapture the domestic market’ in the 2015-2016 financial year.5 In the European Union (EU), 
anti-dumping legislation has been modernised to reflect current global economic challenges.6 For 
this reason, an effective anti-dumping regime requires anti-dumping laws that are clear, as 
dumping is a complex subject.7 
The Implementation of Article VI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 (Anti-
Dumping Agreement (ADA) does not regulate the behaviour of private companies involved in 
dumping rather its focus is when governments can take action against anti-dumping behaviour.8 
This explains why Members of the WTO are under no obligation to enact anti-dumping legislation 
but if a member chooses to promulgate anti-dumping legislation, the laws should be in accordance 
with the WTO rules.9 Zimbabwe has been a Member of WTO since 1995; hence, its anti-dumping 
laws should comply with the WTO.10 The International Council of Chemical Associations argues 
                                                            
1Miranda J ‘Should Anti-dumping Laws be dumped’ (1997) Law and Policy in International Business 264 (hereafter 
Miranda J (1997). 
2Trebilcock MJ Advanced Introduction to International Trade Law (2015) 61 (hereafter Trebilcock MJ (2015). 
3See discussion in 2.3.2 Schools of thoughts on anti-dumping duties. 
4WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 08 April 2016); see also2.3.2 Schools of 
thoughts on anti-dumping duties, 3.5.3 Final Phase and 4.5.4 Provisional measures, Undertakings, Termination 
without Measures and Imposition of Definitive Duties. 
5ITAC Annual Report 2015-2016 26; see discussion in 3.5.3 Final phase. 
6Sidley ‘European Union Introduces Additional Reforms to Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Rules’ (2018) 
available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b81d240c-288b-4c82-a210-fd2d8ef59595 (accessed 13 
October 2018) see also 4.2 Overview. 
7See generally 2.4 WTO Treatment of Dumping. 
8See generally 2.4 WTO Treatment of Dumping. 
9WTO ‘Anti-dumping’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm (accessed 20 April 
2016). 
10It is also a founding Member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and a signatory to all the 
WTO agreements including Article VI of GATT and the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA).   
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that one of the major challenges of the anti-dumping framework has been the fact that WTO 
members into domestic laws have not accurately transposed it.11 In its view, this raises issues and 
legal uncertainties that influence trade.12 In addition, during the process of transposing, some 
issues are not clarified which leads to shortfalls in such legislations. This is the case for Zimbabwe; 
its legislation has a number of shortfalls both procedurally and substantially. 
There has been no dedicated peer-reviewed literature that focuses on assessing Zimbabwe’s anti-
dumping laws and plugging the leaks concerning such trade distortions. As such, most sources that 
used in this Chapter are not peer reviewed secondary sources. With the aid of these sources, this 
Chapter seeks to determine the need for reform in order to develop a sound anti-dumping 
framework, which is the foundation for effective regulation. To achieve this, the Chapter first looks 
at the current anti-dumping laws. The Chapter also refers to South Africa and the EU discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, as cases of best practice for anti-dumping law. The study cannot 
be comparative in the traditional sense because both South Africa and the EU have developed anti-
dumping systems and Zimbabwe does not.13  
In looking at the current anti-dumping laws in Zimbabwe, the Chapter also provides an overview 
on anti-dumping matters in Zimbabwe. It discusses the legislative and institutional frameworks 
that deal with anti-dumping. Additionally, the Chapter will discuss the substantive and procedural 
requirements to meet when enacting anti-dumping duties. Finally, the Chapter will discuss 
economic and non-economic reasons for further development of the anti-dumping system before 
concluding the Chapter. 
5.2 OVERVIEW 
Though anti-dumping measures remedy unfair trade practises, Zimbabwe has never investigated 
any dumping allegation despite calls by different stakeholders to investigate such.14 For example, 
Capri, Willowvale Mazda Motor Industries, Quest Motors, Olivine, National Foods are some of 
                                                            
11International Association of Chemical Associations ‘Anti-Dumping in the Framework of a new WTO Round’ 
2001 Position Statement 2. 
12International Association of Chemical Associations (2015) 2. 
13For a discussion of what a comparative entails see generally Boele-Woelki, K. (2009) ‘What comparative family 
should entail”’ in Boele-Woelki, K. (ed.) Debates in family law around the globe at the dawn of the 21st Century 
(2009) 3- 36. 
14Muganda RG ‘Lets enforce dumping laws’ The Herald 27 September 2012. 
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the local companies, which are calling for the enforcement of the laws, but their calls remain 
unheeded.15 The Competition and Tariff Commission (CTC) has cited that some allegations 
referred to it for investigation do not technically involve dumping.16 However, in 2012 a case 
involving Dunlop Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited was carried forward into the year and it involved 
allegations that motor vehicle tyres from the Far East were being dumped.17 Despite the case being 
carried to 2012, Dunlop Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited did not fill nor submit an anti-dumping 
application form to initiate investigations.18 In 2013 the CTC handled a complaint by Kind Brands 
(Pvt) Limited on dumping of imported shoe polish on the local market.19 The CTC closed the case 
due to lack of interest by the company, because of its failure to furnish the required information 
needed to pursue an investigation.20 
Scholars such as Marongwe have identified some of the reasons that are driving the dumping of 
goods in Zimbabwe and suggest applying higher tariffs or quantitative restrictions to curtail the 
problem.21 In addition, Maravanyika has identified the dumping of particularly Chinese goods in 
Zimbabwe as a form of new colonisation.22 He further averred that Zimbabwe was failing to use 
the WTO agreements to protect its markets.23 It is important to note that Maravanyika’s assertions, 
though relevant, focused on the political school of thought of colonisation omitting the trade law 
aspects of dumping, which are the most important issues to consider. In light of this, Mugano notes 
that ‘in order to curtail the influx of certain goods which are threatening the survival of local 
industry, government must consider a mix of safeguard measures under the WTO rules’.24 This 
requires Zimbabwe to use either anti-dumping measures or countervailing measures or safeguards 
depended on the circumstances of each case. 
Trade remedies are not only an important tool in domestic industries, but also in progressing intra-
African trade and regional integration. The International Trade Administration Commission 
                                                            
15Muganda RG ‘Lets enforce dumping laws’ The Herald 27 September 2012. 
16See generally CTC Annual Report 2012. 
17CTC Annual Report 2012 63. 
18CTC Annual Report 2012 63. 
19 See generally CTC Annual Report 2013. 
20 See generally CTC Annual Report 2013. 
21Marongwe M ‘Zim Needs Law to Curb Cheap Good Influx’ Newsday 16 May 2003.  
22Marawanyika M ‘Zimbabwe under new colonialism’ The Standard 16 May 2003. 
23Marawanyika M ‘Zimbabwe under new colonialism’ The Standard 16 May 2003.  
24Mugano G ‘Time to Tighten Screws on Dumping’ The Herald 31 October 2013. 
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(ITAC) plays such role in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).25 Another example is 
that of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African 
Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tripartite Free Trade 
Area (TFTA) and African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) were flexible trade remedies 
inclusion has been amongst challenging issues in negotiation.26 This is because of the opposing 
arguments that flexible trade remedies are essential in helping African countries effectively 
implement them, whilst the other argument propose that the ‘real issue is about domestic 
capacity’.27 Both arguments are important in anti-dumping laws because, as a complex subject, 
there is need for flexible rules and in order to investigate the domestic industry should have the 
capacity to avoid non-compliance with the WTO laws. 
5.3 THE LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
5.3.1 Legislative Framework 
The main anti-dumping regulation in Zimbabwe is the Competition (Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty) (Investigation) Regulations, 2002 (Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002).28 This 
legislation covers both unfair trade practices, namely: countervailing measures and anti-dumping 
measures. Dealing with both countervailing measures and anti-dumping measures in the same 
regulation is problematic. For instance, some provisions are not clear if they deal with anti-
dumping or countervailing measures. For this reason, there is need to enact separate legislation 
that specifically deal with anti-dumping measures on one hand and countervailing measures, on 
the other hand. Besides Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002, dumping is also defined in the Customs 
and Exercise Act of 2014 and the Competition Act (Chapter 14:28).  
Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 is the relevant legislation applicable to this study because it 
contains both substantive and procedural requirements for enacting anti-dumping measures. 
Before 2002, there was no legislation, which laid down how to conduct investigations. This meant 
Zimbabwe was unable to investigate dumping issues and if there were any, as the Parliament had 
not yet passed such requirements.  
                                                            
25See discussion in 3.3.1 Legislative Framework, Members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) are 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.  
26Erasmus G ‘New era in African trade arrangements’ The Herald 06 September 2017. 
27Erasmus G ‘New era in African trade arrangements’ The Herald 06 September 2017. 
28This regulation will be referred to as Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 in this research. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
160 
 
Besides Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002, the Constitution of Zimbabwe ‘is the supreme law of 
the country’.29 This means that any ‘law, practice, custom or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid 
to the extent of the inconsistency’.30 The provisions in the Constitution, which are relevant to anti-
dumping investigations, are those that are concerned with access to information, right to 
administrative action and those of good public administration and leadership.31 These provisions 
promote transparency, which is one of the core pillars of anti-dumping investigations at the WTO 
level.32 
Apart from the Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 and the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the 
Administrative Justice Act (Chapter 10:28) (AJA) is also applicable to anti-dumping 
investigations.33 For example, Section 3 of the AJA requires an administrative authority to give all 
relevant parties adequate notice about the nature and purpose of an administrative action 
proposed.34 In addition, all parties should be given a reasonable opportunity to make adequate 
representations and adequate notice of the review mechanism or any right.35 The word ‘adequate’ 
denotes that information provided should be enough to the extent that it fosters meaningful 
representations.36  
The AJA also prescribes that an administrative authority should act within time bounds of the law 
or, within a reasonable period, where there is no specified time, and supply written reasons where 
an action has been taken.37 This legislation is similar to South Africa’s Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000 (PAJA) as both legislations deal with processes for 
administrative procedures.38 Adequate representations and reasonable time to provide evidence are 
                                                            
29Section 2 (1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 20 of 2013 (hereafter Zimbabwean Constitution). 
30Section 2 (1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution. 
31See Section 62; 68 and 194-198 of the Zimbabwean Constitution. 
32See generally 2.4.1.3 Comparison of Normal Value and Export Price see also 3.2.1 Legislative Framework and 
4.2.1 Legislative Framework. 
33 Administrative Justice Act 12 of 2004 (hereafter AJA). 
34Section 3 (2) (a-) of the AJA See also a commentary of AJA in Feltoe G  A guide to administrative Law in 
Zimbabwe (2012) (hereafter Feltoe G (2012) An “administrative authority” is defined as  
‘any person who is— (a) an officer, employee, member, committee, council, or board of the State or a local 
authority or parastatal; or (b) an committee, or board appointed by or in terms of any enactment; or (c) a Minister or 
Deputy Minister of the State; or (d) any other person or body authorised by any enactment to exercise or perform 
any administrative power or duty; and who has the lawful authority to carry out the administrative action concerned’ 
see Section 2 (1) of AJA . 
35Section 3 (2) (a-) of the AJA. 
36Feltoe G (2012) 24. 
37See generally Section 2 of the AJA. 
38 See generally Section 3.3.1 Legislative Framework 
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key components in anti-dumping investigations at the WTO level.39 This is because they help to 
protect the process from abuse.40  
The next section will discuss the institutional framework, substantive requirements of dumping 
and the procedure that should be followed when enacting anti-dumping measures. 
5.3.2 Institutional Framework 
The autonomous statutory body, which implements, enforces Zimbabwe’s competition policy and 
law as well as execute the trade tariffs policy of the country is the CTC.41 The Commission is 
comprised of a merger of the former Industry and Trade Competition of Zimbabwe and the Tariff 
Commission.42 Although the commission is an independent body, it falls under the Ministry of 
Industry, Commerce and Enterprise Development.43 The existence of competition policy and 
tariffs policy under one division is peculiar to Zimbabwe as far as statutory co-existence is 
concerned because there is no any other jurisdiction known for having such a practice.44  
The co-existence has the potential of causing serious conflicting policy objectives.45 This is 
because the role of competition law and policy is to promote effective competition in markets by 
assessing the level of competition in a market, and regulating rules, which limit anti-competitive 
market conduct.46 Trade tariffs in the CTC are however ‘geared towards protectionism which may 
operationally be reduced into barriers to entry’, which seems to be in direct conflict with 
competition policy that promotes effective free market.47 The study recommends that the two 
policies should not be housed under one division, but should rather be governed by different 
independent Commissions. 
                                                            
39Mexico – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures On Beef And Rice WT/DS295/R  para 7.192;  also see generally 
Article 6 of the ADA 
402.5.2 Conduct. 
41CTC was established through Competition Act (Chapter 14:28) see Section 4.  
42Kobsy M ‘Briefing Note On The Zimbabwe Competition And Tariff Commission (CTC)’ available at 
http://www.academia.edu/25268944/BRIEFING_NOTE_ON_THE_ZIMBABWE_COMPETITION_AND_TARRIFF_
COMISSION_CTC (accessed 26 August 2016) 
43Competition and Tariff Commission’ ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ available  
http://www.competition.co.zw/faqs/99-faq-s (accessed 26 August 2016) 
44United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Voluntary Peer Review Of Competition Law 
And Policy: Zimbabwe (2012) 20. 
45UNCTAD Voluntary Peer Review Of Competition Law And Policy: Zimbabwe (2012) 20. 
46UNCTAD The role of competition policy in promoting economic development: The appropriate design and 
effectiveness of competition law and policy (2010) 3. 
47UNCTAD Voluntary Peer Review Of Competition Law And Policy: Zimbabwe (2012) 20. 
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Previously in Chapter 2, it was stated that there are many over-laps between anti-dumping law and 
competition law.48 The challenge, however, is that despite these links, the WTO anti-dumping 
rules do not adequately address competition issues.49 The author concurs with the review done by 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that the co-existence of 
tariffs and competition in the CTC may cause conflicting policy objective because the two are 
divergent. However, as suggested in Chapter 2, it is necessary for competition issues that affect 
anti-dumping law to be harmonised so as not to perpetuate anti-dumping measures being used for 
protectionism rather than remedying unfair trade.50 
The CTC has a mandate to ‘undertake investigations and make reports to the Minister of Industry, 
Commerce and Enterprise Development relating to tariff charges, unfair trade practices and the 
provision of assistance or protection to local industry’.51 Anti-dumping investigations fall within 
the scope of the CTC and thorough investigations should be done in accordance with the WTO 
rules and Statutory Instrument of 266 of 2002.52  
The CTC is composed of four divisions, namely competition, tariffs, legal and corporate services 
and finally finance and administration services.53 It has two principal arms comprising of the Board 
of Commissioners as the adjudicative arm and the Directorate as the investigative arm.54 The 
Minister of Industry and Trade appoints members of the Commission on a part-time basis and on 
a three-year fixed term, in consultation with the President.55 The Commissioners are appointed 
‘for their ability and experience in industry, commerce or administration or their professional 
qualifications or their suitability’.56 Appointment of the Commissioners requires the Minister to 
ensure that all interested stakeholders are represented.57 The Directorate is comprised of full-time 
                                                            
48See generally 2.6 Challenges within World Trade Organisation Anti- Dumping Rules. 
49See generally 2.6 Challenges within World Trade Organisation Anti- Dumping Rules. 
50See generally 2.3.2 Schools of thoughts on anti-dumping duties; see also 2.6 Challenges within World Trade 
Organisation Anti- Dumping Rules. 
51Section 5 (g) of the Competition Act (Chapter 14:28). 
52 Section 14(1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002, also see Competition and Tariff Commission’ ‘Frequently 
Asked Questions’ available at  http://www.competition.co.zw/faqs/99-faq-s (accessed 26 August 2016). 
53See generally Competition and Tariff Commission website available  www.competition.co.zw 
54Kububa A ‘Overview Of Competition Policy And Law In Zimbabwe’ (2009) Third Annual Competition 
Commission, Competition Tribunal And Mandela Institute Conference On Competition Law, Economics And 
Policy In South Africa 5(hereafter Kubuda A (2009) ). 
55Section 8 of the Competition Act (Chapter 14:28). 
56Kububa A (2009) 6. 
57Kububa A (2009) 6. 
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professionals, most of whom have qualifications in economics, law, accounting and business 
administration.58 
When it comes to the investigation of unfair trade practices, the CTC has a team of investigators 
falling under the Directorate who, inter alia, investigate dumping, analyse any injury and establish 
causal links. The team carries out the anti-dumping investigations and makes a prima facie case 
before submitting reports to the commissioner who has the jurisdiction to take decisions in 
meetings and make final decisions.59  
Mugano raises an important point that empowering statutory instruments of the CTC (Statutory 
Instrument 266 of 2002) do not capacitate the investigating authority to make a determination on 
whether the unfair practices are caused by dumping and subsidised imports and suggests that more 
power be given to the investigating authority.60  However, Mugano omits to investigate the nature 
and scope of the powers that must be given to the investigating authority. As such, the study 
suggests that, the extent of powers should be clearly be defined to provide clarification on what 
can or not be done as well as limit scope of abuse of powers. 
In its 2011 report to WTO, Zimbabwe stated that the CTC does not have institutional capacity to 
use the trade remedy measures.61 This is unfortunate because, in Chapters 3 and 4, the author 
discussed the fact that the success in implementing anti-dumping laws and conducting fruitful 
investigations cannot be separated from institutions capacity to effectively conduct anti-dumping 
investigations.62 Moreover, South Africa and the European Union (EU) have no overlap of 
functions between general competition matters and trade related matters.63 Therefore, it is 
                                                            
58Section 6(2) of the Competition Act [Chapter 14:28]. 
59UNCTAD Voluntary Peer Review Of Competition Law And Policy: Zimbabwe Overview (2012) 10. 
60Mugano G ‘Time to Tighten Screws on Dumping’ The Herald 31 October 2013. 
61WTO ‘Trade Policy Review Report by Zimbabwe’ WT/TPR/G/252 14 September 2011. 
62See generally 3.2.2 Institutional Framework & 4.2.2 Institutions. 
63In the case of South Africa the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) deals with customs tariffs, 
trade remedies and import and export control whilst the Competition Commission  South Africa is a statutory body 
constituted in terms of the Competition Act  89 of 1998 to ‘investigate, control and evaluate restrictive business 
practices, abuse of dominant positions and mergers in order to achieve equity and efficiency in the South African 
economy’ see http://www.compcom.co.za/who-are-we/ . 
In the EU the European Commission  has the capacity to deal with anti-dumping matters in the union, it holds 
authority to ‘initiate and terminate anti-dumping investigations, as well as taking measures where possible’ In 
addition general competition matters and trade related matters also do not fall under same Directorates and their 
powers are not drawn from the same legislation see European Commission ‘Anti-dumping’ available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-defence/actions-against-imports-into-the-eu/anti-dumping 
(accessed 15 November 2017) ;see generally 4.2.2 Institutional Framework. 
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submitted that the lack of capacity and overlap of functions undermines the CTC’s ability to 
perform effectively. 
Despite promises in Zimbabwe National Trade Policy 2012-16 for capacitation and strengthening 
of the CTC for it to be able to establish the existence of unfair ‘trade practices caused by dumping 
and subsidised imports, with a view to initiating anti-dumping action as well as instituting 
countervailing measures’, nothing has been done.64 Zimbabwe can take lessons from South Africa, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, and invest in growing technical expertise through research organisations 
such as Trade Law Centre (TRALAC) as well as send delegates to other jurisdictions and the WTO 
to learn on anti-dumping rules.65 The WTO ‘assistance activities aims to help developing countries 
[such as Zimbabwe] take full advantage of the multilateral trading system’.66 Developing countries 
are provided with technical assistance and training in trade related matters to enhance effective 
participation in global trade.67 
5.4 SUBSTANTIVE PROCEDURES 
As observed earlier, Zimbabwe is a Member of the WTO, and its anti-dumping provisions should 
be WTO compliant. In Chapter 2, the author discussed that under the WTO rules anti-dumping, 
measures may be imposed only if dumping, injury and causation have been determined.68 These 
are the substantive elements in an anti-dumping investigation and are drawn from the definition of 
dumping. In Zimbabwe, dumping takes place where the export price of the product under 
investigation is less than normal value,69 and consequently, there is material prejudice or potential 
prejudice to the domestic industry.70  
Therefore, in determining dumping, the Commission must follow all the substantive procedures in 
accordance with Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. The next section discusses the substantive 
procedures that are taken into consideration. 
                                                            
64Zimbabwe National Trade Policy 2012-16 23. 
65See generally 3.1 Introduction. 
66WTO ‘WTO technical assistance and training’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm (accessed 16 October 2018).  
67WTO ‘WTO technical assistance and training’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm (accessed 16 October 2018). 
682.4 WTO Treatment Of Dumping. 
69Section 14(1) (a) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
70Section 14(1) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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5.4.1 Determination of dumping  
Normal Value 
In any anti-dumping investigation, normal value plays a critical role in determining if a product 
has been dumped.71 This is because a prima facie case of dumping can be established if a product 
under investigation is sold below the normal value. Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 defines 
normal value as the comparable price of the product under investigation that is ‘actually paid or 
payable in the ordinary course of trade for like products sold for consumption in the domestic 
market of the exporting country’.72 Hence, this provision imposes conditions on sales transactions 
that should be fulfilled before they can be used in calculating normal value. This position is similar 
to that of the WTO as discussed in Chapter 2.73  It was discussed that in US — Hot-Rolled Steel 
the Appellate Body held that the  
‘text of Article 2.1 expressly imposes four conditions on sales transactions in order for them to be 
used to calculate normal value: first, the ‘sale must be “in the ordinary course of trade”; second, it 
must be of the “like product”; third, the product must be “destined for consumption in the exporting 
country”; and, fourth, the price must be “comparable”’.74  
Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 does not define the phrase ‘ordinary course of trade’ as such the 
Commission may to look for its interpretation outside the Act. In the EU, the court in Goldstar Co. 
Ltd v Council of the European Communities held that the term ordinary course of trade is a 
‘concept which relates to the nature of sales themselves’.75 Despite the fact that there is no 
definition of the phrase ‘ordinary course of trade’, Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 does provide 
for instances where production is not in the ‘ordinary course of trade’.  It states that sales of ‘like 
products’ in the domestic market of the exporting country  
                                                            
71See generally Article 2.1 of the ADA. For a commentary on Article 2.1 of the ADA, see Andersen H EU Dumping 
Determinations and WTO Law (2009) 109; see discussions of normal value in South Africa and EU in 3.3.1 
Determination of dumping and 4.3.1 Determination of dumping respectively. 
72Section 15(1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
73See generally 2.4.1.1 Determination of Normal Value. 
74United States – Anti-Dumping Measures On Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products From Japan  WT/DS184/AB/R 
para 165 (hereafter Appellate Body US — Hot-Rolled Steel); see also 2.4.1.1 Determination of Normal Value and 
Article 2.1 of the ADA. 
75Goldstar Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities Case C-I05/90 para 2; see also 4.4.1 Determination of 
Dumping. 
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‘may be treated as not being in the ‘ordinary course of trade’ by reason of price and may be 
disregarded in determining normal value only if the Minister determines that such sales are made 
within an extended period of time in substantial quantities and at prices which do not provide for 
the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time.’76 
This means sales may not be in the ‘ordinary course of trade’ due to price when prices are below 
per unit cost of production.77 The cost of production should ‘be computed on the basis of all fixed 
and variable costs of manufacturing for sale in the exporting country plus a reasonable amount for 
selling, administrative and other general expenses’.78 The problem with these sales is that they 
may only be disregarded upon determination of the Minister that they were made within an 
extended period.79 This means that the CTC has no capacity to disregard sales, and as result, it 
should rely on the Minister to disregard sales, which are below cost of production. This makes one 
question the independence of the Commission because the Minister is actively involved in the 
investigation and the Commission has no capacity whatsoever in this regard.80  
When it comes to the definition of what a reasonable period, Zimbabwean courts have not had the 
opportunity to interpret the phrase in the context of anti-dumping. However, in Chapter 2 it was 
held that the panel in US — Hot-Rolled Steel held that  
‘a ‘reasonable period’ must be interpreted consistently with the notions of flexibility and balance 
that are inherent in the concept of ‘reasonableness’, and in a manner that allows for account to be 
taken of the particular circumstances of each case’.81  
As such, there is no concrete measure of what constitutes reasonableness and the Minister has to 
decide on a case-by-case basis taking all the circumstances in consideration. 
For sale transactions to be considered for normal value they must be of a ‘like product’.82 A ‘like 
product’ is any product ‘which the Minister determines as being identical in all respects to the 
subject products or any products which the Minister determines to have characteristics closely 
                                                            
76Section 15 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
77Section 15 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
78Section 15 (5) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
79Section 15 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002, this is the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Enterprise 
Development.  
80See generally 5.2.1 Institutional Framework where it was mentioned that the CTC is an independent body. 
81Appellate Body US — Hot-Rolled Steel para 165; see also 2.4.1.1 Determination of Normal Value. 
82Section 15 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
167 
 
resembling those of the subject products’.83 This means that the CTC also has no capacity to 
determine what a ‘like product’ is as it is the duty of the Minister to make such a determination. 
One can then argue that although Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 supposedly gives the CTC 
power to conduct investigations, it actually lacks capacity. This is because important elements in 
an anti-dumping investigation fall exclusively under the determination of the Minister.84  
In addition, the definition of ‘like product’ in Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 also relates to 
countervailing measures because the regulation contains both anti-dumping measures and 
countervailing measures. This is problematic because, in Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, the 
Appellate Body specifically indicated that the term ‘like product’ might have different meanings 
in different agreements.85 Although both anti-dumping measure and countervailing measures are 
unfair trade remedies, they both apply under different circumstances. Chapter 2 mentioned that in 
international trade, anti-dumping measures might be imposed when dumping takes places and an 
allegation of subsidies may warrant countervailing measures.86 
Sale transactions should also be comparable and consumed in the domestic market of the exporting 
country for them to be considered for normal value.87 This means that sales should allow for fair 
comparison according to Section 17 Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. Where exporting country 
is concerned, it is defined as:  
‘(a) the country of export of the subject products; or (b) where the subject products are not exported 
directly to Zimbabwe but are transshipped without substantial transformation through an 
intermediate country, the country of origin of the subject products’.88 
                                                            
83Section 2 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002.  
84See discussion in 3.4.1 Determination of dumping and 4.4.1 where it shows that the respective Commissions in 
South Africa and EU have full capacity to conduct anti-dumping investigations, which includes determination of all 
elements, involved in an anti-dumping investigation. 
85Korea – Taxes On Alcoholic Beverages WT/DS75/AB/R para 117 
86See generally 2.1 Introduction. The WTO defines a subsidy as ‘any financial benefit provided by a government 
which gives an unfair advantage to a specific industry, business or even individual’ The WTO lists five types of 
subsidies. See WTO ‘Agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf (accessed 27 May 2017). For a detailed analysis of the 
remedies, see Erixon F ‘Anti-dumping in the European Union’ in Debroy B and Chakraborty D (eds) Anti-dumping: 
global abuse of a trade policy instrument (2007) 128-130. 
87Section 15 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
88Section 2 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
168 
 
If sales are disregarded because they are not in ‘the ordinary course of trade, normal value may be 
determined on the basis of ‘(a) the remaining sales in the domestic market made at a price which is not less 
than the cost of production, provided that such remaining sales are in sufficient quantities’. 
Sufficient volume, for purposes of determining a normal value is when such remaining sales 
constitute 5 per cent or more of the sales volume of the product in Zimbabwe.89 
Where there are no sales in the ordinary course of trade or where the volume of sales is low to the 
extent that a proper comparison cannot be achieved Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 provides 
alternatives in the calculation of normal value.90  
The alternatives include the use of a comparable price when the product under investigation is 
exported to a third country, if price is representative and the use of constructed value that takes 
into account production costs and a reasonable amount of profits of products in question.91 
Zimbabwe provides for use of appropriate third country as first alternative as opposed to 
construction of normal value because construction always leads to higher anti-dumping duties.92 
However, there is danger in using prices of products when exported to third countries is that they 
may also be dumped.93 In addition, Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 does not define what an 
appropriate third country is which as discussed in Chapter 2 is problematic because it provides a 
gap that can be abused by an investigating authority.94 Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 was 
enacted after the ADA and it is unfortunate that the legislator also left provisions unexplained 
perpetuating issues of misinterpretation. 
Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 provides conditions where sales exported to a third country may 
not qualify to be used in calculating normal value. If sales are below per unit cost of production 
they may be disregarded because of price provided that the ‘Minister determines that such sales 
                                                            
89CTC: Application Form for The Imposition Of Anti-Dumping Duties 12. 
90Section 15(1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
91Section 15(2) (a) and (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
92South Africa in Chapter 3 has been criticised for using constructed normal value as first alternative See South 
Africa - Anti-dumping Duties on Certain Pharmaceutical Products from India - Request for Consultations by India 
also see 3.4.1 Determination of dumping. 
93Murigi WC The Development of a Successful Antidumping Regime In Kenya (unpublished LLM thesis, University 
of the Western Cape 2013) 13. 
94See generally Section 2.2 of the ADA and the discussion on using prices of a third country in 2.4.1.1 
Determination of Normal Value. 
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are made within an extended period… within a reasonable period of time’.95  The problem is that 
the CTC does not have capacity to make such a determination although it is the investigative 
authority, and this is still the same as when the normal way of calculating normal value is used. 
Where some sales to a third country are excluded based on Section 15 (4) the remaining sales may 
still be used. This can be done where the ‘remaining sales in the third country market [are] made 
at a price which is not less than the cost of production, [and] are in sufficient quantities’.96  
When using constructed normal value, Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 provides that constructed 
value should take into account production costs and a reasonable amount of profits of products in 
question.97 No further guidance is given on how to calculate the costs. The CTC anti-dumping 
application form does provide some guidance, however the form is not a statute therefore not 
binding. Moreover, it clearly states that ‘the cost build-up format is only a guideline to indicate the 
level of detail required by the Commission’.98 Although South Africa has been criticised in the 
way they calculate normal value, the Anti-Dumping Regulations (ADR 2003) is clear on what 
costs the procedure the Commission should use when calculating normal value.99 It is submitted 
that, where there is detailed procedures of calculating normal, it promotes transparency and 
minimises disputes that may arise because of using a different set of procedure for each case. 
Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 also provides that when calculating the normal value of the 
product in question where it originates from a non-market economy country, the normal value 
should be established in a prescribed manner.100 The regulation does not provide any information 
besides the definition of non-market economy. A non-market economy is defined as an economy 
of a foreign country of ‘which the government has a complete or substantially complete monopoly 
of its trade and where domestic prices are fixed by the government of the foreign country’.101  The 
use of non-market economy methodology is permitted under GATT where a strict comparison is 
                                                            
95Section 15 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
96Section 15 (6) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
97Section 15 (2) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
98CTC: Application Form For The Imposition Of Anti-Dumping Duties 13.  
99See Section 8 (9) to 8 (13) of ADR 2003 see also alternative See South Africa - Anti-dumping Duties on Certain 
Pharmaceutical Products from India - Request for Consultations by India also see  3.3.1 Determination of dumping. 
100Section 18 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
101Section 2 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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impossible and importing countries can exercise discretion on how to calculate normal value from 
non-market economies.102 
Although Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 does not provide information on how to calculate 
normal value where a non-market economy is concerned, the CTC application form does. The 
problem is that it is not binding. In addition, the form does not mention who has the authority to 
determine such. It may be argued that the Minister has such authority because he is the one that 
can determine what a ‘like product’ is and which sales can be disregarded in calculating normal 
value.103 Thus, when it comes to a non-market economy the Minister should: 
‘nominate a third or surrogate country and a producer of the like product in that country for the 
purpose of determination of a normal value for the product allegedly dumped. The third country 
should have an industry at a similar level of development as that in the exporting country. If more 
than one country is subject to the current application, the information of that country may be used 
as the third or surrogate country.’104 
Watson argues that there is no justification for the use of non-market methodology because it 
results in ‘unpredictable and unrealistically high antidumping duties’ which is against principles 
of the WTO.105  Products from China were once subjected to this method because, in 2001 when 
China became a member of the WTO, it agreed that the other WTO members would use this 
method in cases of dumping for a transitional period of 15 years and this ended on December 11, 
2016.106 In Chapter 3, the study highlighted that South can no longer use the non-market 
methodology on products from China as doing so violates WTO rules.107In Chapter 4, it was 
discussed that although Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 was amended to recognise the end of China’s 
transitional period the EU may still be violating the WTO laws because the regulation still applies 
to Chinese products initiated before amendment at least until first review.108 This means that they 
may still be violating the WTO laws because the burden of proof is still on Chinese producers to 
                                                            
102GATT, Annex I, Ad Article VI para 2. 
103See Section 2 and Section 15(4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
104CTC: Application Form for the Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties 14. 
105Watson WK ‘It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy Treatment’ (2016) Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel 
Center For Trade Policy Studies Free Trade Bulletin No. 65 1( hereafter Watson WK (2016)) 
106Watson WK (2016) 1. 
107See generally 3.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
108Article 2 (7) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 s; see also 4.3.1 Determination of dumping. 
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prove that products were under market conditions.109 As such, it is critical for the CTC to observe 
such rules non-compliance with the WTO rules.  
Export Price 
Export price is defined in Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 as ‘the price actually paid or payable 
for the subject products’.110 The Act provides no further guidance on how to calculate export price. 
The CTC application form, however, provides that there different ways that can be used to 
calculate export price.111 The most favourable way is to use a direct ex-factory price for the purpose 
of export.112 However, if such price of each known exporter is inaccessible or unavailable; ‘the 
export price can be calculated from cost and freight (C & F) prices of the dumped product by 
deducting total expenses incurred from the port of importation in Zimbabwe to the factory gate’.113  
Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 recognises that in some cases there is no export price, or there 
may be an agreement between the importer and the exporter which may amount to the export price 
being unreliable.114 In such scenarios, the export price will have to be constructed using the price 
at which product in question is first ‘resold to an independent buyer or not resold in the condition 
imported, on any reasonable basis’.115 If the export price is constructed, the investigating authority 
needs to include all sustained costs between importation and resale.116 The Act provides no further 
guidance on how to construct export price. 
Fair Comparison 
When both the normal value and export price have been determined, Statutory Instrument 266 of 
2002 requires that the CTC make a fair comparison of the two values.117 In the comparison, due 
allowance should be made whilst considering merits for each case and differences which affect the 
comparison.118 The comparison should ‘be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-
                                                            
109See generally Miranda J ‘Interpreting Paragraph 15 of China’s Protocol of Accession’ (2014) 9 (3) Global Trade 
and Customs Journal. 
110Section 16(1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
111CTC: Application Form for the Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties 14. 
112CTC: Application Form for the Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties 14. 
113CTC: Application Form for the Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties 14-15. 
114Section 16(2) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
115Section 16(2) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
116See generally Section 16 (2) and Section 16 (3) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
117Section 17(1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
118Section 17(1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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factory level, and in respect of sales made at, as nearly as possible, the same time’.119 
Unfortunately, Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 only provides for one method of comparison that 
is the weighted average-to-weighted average basis.120 The problem in this is that some transactions 
cannot be compared on a weighted average-to-weighted average basis and comparing them using 
such method may lead to a comparison, which is not fair, and this is against the WTO rules. 
Zimbabwe can take lessons from the EU which provides for different methods of comparison.121 
Dumping Margin 
After comparing the normal value and export price, it is paramount for dumping margin to be 
established as it indicates the level of anti-dumping duty that can be applied. The dumping margin 
must be determined by comparing product export price with normal value in the importing 
country.122 Evidence should clearly support that the export price is lower than normal price.123 The 
margin of dumping is defined as the ‘amount by which the normal value of the subject products 
exceeds the export price’.124 Dumping margin is established upon ‘comparing average normal 
value and weighted average price of all export transactions of the subject products’.125 This method 
is known as average-to- average method in the ADA.126  
It is important to note that, unlike ADA, the Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 does not provide for 
other methods that can be used in determining the dumping margin.127  The CTC can only use any 
one of these methods where they are provided for in other regulations.128 The problem arises where 
other methods under ‘average-to-transaction method’ are not provided in any regulation because 
methodologies in the ADA are only guidelines.129 This means that any other method that allows 
                                                            
119Section 17(2) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
120Section 17(3) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002; South Africa in  Section 11 of ADR 2003 provides for other 
methods of comparison  and  although EU does not provide a basis for comparison, it allows investigators to use a 
comparison that is fair on products involved  see Article 2(10) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
121See generally 4.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
122See generally Article 2.1 of the ADA.   
123See generally Article 2.1 of the ADA.   
124Section 2 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
125Section 17(3) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
126See generally Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
127The ADA provides for other methods that can be used in determining dumping margin; these are the transaction-
to-transaction method and the average-to-transaction method. See generally Article 2.4.2 of the ADA and see 
discussion on all three methods as provided in 2.4.1.4 Determination of Dumping Margin. 
128Section 17(3) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
129Kim BY ‘Understanding “Zeroing” in Anti-Dumping Procedures and Korea’s Negotiation Strategy’ (2004) Korea 
Review of International Studies 89 (hereafter Kim BY (2004). 
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for fair comparison which can be used in determining dumping margin may not be used if it is not 
provided for in any regulation. This limits the CTC’s capacity to determine dumping margin on 
the basis of a fair comparison. 
 Determination of dumping alone is not adequate to warrant application for anti-dumping 
measures, injury and causality should also be determined. 
5.4.2 Determination of injury 
In Chapter 2, the author discussed that injury is an important element in anti-dumping 
investigations because the WTO does regulate or prohibit dumping per se but if such dumping 
causes injury, it becomes an unfair trade practice.130 This means anti-dumping measures may be 
imposed.131 Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 does not use the term injury but instead it uses the 
word prejudice to explain the same concept. It states that the Minister of finance may impose an 
anti-dumping duty on products under investigation,132 upon a recommendation from the Minister, 
on the evidence furnished by the Commission after concluding an investigation where he 
determines: 
‘…and (b) that prejudice or potential prejudice to any domestic industry is occasioned in either of 
one of the following ways— 
(i) the subject products are, through the effects of dumping, causing or threatening to cause 
material prejudice to the domestic industry in Zimbabwe producing like products; 
(ii) the subject products are, through the effects of dumping, materially impeding the 
establishment of the domestic industry producing like products in Zimbabwe’.133  
The wording of this provision seems to suggest that prejudice or potential prejudice takes place in 
either two ways. Firstly, where prejudice or potential prejudice actually cause or threaten to cause 
prejudice to Zimbabwe’s domestic industry and secondly, where it materially impedes the 
establishment of a domestic industry, which produces ‘like products’ in Zimbabwe.134 The 
intention of the legislature is not clear; and it is confusing and deviates from the WTO standards. 
                                                            
130See generally 2.8 Conclusion. 
131See generally 2.4 WTO Treatment of dumping. 
132Section 14 (1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
133Section 14 (b) (i-ii) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
134Section 14 (b) (i-ii) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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When it comes to the WTO anti-dumping rules injury refers to material injury or threat of material 
injury, or material retardation.135 This is the same position for South Africa and EU.136  
In Zimbabwe, it seems as if the word prejudice and potential prejudice means material prejudice, 
threat of material prejudice and material retardation. Brink emphasises that in order to understand 
anti-dumping action, it is important to understand anti-dumping terminology.137 In addition, it was 
discussed in Chapter 2 that anti-dumping is highly complex and require a high level of technical 
expertise in accountancy, economics and law fields.138 
Therefore, it is important for the legislature to draft clear anti-dumping rules that do not create 
questions on which standard to follow. Zimbabwe’s provision on prejudice raises questions on 
which standard the CTC should use when conducting investigations. For example, should they 
look at prejudice or potential prejudice? How do they determine potential prejudice of material 
prejudice, threat of material prejudice and material retardation? Does potential prejudice of actual 
material prejudice exist?  
In addition to these questions, the Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 does not define ‘material 
prejudice’. Furthermore, there is no guidance on the evidence that the CTC should look at in the 
determination of prejudice or potential prejudice. The failure to give further guidance on the 
evidence required creates loopholes in the system, which may lead to abuse. This is because there 
are no uniform rules that apply and evidence which may point to injury may be ignored leading to 
further injury of the domestic industry.  
In Chapters 3 and 4, South Africa and EU’s legislation respectively provides elements that 
investigating authorities should look at in order to ascertain if injury has taken place.139  This helps 
their investigating authorities when examining evidence, as they are guided on what exactly to 
                                                            
1352.4.2.3 Injury see also WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2016). 
136See generally 3.3.2 Determination of Injury and 4.3.2 Determination of Injury. 
137Brink G ‘A nutshell guide to anti-dumping action’ (2008) 257. 
138 See generally 2.4 WTO Treatment of Dumping, see also Brink G ‘A nutshell guide to anti-dumping action’ 
(2008) 271 available at 
https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/8445/Brink_Nutshell%282008%29b.pdf?sequence=1   accessed 
28 September 2017)  
139See generally 3.3.2 Determination of Injury and 4.3.2 Determination of Injury. 
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look for in order to assess the extent of the material injury. 140 Lee opines that nations need to 
untighten the laws that the WTO previously tightened in its ADA.141 This means that there is need 
for Members to simplify provisions, which are complex under the WTO. Zimbabwe, therefore, 
needs to explain these factors in order to simplify its provisions.  
When it comes to the determination of a threat of material prejudice, Statutory Instrument 266 of 
2002 is also silent on what evidence the investigating authorities should look at before concluding 
that products have threatened to cause material prejudice. The WTO prescribes that a 
determination of threat of material injury must be founded on facts rather than mere allegation, 
conjecture or remote possibility.142 It also provides guidelines on what to look at in Article 3.7 of 
the ADA. Moreover, in Mexico – Corn Syrup the panel held that an analysis of threat of material 
injury should also include an evaluation of factors listed in Article 3.4.143  
Factors in Article 3.4 relate to material injury and in Zimbabwe the Act does not list any of such 
factors where material prejudice is concerned. A lack of clear guidelines on which evidence to 
look at when determining a threat of material prejudice may lead the CTC to determine the threat 
on the basis of remote possibility rather than facts. Although the WTO provides guidelines in 
Article 3.7 that the CTC may use, some may not necessarily apply in Zimbabwean context hence 
the legislature should have formulated guidelines that are specific to Zimbabwean context.   
It is important to highlight that there some guidelines in the forms that are filled by applicants but 
these forms refer to injury not prejudice or material prejudice. This may not necessarily mean the 
same thing although the concept is similar as discussed by the author in the above paragraphs. The 
forms states that the CTC must look at whether or not there has been significant;  
‘depression and/or suppression of the Zimbabwean industry’s prices by considering injury in 
respect of the following potential injury factors sales volume; profit and loss; output; market share; 
productivity; return on investments; capacity utilisation; cash flow; inventories; employment; 
                                                            
140See generally Section 13(2) of the ADR 2003 and Article 3 (2) (a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 as discussed in 
3.3.2 Determination of Injury and 4.3.2 Determination of Injury. 
141Lee SE World Trade Regulation: International Trade under the WTO Mechanism (2012) 12. 
142See generally Article 3.7 of ADA. 
143Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation Of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States WT/DS132/R 
para.7.127 (hereafter Panel Report Mexico – Corn Syrup) see also UNCTAD Dispute Settlement in International 
Trade: Anti-Dumping Measures (2003) 27 
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wages; growth; ability to raise capital or investments; and any other relevant factors placed before 
it’.144 
Although these guidelines are a clear indication of what evidence the investigating authorities 
should look at when assessing prejudice, they are not binding, as they are not in Zimbabwe’s anti-
dumping regulation. This means that there is no obligation on investigating authorities to use them. 
Prejudice or potential prejudice may also be caused where ‘the subject products are, through the 
effects of dumping, materially impeding the establishment of the domestic industry producing like 
products in Zimbabwe.’145 Thus, if products under investigation are impeding the creation of a 
domestic industry that produces like products it would be found to be causing prejudice. This 
concept is similar to that of material retardation provided in the ADA, but the ADA does not 
provide the definition of what it is, and unlike in other types of injury, it also does not provide 
guidelines.146  In Chapter 2, 3 and 4 it was discussed that the concept of material retardation deals 
with a non-existent industry, which has not been able to be established because of dumped 
imports.147  
The concept of domestic industry when determining prejudice or potential prejudice is crucial to 
understand. Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 clearly states that the prejudice or potential prejudice 
should be to a domestic industry that produces like products.148 In other words, if there is no 
domestic industry that produces like products, then one cannot conclude that dumping is causing 
prejudice. A domestic industry is defined as ‘domestic producers of like products; or the domestic 
producers whose collective output of like products constitute a major proportion of the total 
domestic production of those products’.149 Producers with agreements with exporters or importers 
or importers/exporters themselves are excluded from the domestic industry because inclusion may 
                                                            
144CTC: Application Form For The Imposition Of Anti-Dumping Duties available at 
http://www.competition.co.zw/complaints/forms/Dumping%20form%20PART%202.pdf (accessed 02 October 2016). 
145See generally Section 14 (1) (b) (ii) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
146See generally Article 3.1 and Article 3.7 of ADA. 
1472.4.2.3.3 Determination of material retardation, 3.3.2 Determination of Injury and 4.3.2 Determination of Injury. 
148Section 14 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
149See Section 2 Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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cause distortion.150 The definition of what constitute a domestic industry is important in limiting 
the scope of the investigation.151 
However in most cases, it is rare for domestic producers to serve a domestic industry without other 
countries within the region having a market share in that domestic industry. The WTO recognises 
that injury may take place in such circumstances152 but Zimbabwe is silent. Those producers who 
come and supply in times of shortages are said to be in the same regional industry with the domestic 
company.153 Thus, they must be given consideration when determining injury, if the market is 
saturated with imports in this industry in such a way that it is causing injury to the production 
within that market.154 It is unfortunate that Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 is silent because 
producers from outside Zimbabwe are not protected despite the fact that they may provide relief 
in times of shortage. 
After a determination of dumping and prejudice, there is need to show that prejudice of potential 
is caused by dumping because anti-dumping measures can only be applied if prejudice is caused 
by dumping. 
5.4.3 Causal Link 
Causation is an important element in an anti-dumping investigation, and the CTC should be 
satisfied that dumping is the cause of prejudice to the domestic industry.155 There is no further 
guidance on how the CTC should be satisfied of causation. Causation should be ‘based on an 
examination of all relevant evidence before the Commission’.156 No further guidelines are given 
on what is meant by relevant evidence. If one infers the meaning from Article 3.5 of ADA there is 
need to analyse the effects of dumping, as set forth in Article 3.2 and 3.4 in order to determine 
causation. The problem is that, as previously discussed Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002, is silent 
                                                            
150Section 2 Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
151 WTO ‘Anti-Dumping: Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 16 October 2018). 
152WTO ‘Technical Information on anti-dumping’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (accessed 07 May 2016). 
153See generally Article 4 (ii) of ADA. 
154See generally Article 4 (ii) of ADA. 
155Section 14 (3) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002; see also Mavroidis PC The Regulation of International 
Trade: The WTO Agreements on Trade in Goods (2016) 109 
156Section 14 (3) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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on these factors and the gap keep building up and this may compromise an entire investigation.157 
As such it is submitted that these factors be clearly defined in the legislation. 
Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 also requires that the CTC examine other known factors other 
than the product under investigation which may be concurrently injuring the domestic industry 
because for anti-dumping duties to be imposed injury should only be caused by the dumped 
product.158 Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 gives no further guidance on the factors that the CTC 
should look at.159This places a huge responsibility on investigating authorities and considering the 
fact that there is lack of technical expertise and capacity as discussed under Institutional 
framework, the outcome of a fair investigation may be compromised.160 One may however look at 
the WTO jurisprudence for guidance. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the Appellate Body 
in US-Hot-Rolled Steel held that in ensuring non-attribution investigating authorities are obliged 
to assess injurious effects of other known factors.161 
Furthermore, in EC — Tube or Pipe Fittings the Appellate Body stated that for the non-attributed  
‘obligation to be triggered, Article 3.5 of the ADA requires that the factor at issue: (a) be 
“known” to the investigating authority; (b) be a factor “other than dumped imports”; and 
(c) be injuring the domestic industry at the same time as the dumped imports’.162  
Thus, not only is there any obligation on the CTC to assess injurious effects of other known factors 
but all the three elements should be fulfilled for this obligation to be triggered. 
5.5 PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
When conducting an anti-dumping investigation the CTC should follow the procedures prescribed 
in Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. In Chapter 2, it was discussed that the ADA prescribes only 
minimum procedural requirements that the WTO members should follow when anti-dumping 
measures are being enacted. It does not prohibit members from adding more procedural 
                                                            
157See generally 5.3.2 Determination of Injury. 
158Section 14 (3) (c) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
159See generally Article 3.5 of ADA on factors that can be looked at, it is important that the factors listed are not a 
closed list but a mere guideline. 
160See discussion in 5.2.1 Institutional Framework. 
161Appellate Body Report US-Hot-Rolled Steel para 223. 
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requirements to supplement those in the ADA, but the procedure should always be fair and 
transparent.163 The next section discusses procedural requirements that the CTC should follow 
when conducting an anti-dumping investigation as prescribed in Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
5.5.1 Initiation 
In Zimbabwe, anti-dumping investigations are initiated when a written petition is submitted to the 
CTC requesting that dumping investigations be conducted on dumped imports already in the 
country or on products likely to be imported in the country.164 The application for anti-dumping 
investigations can be done by an individual person on his own accord or on behalf of a domestic 
industry that produces like products.165 The request should be in a form which Minister may 
prescribe.166  
This means the format of the application is left to the determination of the Minister, which is 
problematic. For example, it can create unnecessary and cumbersome processes to the people 
wanting to initiate an anti-dumping investigation. In addition, the fact that only the Minister 
determines the format of the application form is also a breeding ground for uncertainty. The ADA 
is clear on what should be included in an anti-dumping application in order to ensure that fairness 
and transparency are maintained at all times.167 Thus, the lack of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 
to outline what should be included in the application may lead to unfairness. 
Moreover, Section 19 (1) states that investigations may be conducted on products likely to be 
imported. This position is difficult to understand. This is because the definition of dumping only 
speaks of products that have already been imported. Article VI of GATT defines dumping as a 
situation when ‘products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at 
less than the normal value of the products, and causes or threatens material injury to an established 
industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic 
industry’.168 As such, it will be difficult to conduct investigations based on a likely import. The 
                                                            
163See generally 2.5 Procedural Requirements For Legislating Anti-Dumping Measures. 
164Section 19 (1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
165Section 19 (1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
166Section 19 (2) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
167See generally Article 5.2 (i-iv) of the ADA, also see on 2.5.1 Initiation. 
168Article VI of GATT 1994. 
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study opines that this position is against the WTO rules and violates notions of transparency and 
unfairness.  
The application for anti-dumping investigations should contain enough evidence to support that 
the normal value of the product in question is less than the export price and as a result there is 
prejudice or potential prejudice to the Zimbabwean domestic industry.169 It should also contain 
any other ‘evidence that may be relevant or reasonably required by the Minister or the 
Commission’.170 This provision suggests that the Minister or the CTC have the capacity to request 
any information that they deem relevant or reasonable.  
The problem with the above provision is that it gives the Minster the power to conduct anti-
dumping investigations that are independent of the CTC. The CTC is the independent board, which 
has the sole mandate to conduct anti-dumping investigation, and yet Section 19 (2) legally allows 
the Minister to perform the mandate bestowed upon the CTC. This compromises the independence 
of the CTC since the Minister is the head of the ministry, which decides whether anti-dumping 
measures may be imposed after the CTC has concluded the investigation. 
Section 19 (2) further poses questions, such as: which position should the CTC take where it differs 
from the Minister? Can the CTC ignore the request of the Minister for additional information, if it 
views it unnecessary? Does this have any effect on the outcome of the investigations? These 
questions are difficult to answer because Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 is silent on who has the 
final say when conducting anti-dumping investigations. Does the Minister override the decisions 
of the CTC during an investigation? Is there any recourse for the party that may be prejudiced by 
the decision of the Minister? As such, there is need to clarify the capacity of the Minister and the 
CTC during anti-dumping investigations. 
Once the CTC receives a written application, it will review the complaint within a prescribed 
period.171 No further information is given on who determines the time period that the CTC should 
finalise the review of the application. When review an application the CTC is required to ascertain 
whether there is sufficient evidence to initiate the investigation process and if the investigation is 
                                                            
169Section 19 (2) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
170Section 19 (2) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002.  
171Section 19 (3) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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in the interest of the public.172 Thus, an application which has sufficient evidence but which is not 
in the interest of public is likely to fail the threshold. The wording of Section 19 (3) (a) means that 
both conditions should be fulfilled.  
In Zimbabwe, public interest plays a critical role because the CTC does not initiate an 
investigation, which is against public interest.173 This position is different from that EU since 
public interest only comes into play when deciding whether or not anti-dumping measures should 
be imposed.174 South Africa does not have a public interest clause but public interest considerations 
play an in important in its anti-dumping investigations.175 In the ADA, Article 9.1 may seem to 
take public interest into consideration through application of lesser duty; however, application is 
not mandatory.176 Unlike the ADA however, Zimbabwe’s provision is mandatory and progressive. 
Public interest is essential in anti-dumping investigations because it promotes principles of fairness 
and due process.177 It is submitted that it balances competing rights creating an environment where 
healthy competition flourishes. As such, not initiating an investigation because of public interest 
should be commendable. 
If the CTC determines that the evidence to support the application is not enough to warrant 
initiation of the investigation, and when the investigation is not in the public interest, the 
Commission has to let the person who initiated the investigation aware that the application did not 
pass the threshold for the investigation to continue.178 The notification should be made as soon as 
it is practicable.179 However, on account that the CTC has enough evidence to initiate 
investigations, it has to notify appropriate stakeholders and publish a notice of initiating the 
investigation in the Gazette.180 It is important to note that under special circumstances the CTC 
                                                            
172See Section 19 (3) ( a-b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
173Section 19 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
174See generally 4.4.4 Community Interest, see also Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036; see also 3.4.4 Public 
interest Considerations, in the section the author discussed that the ADA does not have a public interest clause, 
South Africa’s regulations also do not contain public interest clauses but the issue of community interest has been 
inferred in some of the cases which include the Semi-refined paraffin wax (candle wax) and the dumped chicken 
from USA. 
175See discussion in 3.4.4 Public Interest Considerations. 
176See generally Article 9.1 of the ADA. 
177Kotsiubska V Public Interest Consideration in Domestic and International Antidumping Disciplines (unpublished 
Master of International Law and Economics ,World Trade Institute 2011) 10. 
178Section 19 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
179Section 19 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
180Section 19 (5) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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may itself initiate investigations without an application being done by an interested party.181 In 
such circumstances, it has to check all the requirements needed in order to initiate the 
investigations and has also to notify all the interested parties.182  Besides the requirements in 
Section 19 (2) and (6) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002, the CTC cannot initiate an investigation 
unless they determine the degree of support or opposition to the petition that has been approved.183  
It is required that the collective output of local domestic producers opposing or supporting the 
application should be more than 50 per cent of production of the like product produced by that 
percentage of the domestic industry.184 Secondly, not less than 25 per cent of the fifty per cent 
should be supporting the petition.185 Statistical sampling techniques can also be used to determine 
the percentage that supported for and against the petition in order to determine whether the 
investigations should continue.186 When investigations are completed, the CTC may apply 
provisional anti-dumping measures. 
5.5.2 Provisional measures and final determination of dumping and prejudice 
The CTC is required to make a preliminary determination in order to see if a dumping margin 
exists; the amount of such a margin and if the products under investigation are causing injury to 
the domestic industry in Zimbabwe.187 A dumping margin dumping ‘means the amount by which 
the normal value of the subject products exceeds the export price’. This means for the CTC to 
make a preliminary determination of dumping margin, it should first determine what the normal 
value and export price is. Section 21 also requires the CTC to make a preliminary determination 
of injury. The requirements of injury in Section 21 are different from those listed in Section 14 (1). 
As previously discussed Section 14 (1) requires the CTC to make a determination of prejudice or 
potential prejudice 
‘…and (b) that prejudice or potential prejudice to any domestic industry is occasioned in either of 
one of the following ways— 
                                                            
181Section 19 (6) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
182Section 19 (7) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
183Section 19 (8) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
184Section 19 (8) (a) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
185Section 19 (8) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
186Statistical sampling should only be used where industries are fragmented and as result, there is an exceptionally 
large number of producers. See Section See section 19 (9) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
187Section 21 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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(i) the subject products are, through the effects of dumping, causing or threatening to cause 
material prejudice to the domestic industry in Zimbabwe producing like products; 
(ii) the subject products are, through the effects of dumping, materially impeding the 
establishment of the domestic industry producing like products in Zimbabwe’.188  
On the other hand, Section 21 states that injury may be actual material injury, threat of material 
injury and material retardation. As such, there is discrepancy between Section 21 and 14 because 
the latter talks about prejudice or potential prejudice and the former refer to injury. As such there 
is need to clarify which of the two standards should the Commission use in make a determination 
of injury.  
When the preliminary determination of dumping margin and injury yields a negative outcome, the 
CTC must give reasons for such a determination in a notice published in the Government 
Gazette.189 It may also end the investigation upon such negative determination.190  The use of the 
word may in Section 21 give the impression that the even though the evidence is insufficient to 
justify the investigation to continue the CTC has an option to continue or to abandon. However, 
there is really no option to continue where evidence is insufficient.191 The ADA states that 
investigations should be ‘terminated promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied 
that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the 
case’.192 
Where a determination is made in the affirmative, an anti-dumping investigation should continue 
and a notice needs to be published in the Government Gazette stating the reasons for such a 
determination, and initial measures applicable.193 Upon the publication of the notice in positive 
determination, the Minister may recommend application of provisional anti-dumping measures.194 
This may be done if he is of the opinion such measures are necessary to prevent prejudice of the 
domestic industry during the investigation period.195  
                                                            
188Section 14 (b) (i-ii) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
189Section 21(2) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
190Section 21(2) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
191See generally Article 5.8 of the ADA. 
192Article 5.8 of the ADA.  
193See Section 22 (3) of the Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 
194Section 22 (1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
195Section 22 (1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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If provisional measures are applied, they can only be imposed 60 days after the investigation was 
initiated.196 These measures may either be a provisional anti-dumping-duty or a ‘security equal to 
the amount of the estimated dumping margin’.197 Provisional measures can only be imposed up to 
such a period as may be prescribed and cannot exceed the prescribed period.198 The problem in 
this is that the prescribed period is not regulated in the Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 which 
leads to uncertainty. There is also no mention of who has the mandate to prescribe the time periods 
provisional anti-dumping may remain in place.  
Where final determination of dumping and injury is concerned, the CTC is required to make a final 
determination of dumping and prejudice within a period which may be prescribed.199 This 
provision is clouded with uncertainty because there is no mention of who prescribes the time period 
and also there is no mention of the actual time period. It also makes one question the existence of 
Section 18 which prescribes the duration of anti-dumping investigations.  Section 23 and 18 may 
be read together, which means that a final determination should be made within eighteen months 
in accordance with Section 18. However, the wording in Section 23 points out to the fact that a 
final determination of dumping and injury may be prescribed somewhere else.  
Furthermore, Section 23 refers to a final determination of prejudice, which is similar to Section 
21, which refers to injury, but Section 14 (1) refers to prejudice or potential prejudice. This means 
that there are two different standards that are used when the CTC determines injury. The one is 
Section 14 and the other in Section 21 and 23. It is submitted that such discrepancy may 
compromise the investigation and leads to unfairness and application of anti-dumping measures in 
an arbitrary manner. As ‘anti-dumping measures are an exception to the rule of most-favoured-
nation treatment; utmost care [should] be taken in invoking them’.200 
If a final determination is negative investigations should be terminated, the CTC must also advise 
the Minister in writing to terminate provisional measures and refund duty paid.201 Besides the 
Minister refunding the provisional duty, the Commissioner of Customs and Excise must also 
                                                            
196Section 22 (2) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
197Section 22 (3) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
198Section 22 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
199See generally Section 23 of the Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
200See generally Chapter 5 Anti-dumping Measures available at 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/gCT9905e.pdf (accessed 26 July 2018). 
201Section 23 (2) of the Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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release any security required for such after which the CTC is required to publish a notice in the 
Government Gazette stating reasons for the negative determination.202 It is submitted that this 
promotes transparency as one is able to publicly access such reasons.  
Where a final determination is positive, a notice needs to be published in the Government Gazette 
stating the reasons for such determination, duties to be applied and products which have to pay the 
duties.203 The CTC has to then advise the Minister to recommend imposition of duties according 
to the dumping margins determined on the product investigated imported into the country when 
the publication of the final determination was done or anytime thereafter.204 Where provisional 
measures were applied, anti-dumping duties will be imposed if the Minister agrees with the CTC 
that material prejudice exists or a threat of prejudice would have materialised if the provisional 
measures were not applied.205 
Where the provisional duty and amount guaranteed in security is lower than the anti-dumping duty, 
‘only the amount equal to the provisional duty or the security given shall be imposed’.206 In cases 
where, the provisional duty and the amount of security in the provisional measures, is more than 
the anti-dumping duty, the amount of anti-dumping duty will be imposed in full.207 The excess 
amount from the provisional anti-dumping duty which had been paid should be reimbursed or 
security amount given should be released.208 When no duties are imposed on products that had 
provisional measures, the Minister will pay back the provisional duty paid and release security for 
the provisional measures raised.209 There is no provision for application for lesser duty if it is 
enough to eliminate injury like in the case of South Africa and EU.210 
Anti-dumping duties may also be applied retrospectively on ‘subject products imported into 
Zimbabwe 90 days prior to the application of provisional measures, but in no case earlier than the 
date of the initiation of the investigation’, provided that the dumping caused or is threatening to 
                                                            
202Section 23 (2) (b) and (c) of the Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
203See generally Section 22 (3) (a) (i-iii) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
204Section 23(3) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
205See generally Section 23 (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 
206Section 23(6) (a) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
207Section 23(6) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
208Section 23(6) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
209Section 23(6) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
210See generally 3.4.3 Final phase and .4.4.4 Provisional measures, Undertakings and Termination without measures. 
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cause prejudice.211 In considering an application of final anti-dumping measures, public interest 
plays a pivotal role. It is one of the factors the Minister needs to consider when determining 
whether to accept the recommendation of the Commission or not in terms of the application of 
duties and the amount.212 Thus, if public interest does not permit the imposition of such final anti-
dumping measures for whatever reason the Minister may elect not to apply them. The public 
interest procedure is not available in the ADA but WTO does not prevent members from adding 
more procedures as long as they are not discriminatory.  
5.5.3 Duration, termination and suspension  
The duration of anti-dumping investigations in Zimbabwe is one year unless there are special 
circumstances and not later than eighteen months after the initiation phase.213 Investigations may 
however be terminated when an individual who made the application withdraw his application or 
if the CTC comes to the conclusion that there is a need to terminate the investigation for purposes 
of public interest.214 An immediate termination can be done when the CTC has determined that 
dumping margin is de minimis or if injury is negligible.215  
If a termination occurs before provisional determination of dumping, the CTC should publish a 
notice to such effect and the notice should contain reasons for termination216 However, if 
termination occurs after the preliminary determination, the CTC are to advise the Minister to make 
a request that any provisional measures applied to be the terminated and a refund of the provisional 
duties paid.217 The CTC should also make aware the Commissioner of Customs and Excise to 
release any security which was given under provisional measures.218 Reasons for the terminations 
will also be made available through the publication of a notice.219 
                                                            
211See generally Section 23 (7) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
212Section 23(4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
213See Section 20 (1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
214See generally Section 24 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
215Dumping margin is considered negligible if the margin is less than 2% of the export price; and the volume of 
imports of the products in question will be regarded as negligible if they account for less than 3% of imports of the 
like products into Zimbabwe, unless the products in question from countries which individually account for less than 
3%  of imports of the like products in Zimbabwe together  account for more than 7 %. See generally Section 24 (3) 
(a) and (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
216Section 24 (5) (a) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
217Section 24 (5) (a) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
218Section 24 (5) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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Suspension of anti-dumping investigations may take place where the Minister approves of any 
undertaking adequate to the CTC which is given by the investigated company provided that such 
undertaking remedies reasons which led to the initiation.220 However, before any suspension is 
approved the Minister must determine if such undertaking will remove dumping margin or the 
effect of injury caused by the product in question,221 if monitoring can be done efficiently;222 and 
if is an interest  of the public.223 If there is a satisfaction of all the elements the investigation will 
be suspended on approval by the Minister.224 Provisional measure applied under Section 22 may 
also be suspended and the refund should be given where anti-dumping duty was given and release 
of security is mandated where it was given.225 Lastly, reasons for suspension must be furnished in 
a published notice.226 It is also important to note that where there is a material violation of price 
undertakings the investigation may be resumed.227  
5.6 REVIEWS 
In Zimbabwe no anti-dumping duties can be applied on goods that were imported five years after 
the notice has been published (notice of final determination) unless when the Minister has already 
determined the review basis that the termination can lead to a recurrence of dumping.228 This 
means anti-dumping duties remain valid for five years unless reviewed. 
Anti-dumping measures may be reviewed by the Minister upon receipt of certain information 
prescribed in Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002.229 The review, however, can only be done after 
the prescribed period of the anti-dumping measure has passed. A review can be prompted where 
there is a substantial change in dumping margin, or where refund of an anti-dumping duty is 
appropriate.230 Reviews can also take place when it is determined that there is no longer need to 
impose an anti-dumping duty ,when an undertaking is not relevant anymore and where there is 
                                                            
220Section 25 (1) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
221Section 25 (2) (a) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
222Section 25 (2) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
223Section 25 (2) (c) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
224Section 25 (3) (a) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
225Section 25 (3) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
226Section 25 (3) (c) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
227See generally Section 25 (8) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
228See generally Section 26 (7) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
229See generally Section 26 (1) (a-f) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
230See generally Section 26 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
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need for  modification.231 An anti-dumping duty should also be reviewed where prescribed time 
period of application of duty has lapsed but the prejudice to the domestic industry is not yet 
remedied.232 Where exporters did not export the products in question during investigation an 
expedited review is required, the Minister should request the CTC to conduct such review if the 
review is in the public interest or if ADA requires that the review be conducted.233  
The problem with Section 26 is that for a review to be conducted, it is the Minister that gives the 
CTC permission to conduct one. The Minister determines this upon receipt of information 
prescribes in Section 26. In Chapter 2, it was stated that Lindsey and Ikenson have argued that, 
indeed anti-dumping laws serve political interests more than anything else as they are prone to 
distorting governmental policies which are deemed as unfair.’234 There are no checks and balances 
for the system in Section 26 and it perpetuates anti-dumping measures being used as political tool 
rather than creating a levelled playing field through remedying of an unfair trade practise. This is 
because the Minister may decide not to request a review by the CTC purely on political bases. It 
is therefore submitted that the issues of review should be relooked and the CTC should be able to 
conduct a review upon receipt of information as contained in the anti-dumping rules at a WTO 
level. The Minister should not be the one to decide because this takes away the capacity of the 
CTC, as it can only conduct a review on the Minister’s call. 
Regrettably, Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 states that the CTC should only conduct the review 
if it is in the public interest or if the ADA requires that a review be done. This creates confusion 
because the other section requires that reviews take place only after the prescribed period has 
lapsed and upon request by the Minister but under the ADA, interim reviews can be made before 
the prescribed period ends if circumstances allow.235 In addition, under the ADA, the investigating 
authority does not need to conduct a request upon request by a Minister, but can initiate on its own 
accord ‘upon request by any interested party which submits positive information substantiating the 
need for a review’.236 
                                                            
231See generally Section 26 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
232See generally Section 26 (7) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
233See generally Section 26 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
234Lindsey B & Ikenson D Anti-dumping Exposed: The Devilish Details of Unfair Trade Law (2003) 18; see 
generally 2.3.2 Schools of thoughts on anti-dumping measures.  
235See discussion on reviews at 2.5.6 Duration, Termination, and Review of Anti- Dumping Duties. 
236See generally Article 11.2 of the ADA. 
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If the CTC conducts a review it is required to publish a notice of the initiation of a review, and 
interested parties should be given an opportunity to comment.237 Any review conducted in terms 
of Section 26 should be finalised within such period as may be prescribed.238 However, this 
prescribed period cannot be more than 12 months because according to the ADA, reviews should 
be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review.239 Upon completion of a 
review, the Commission should ‘publish a final determination in the review stating the reasons 
therefor’.240 This final determination shall apply to subject ‘products imported on or after the date 
of publication of the final determination in the review’.241 This, however, does not apply to a 
review which was initiated based on ‘a refund of an anti-dumping duty is appropriate’ and when 
‘an expedited review is required for exporters or producers who did not export the subject products 
to Zimbabwe during the period of investigation’.242 
In Chapter 2, it was discussed that Article 13 of the ADA requires Members who have adopted 
anti-dumping legislation to conduct a judicial review.243 Zimbabwe complies with this section and, 
interested parties have the right to review in the Administrative Court against positive 
determinations and final reviews.244 Applications are, however, only allowed to be made within 
thirty days of the determinations.245 The decision of the court will either mean that it will agree 
with the CTC or it may send back the matter to the CTC for reconsideration.246 The Minister is 
obliged to implement whatever decision the court will take on the review.247 
The notable shortfall in Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 when it comes to reviews is that the Act 
does not prescribe what information is required from parties involved in the review process. There 
is no transparency and also there is no clarity on the procedure of the reviews. Both South Africa 
and EU provisions are clear on these issues and embeds the WTO principle of transparency.248 To 
                                                            
237Section 26 (1) (f) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
238Section 26 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
239Article 11.4 of the ADA. 
240Section 26 (5) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
241Section 26 (6) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
242Section 26 (5) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
243See generally 2.5.6 Duration and Review of Anti- Dumping Duties. 
244Section 27 (1) (a) (b) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
245These determinations include where a notice of positive or negative final determination has been made in terms of 
section 23 or from the date of the final review occasioned by subsection (5) of section 26. 
246Section 27(3) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
247Section 27(4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
248See generally 3.5 Reviews and 4.5 Reviews. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
190 
 
this end, Zimbabwe should consider reforming this and clearly prescribing the information needed 
when one is applying for a review. 
5.7 ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC REASONS FOR CREATING AN EFFECTIVE 
ANTI-DUMPING REGIME 
Members of the WTO have had their ability to raise tariffs on imports limited because one of 
GATT’s aims is to eliminate tariffs.249 After joining the WTO, Zimbabwe lowered its tariffs and 
removed trade barriers as a way of promoting free trade but this has been characterised by 
reversals, as tariffs are a source of revenue.250 However, ‘as a result of lowering the fixed tariffs 
and consequently experiencing an increased exposure to market instability there have been 
concerns over inadequate domestic market protection particularly for poultry and textiles which 
have been negatively affected by the increase of imports’.251 
Anti-dumping laws are there to protect the local industry against any unfair trade practices 
particularly dumping.252 Zimbabwe has become a ‘dumping nation’ for most rich nations in this 
world.253 This has crippled the domestic industry due to the domestic industry failing to compete 
with the imports.254 Additionally, because of a problem of viability, the local industry has failed 
to produce products for export, and therefore, calls for government action on dumping and placing 
more strict conditions on the importation of products.255 
                                                            
249Ruhl KJ  ‘Antidumping in the Aggregate [Preliminary and Incomplete]’ (2012)  New York University Stern 
School of Business 2 
250Hurungo JT ‘Trade Policy Review: Zimbabwe’ (2007) Tralac 25 also see Chitiga M, Kandiero T & Mabugu R 
‘Computable general equilibrium micro-simulation analysis of the impact of trade policies on poverty in Zimbabwe’ 
(2005) University of Pretoria Department of Economics Working Paper Series 2007-15 6. 
251Kububa A ‘Overview Of Competition Policy And Law In Zimbabwe’ (2009) Third Annual Competition 
Commission, Competition Tribunal And Mandela Institute Conference On Competition Law, Economics And 
Policy In South Africa 18 (hereafter Kubuda A (2009) ) 
252See generally 2.1 Introduction also see Zanardi M ‘Antidumping: A problem in international trade’ (2006) 22(3) 
European Journal of Political Economy 591-617. 
253The then vice president of the country alleged this when he made his opening speech at the Zimbabwe 
International Trade Fair’s International Business Conference see VOA  ‘Mnangagwa says government worried as 
Zimbabwe is now a dumping ground for imports’ in New Zimbabwe Newspaper 27/04/2016 available at 
www.newzimbabwe.com/news-28933-VP+Zim+a+dumping+ground+for+imports/news.aspx (accessed 1 
September 2016). Zimbabwe has been spending more money on imports than export and this has caused a trade 
deficit and some countries have been allegedly dumping these imports.  
254Shava T ‘Imports crippling local industries’ (2016) available at http://nehandaradio.com/2016/04/28/99819/ 
(accessed 26 September 2016 (hereafter Shava T (2016)). 
255Shava T (2016). 
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Zimbabwe has never applied any anti-dumping measures, but whenever the local industry is 
threatened by imports, Zimbabwe reacts by imposing restrictions on the imports or placing a ban 
on imports.256 Amongst the reasons to justify ban on imports is that a surge of imports cripples the 
domestic industry.257 At many times, these restrictions are red tapes put in place to protect non-
competitive local industries258 rather, Zimbabwe should thoroughly investigate if the imports are 
a result of unfair trade practices and raise tariffs accordingly. Although it is not always bad practice 
to limit imports where there is a material injury to the domestic industry, it is against the WTO 
rules to limit imports simply because the local industry is not competitive enough to produce goods 
favourable to the consumer.259 Thus, instead of applying safeguard measures every time the local 
industry is not competitive with international markets, Zimbabwe should consider making use of 
anti-dumping regulations if there is worry that imports are being dumped. 
In Chapter 1, it was held that the CTC had its first trade tariffs workshop on the 18th of August 
2018.260 The role of anti-dumping measures in reindustrialisation was emphasised.261 It was held 
that anti-dumping measures should be applied to remedy the injurious dumping on Zimbabwe’s 
local industries.262 This would in turn help the economy to grow through capacity increase, because 
local producers would be able to compete with external producers at a fair level.263  
There have been other efforts made to promote local industries to be competitive through 
encouraging consumers to consume Zimbabwe’s produced products. The Buy Zimbabwe Initiative 
is the most important one; it is a programme that tries to promote the consumption of locally 
                                                            
256An example of one of the statutes enacted to barn imports is Statutory Instrument (SI) 64 of 2016 that restricted 
the importation of different products in a bid to protect local industries. 
257Marawanyika G ‘Zimbabwe: SA imports ban ‘a safeguard measure’ (2016) available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/zimbabwe-sa-imports-ban-a-safeguard-measure-2050140 (accessed 01 
September 2016). 
258Cronje JB ‘How will SA respond to Zimbabwe’s import restrictions?’ available at 
https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/10216-how-will-sa-respond-to-zimbabwe-s-import-restrictions.html 
(accessed 01 September 2016). 
259Ouintal G ‘Pretoria challenges Zimbabwe import ban’ (2016) available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2016/07/11/pretoria-challenges-zimbabwe-import-ban (accessed 01 
September 2016). 
260See generally 1.3 Research Problem and Objectives, see also CTC Zimbabwe available at   
https://twitter.com/ctczimbabwe?lang=en (accessed 25 October 2018). 
261This was a live recording; see generally CTC Zimbabwe available at https://twitter.com/ctczimbabwe?lang=en 
(accessed 25 October 2018). 
262This was a live recording; see generally CTC Zimbabwe available at https://twitter.com/ctczimbabwe?lang=en 
(accessed 25 October 2018). 
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produced Zimbabwean goods in order to revive the local industry.264 However, a paradigm shift is 
needed before consumers start to redevelop their thirst for locally manufactured goods and services 
as the reputation has been badly injured.265 The government has so far supported the Buy 
Zimbabwe Initiative and invested in the Buy Zimbabwe Campaign by forcing state-owned 
enterprises to give priority to local manufacturers when procuring.266  
The government is also trying to support the initiative by enacting polices geared towards 
resuscitation of manufacturing industries. Through Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-
Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) the government is prioritising the manufacturing sector 
where it is committed to revive distressed and closed companies through ‘increasing capacity 
utilisation to optimum levels, generating employment and substituting imports as well as building 
a sustainable basis for export led growth’.267 The Buy Zimbabwe initiative plays a central role in 
the implementation of ZimAsset as it is one of the organisations that have been urging the 
government to impose anti-dumping regulations.268  
Zimbabwe mainly relies on the production of primary goods and services due to failure to widely 
industrialised, which results in the failure to beneficiate primary products into valuable products.269 
As such, Zimbabwe’s imports are mainly finished products.270 Anti-dumping regulations are, 
therefore, important in safeguarding the domestic industry against unfair trade practises as most 
finished goods from Zimbabwe are imports. 
                                                            
264Chiweza D Out of the Rabble: Ending the Global Economic Crisis by Understanding the Zimbabwean Experience 
(2013) 80. 
265Chiweza  avers that consumers will always choose a better product on the shelves even if the product is import 
,hence there is need for Zimbabwean products to be competitive enough for consumers to opt for them see 
Chiweza(2013) 81. 
266Zimbabwe National Trade Policy 2012-16 25. 
267Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) “Towards an Empowered Society 
and a Growing Economy” OCTOBER 2013- DECEMBER 2018 3.18 
268See generally 1.5 Benefits Of The Study 
269Bongani Ngwenya, a senior lecturer at Solusi University’s Postgraduate School of Business is quoted in Newsday 
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Zimbabwe largest trading partner is South Africa with exports worth USD 2.25 billion, and a USD 
2.15 billion for imports.271 Zimbabwe also exports goods worth USD 267 million to Mozambique, 
USD 116 million to United Arab Emirates, USD 72 million to Zambia and Belgium accounts for 
USD 45 million.272 South Africa replaced the European Union (EU), which, in the past, was the 
major exporting destination for Zimbabwe with two-thirds of total exports.273 Zimbabwe also 
imports from Mozambique, China, Zambia, India and Singapore with Singapore accounting for 
more imports at the end of 2017.274 As a result of import surplus, it is of great importance that 
Zimbabwe should review its anti-dumping regulations. This is so because if any of the imported 
goods are being dumped it will seriously affect the already struggling domestic industry. 
There are cases where dumping has been alleged and amongst them is the poultry and 
manufacturing sector. Zimbabwe has a well-established poultry industry that excelled fairly well 
in 2009 to 2011 seasons despite the hardships the country was going through.275 The biggest 
market in the sub-sector is that of broiler meat and eggs.276 Despite having a larger share in the 
market, the first quarter of 2016 saw the industry recording a loss in large scale abattoirs.277 The 
records indicate that a total of 1,5 million slaughtered birds and 2,480mt dressed broiler meat per 
month was recorded which is 14 per cent and 13 per cent lower respectively when compared to 
the first quarter of 2015.278 
Although the industry is still performing, it has faced many challenges, including corruption, 
flooding of dumped and cheaper imports, and the cash crisis. Corruption is said to be churning out 
                                                            
271Global Edge ‘Zimbabwe: Trade Statistics’ available at https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/zimbabwe/tradestats   
(accessed 20 July 2018); these figures are based on the 2016 to 2017 financial year see generally Zimbabwe 
National Statistics at http://www.zimstat.co.zw/ for a full analysis. 
272Global Edge ‘Zimbabwe: Trade Statistics’ available at https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/zimbabwe/tradestats   
(accessed 20 July 2018). 
273Global Edge ‘Zimbabwe: Trade Statistics’ available at https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/zimbabwe/tradestats   
(accessed 20 July 2018). 
274Timeslive ‘Of the imports into Zimbabwe in the first quarter of 2016, 35.8% came from South Africa, Singapore 
accounted for 24.7%, China 9.5%,  and Zambia 5% 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/businesstimes/2016/07/17/Harare-firm-on-import-ban---for-now  
275Zengeni T ‘The Competitiveness and Performance of the Zimbabwe Poultry Industry’ (2013) available at 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/55b8733ae4b036c899c6fd4d/1438151482303/
Tatenda+Zengeni_Competitiveness+of+the+Zimbabwe+Poultry+industry.pdf (accessed 26 September 2016). 
276Field A ‘Poultry By-Product Dumping into Zimbabwe an issue’(2012) available at 
https://justandrewinzimbabwe.wordpress.com/2012/02/22 (accessed 1 September 2016)(hereafter Field A (2012).  
277The Source ‘Poultry industry produces 17mln day old chicks in Q1’ (2016) available at  
http://source.co.zw/2016/06/poultry-industry-produces-17mln-day-old-chicks-in-q1/ (accessed 22 September 2016). 
278The Source ‘Poultry industry produces 17mln day old chicks in Q1’ (2016) available at  
http://source.co.zw/2016/06/poultry-industry-produces-17mln-day-old-chicks-in-q1/ (accessed 22 September 2016). 
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cheaper imports into Zimbabwe, the imports of which, are not paying the requisite duty.279 These 
imports find their way from countries such as Brazil at very low prices of less than a dollar per 
kilogram.280  In 2010, 17 000 tonnes of dressed poultry meat are said to have entered the country281 
and only 13 000 tonnes of the 17 000 are said to have come through approval from Veterinary 
permits.282 Moreover, in the first six months of 2014, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) 
recorded that an approximate of 2000 tonnes of chickens was imported, but this is not reflected on 
Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTATS) fuelling allegations that a total of $3 million 
was lost in uncollected revenue.283   
Most countries use genetically modified organisms (GMO) varieties of maize and soya to feed 
chicken and as a result the price of poultry relatively low than Zimbabwe.284 Leading producers of 
poultry meat such as Brazil and United States have landed their jets in southern Africa, where they 
are supplying meat at nearly half the cost of production in their domestic countries.285 In 2012, 
Zimbabwe increased the import duty of imported chicken to $1.50, as means of reducing dumped 
poultry meat from South Africa and Brazil.286 However, this did not do much to help the collapsing 
industry, as there is still a surge of poultry due to among other things corruption in the issuing of 
permit licences.287 Thus, because of lack of strict import controls, the grey trade has become a 
threat to the consumers and local industry which calls for a level playing field through anti-
dumping duties. 
In the manufacturing industry Zimbabwe has a very small electrical appliances industry which 
sells household electrical goods and industrial goods. As a result electrical appliances 
                                                            
279Gumbo L ‘Stop the rot at border posts’ The Herald 26 August 2016; Dewa T ‘More than 150 immigration officers 
transferred amid reports of corruption’21 September 2016 http://nehandaradio.com/2016/09/21/150-immigration-
officers-transferred-amid-reports-corruption/  (accessed 22 September 2016). 
280Field A (2012). 
281Field A (2012). 
282These chicken cuts are said to be coming from South America (Brazil and Mexico) see Field A (2012). 
283The Herald ‘Chicken imports threaten poultry industry’ The Herald 1 October 2014. 
284Zimbabwe has placed a ban on the importation of GMO maize, which in turn means chicken feed in Zimbabwe is 
more expensive than in the countries that use GMO. 
285This can lead to dumping as defined by Article VI of GATT if there is material injury, a threat of injury and 
material retardation in the domestic industry of the importing country. 
286New Zimbabwe ‘Poultry prices down 23 pct, industry facing collapse due to cheap imports, association’ (2015) 
available at http://www.newzimbabwe.com/business-23639-
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2006) (hereafter New Zimbabwe (2015). 
287See generally New Zimbabwe (2015). 
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manufacturers in Zimbabwe are not able to supply the Zimbabwean market and they contribute 
less than 10% of the household goods required in the Zimbabwean market.288 Most of the electrical 
appliances are, therefore, imported from countries such as Singapore, China, Dubai, South Africa 
and Botswana.289 Inputs for local production are also imported from surrounding countries; about 
80% of inputs are taken outside Zimbabwe.290 
Since Zimbabwean manufacturers import a significant amount of their inputs, they lag behind in 
terms of technological advancement as they lack the technical know-how to produce the parts.291 
This reduces their competitiveness on the international markets. Internationally they do not have 
a comparative advantage and the face firm competition where quality and pricing is concerned.292  
Be that as it may, the electrical appliances industry is among the various industries that have 
alleged dumping issues in Zimbabwe. A local refrigerator company called Capri once alleged 
dumping stating that a South African company, Defy has been selling refrigerators at lower prices 
than what they are produced within their home country.293 The price being charged in Zimbabwe 
was far much lower than the prices being charged in other surrounding countries such as Zambia 
and Mozambique.294 Capri saw this as an intentional attempt to destroy the Zimbabwean brand, 
build a strong brand of Defy, and monopolise the industry.295 This type of dumping is called 
predatory and was discussed in Chapter 2, it is the most destructive as is drives out local producers 
out of business.296 
                                                            
288Konje P ‘Household Electrical Goods Zimbabwe’ (2011) available at 
http://www.zimtrade.co.zw/IMG/pdf/household_electrical_goods.pdf 6 (accessed 01 September 2016) (hereafter 
Konje P (2011). 
289Konje P (2011) 7. 
290Zimbabwean raw materials account for about 20% and as result the sectors' contribution to GDP, employment, 
and economic growth is insignificant. 
291Konje P (2011) 6. 
292Konje P (2011) 6. 
293Muganda RG ‘Lets enforce dumping laws’ The Herald 27 September 2012 available at 
http://www.herald.co.zw/lets-enforce-dumping-laws/ (accessed 03 March 2016). 
294Muganda RG ‘Lets enforce dumping laws’ The Herald 27 September 2012 available at 
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Strengthening and applying anti-dumping laws in Zimbabwe is a decision that does not affect only 
the economy but has implications for the welfare and social well-being of the broader society.297 
Members of the community usually suffer when domestic production ceases and imported cheap 
products takeover.298 The results of imports might be positive in the first place, however, reduced 
prices have long-term effects that are not in the interest of the community.299 
There are a number of authors who have attributed the collapse of local industries in various 
African countries to trade and dumping.300 Most companies closed shop due to the influx of these 
dumped products in Zimbabwe.301 Brooks and Simon believe that there are a number of other 
factors like trade liberalisation, economic challenges, and cheaper new imports from Asia which 
are also at play.302 Dumping affects the society since companies may close, employees become 
unemployed and start suffering making the society live below the poverty datum line. Therefore, 
creating an effective anti-dumping regime and using anti-dumping laws does not only remedy 
unfair trade practices, it also promotes a good standard of living for the community. This is because 
if industries are operating at optimum capacity, many people will be employed and in turn better 
their lives. 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter discussed that anti-dumping measures are meant to remedy unfair trade practises, 
and there has been calls by different stakeholders to investigate dumping in Zimbabwe.303 These 
stakeholders include ‘Capri, Willowvale Mazda Motor Industries, Quest Motors, Olivine, National 
Foods amongst other performing local companies’ which have expressed  that anti-dumping laws 
                                                            
297Le Clerc-Marc J ‘Reforming Anti-dumping Law: Balancing the Interests of Consumers and Domestic Industries’ 
(1999) 44 McGill Law Journal 119.   
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should be enforced but their call has not been heed.304 This Chapter also discussed that in 
Zimbabwe anti-dumping measures are regulated in Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. There are 
also important statutes which are of relevance to anti-dumping investigations namely the 
Constitution and the AJA.305 
Where institutional framework is concerned it was discussed that anti-dumping investigations fall 
within the scope of the CTC. The CTC was established through the Competition Act. The Chapter 
discussed that the existence of competition policy and tariffs policy under one division is peculiar 
to Zimbabwe as there is no any other jurisdiction known for having such a practice.306 It was 
discussed that this has the potential of posing serious conflicting policy objective.307 It was held 
that investigating officers lacks institutional capacity to conduct anti-dumping investigations 
because important elements are left to the determination of the Minister.308 In addition, the CTC 
is also plagued by other challenges that include a lack of skills and expertise in the CTC and a 
reluctance of the private sector to pursue cases.  
When it comes to substantive provision most provisions in Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 are 
not clear and the Act leaves many things unregulated creating gaps for abuse. For example, it was 
discussed that Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 that when it comes to the construction of normal 
value the Act does not give further guidance is given on how to calculate the costs.309 Moreover, 
when it comes to the determination of both dumping and injury the Minister is the one that has to 
determine what a like product is. This is despite the fact that the mandate to conduct anti-dumping 
investigations is supposedly that of the CTC. 
When it comes to the determination of injury the provisions of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 
are not clear as well. The Act refers to prejudice or potential prejudice meaning three things namely 
actual material prejudice, threat of material prejudice and material retardation. This is different 
from the WTO, South Africa and EU.310 Under these three, injury means actual material injury, 
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305See generally 5.2.1 Legislative Framework. 
306United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Voluntary Peer Review Of Competition Law 
And Policy: Zimbabwe (2012) 20. 
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threat of material injury and material retardation. No further guidance is provided is given on 
prejudice or potential prejudice in Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. Importantly the study one of 
the questions raised was how does the CTC determine potential prejudice of material prejudice, 
threat of material prejudice and material retardation? It was discussed that Zimbabwe may take 
lessons from the way South Africa and EU’s legislation are crafted. 
It should, however, be commended that the regulation in Zimbabwe contains a ‘public interest’ 
clause because, at many times, it is not the government itself that is affected by dumping but the 
general populace.  
When it comes to procedural requirements, there are many gaps in the provisions of Statutory 
Instrument 266 of 2002. For example, the application form should be in a way, which the Minister 
may prescribe.311 This means that the format of the application is left to the determination of the 
Minister. This is problematic as it creates unnecessary and cumbersome processes.312 In addition, 
there are no set periods of when things like final determination should be concluded upon.313 
Moreover, Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 does not specify the period for application of 
provisional measures.314 
The impact of anti-dumping is felt seriously by every economy, and therefore, there is a need for 
Zimbabwe to protect local industries from unfair competition from imports. Some Zimbabwean 
industries such as poultry and manufacturing industry have alleged dumping but unfortunately no 
investigation has been conducted. Earlier on, the study showed that industries have recorded losses 
because of alleged dumping with the poultry industry being the most affected.315 Therefore, there 
is need to amend the current legislation and develop it to a standard that can address and protect 
Zimbabwe’s domestic industry from injurious dumping. This will help in creating competitive 
industries, helping Zimbabwe to be a global play with comparative advantage in the ACFTA.  
The next Chapter concludes the thesis; it discusses the findings and gives recommendations for 
Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CREATING AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-
DUMPING REGIME IN ZIMBABWE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
When dealing with dumping as a factor affecting macro-economic stability and hindering the 
growth of local industries, it is best to look at how it should be regulated. 1 A sound framework 
provides a foundation for effective regulation of dumping.2 This in turn provides for anti-dumping 
measures to be utilised optimally in providing a levelled playing field between exporters and the 
domestic industry producers of like products.3 1947 anti-dumping rules in the World Trade 
Organisation, have been supplemented through additions to Article VI during the 1967 Kennedy 
round and then by the Anti-Dumping Code during the 1973–1979 Tokyo negotiations.4 South 
Africa and the European Union (EU) have also amended their rules to reflect the changes in the 
international trading trends.5 Although, it cannot be said that there exists a national anti-dumping 
law that is flawless both South Africa and EU have made considerable efforts in trying to provide 
sound frameworks that paves way for effective regulation. On the other hand, Zimbabwe still lags 
behind.6 For this reason, there has been massive lobbying to strengthen and enforce anti-dumping 
laws in the country, in order to protect the domestic industry from dumped goods.7 
6.1.1 Main Research Question 
The main question for this thesis was whether there was a need for assessing Zimbabwe’s national 
anti-dumping framework.8 It was stated that the Zimbabwe’s anti-dumping regulations have 
problems both substantively and procedurally that need to be addressed to enable creation for a 
sound anti-dumping system, providing a platform for development of a healthy and competitive 
market.9  
                                                            
1See generally 1.2 Background to the Study. 
2 Payments Association of South Africa ‘Legal & Regulatory Framework’ available at 
http://www.pasa.org.za/national-payment-system/legal-regulatory-framework (accessed 19 February 2019). 
3 Dorn  JW & Layton DW ‘The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement: A Guide For Developing Countries’ in The World 
Bank  Legal Aspects of International Trade (2001) 189. 
4 2.2 Brief History of World Trade Organisation rules on dumping. 
5 See generally 3.3.1 Legislative Framework and 4.3.1 Legislative Framework. 
6See generally 1.3 Research Problem and Objectives. 
7See generally 1.3 Research Problem and Objectives. 
81.4 Research Questions.  
91.4 Research Questions. 
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6.1.2 Ancillary Research Questions 
In support of the main question, the study engaged in the following sub-questions: 
a) How is dumping defined under the provisions of the WTO and what are the procedures for 
the use and implementation of anti-dumping rules by a Member?  
b) What are some of the problems in anti-dumping rules at the WTO level? 
c) How is dumping regulated under the provisions of South Africa: is it in compliance with 
international obligations under the WTO? 
 
d) How is dumping regulated under the provisions of EU: is it in compliance with 
international obligations under the WTO? 
 
e) How is dumping regulated under Zimbabwe’s national anti-dumping framework: is it in 
compliance with international obligations under the WTO? 
f) What lessons can Zimbabwe learn from the EU and South Africa, who have successful 
anti-dumping experience?10  
6.1.3 Chapters Summary 
6.1.3.1 Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 introduced the concept of dumping; it provided an overview of the background to the 
study, the significance of the study, and the methodology.11 The Chapter also expressed the 
problem that exit, which led to the formulation of the main and ancillary research questions.12 
These questions were ultimately addressed in the different Chapters as summarised below. 
6.1.3.2 Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 went on to discuss the international anti-dumping framework within the context of the 
WTO.13 This was with reference to ancillary research question and b. Special reference was made 
on the relevant provisions of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
Implementation of Article VI of GATT (Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA).14 The Chapter 
discussed substantive and procedural requirements for enacting anti-dumping measures as 
                                                            
101.4 Research Questions. 
11See generally1.2 Background to the Study, 1.5 Aim of the Study and 1.6 Research Methodology. 
121.4 Research Questions. 
13See generally 2.4 World Trade Organisation Treatment of Dumping. 
14See generally 2.4 World Trade Organisation Treatment of Dumping. 
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provided for in the ADA.15 Whilst discussing substantive and procedural requirements, the Chapter 
also discussed some of the problems in anti-dumping rules at the WTO level.16 
When requirements of the WTO were evaluated in Chapter 2 what was indicated was not only 
what the requirements of Article VI of GATT and the ADA are, but also the Chapter showed how 
several provisions have been interpreted in terms of the WTO jurisprudence.17 This guides the 
WTO Members on how to interpret their own provisions. It was discussed that under the WTO 
anti-dumping measures may only be imposed where dumping causes injury.18 
Amongst the shortcomings discussed in the WTO rules is that currently the rules do not adequately 
address competition issues and there is no public interest clause despite the fact that in most cases 
products are sold to the public.19 The author suggested that competition issues be harmonised with 
anti-dumping rules in order to create a balance between competition and anti-dumping.20 As for 
public interest clause, the author suggested that a clause be drafted into ADA  which  prescribes 
that, ‘where appropriate, and on a case by case basis, the importing state may consider  the interests 
of the public where the consideration of such interests do not lead to market negatives or absurd 
results in the national economy’.21 Moreover, issues to be considered, as ‘being of public interest 
would include the competitive situation, the interests of consumers or any other economic 
circumstances of interest’.22 Public interest should be considered on initiating an investigation and 
on application of anti-dumping measures.23 
6.1.3.3 Chapter 3 
With reference to ancillary research question c and f, Chapter 3 discussed what South Africa is 
doing in order to regulate the injurious dumping of goods into its domestic markets. It assessed 
                                                            
15 See generally 2.4 World Trade Organisation Treatment of Dumping and 2.5 Procedural Requirements for 
Legislating Anti-Dumping Measures. 
16See generally 2.6 Challenges within the World Trade Organisation Anti-Dumping Rules. 
172.4 WTO Treatment of Dumping. 
18See generally 2.4 WTO Treatment of Dumping. 
192.6 Challenges within World Trade Organisation Anti- Dumping Rules. 
202.6 Challenges within World Trade Organisation Anti- Dumping Rules. 
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South Africa’s legislative framework as the best African practice with the aim of drawing lessons 
for Zimbabwe in Chapter 5.24   
The study indicated that South Africa is the largest user of anti-dumping measures in Africa.25 Its 
jurisprudence has developed over time with technical expertise built through platforms such as 
Trade Law Centre (TRALAC) and workshops done by the WTO.26 Zimbabwe can take lessons 
from South Africa in this regard, and invest in growing technical expertise through research 
organisations as well as sending its delegates to other jurisdictions and the WTO to learn on anti-
dumping rules.27  It was discussed that the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002 
(ITAA) and the Anti-Dumping Regulations (ADR 2003) provide clearer rules that help the 
Commission function effectively in conducting anti-dumping investigations.28 Provisions which 
relate to injury are amongst the clearer rues and Zimbabwe can learn from that.29  
It was held that, although South Africa does not have a mandatory public interest rule, it can be 
inferred from some of its Commission reports and conduct that public interest has been considered 
in reaching some of its decisions.30 These decisions are concerned with whether or not to apply 
anti-dumping measures or to initiate investigations.31 
South Africa’s anti-dumping legislation does generally comply with the ADA with regards to some 
of its provisions does comply with the WTO provisions but it has been criticised in the way it 
constructs its normal value.32 South Africa uses this method as the first primary alternative to 
normal value and this always leads to higher anti-dumping duties prejudicing exporters.33 Brink 
has also criticised the way dumping margins are calculated pointing out that there is lack of 
transparency on how calculations are done and highlighting that in some situations the 
Commission uses unverified evidence disadvantaging exporters.34 The study also observed that 
                                                            
24See generally 1.7 Chapter Outline. 
253.1 Introduction. 
263.1 Introduction. 
27See generally 5.3.2 Institutional Framework. 
28See generally 3.4.1 Determination of Dumping; 3.4.2 Determination of Injury and 3.5 Procedural Requirements. 
29See generally 3.4.2 Determination of Injury. 
30See generally 3.4.4 Public Interest Considerations. 
31See generally 3.4.4 Public Interest Considerations. 
32See generally 3.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
33See generally 3.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
34See generally 3.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
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South Africa has been criticised for using unverified information, which goes against WTO 
principles of fairness and transparency discussed in Chapter 2.35 
6.1.3.4 Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 discussed anti-dumping laws in the EU with reference to ancillary research questions d 
and f. The Chapter discussed how the laws have been used to regulate the injurious dumping in 
the EU. The aim was to also draw lessons for Zimbabwe in Chapter 5.36  
Chapter 4 discussed that the EU’s anti-dumping regulation, Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 closely 
followed the wording of the ADA.37 The Regulation has made great efforts to explain normal 
value; export price; and how to calculate dumping margin.38 The EU has comprehensive provisions 
on fair comparison and injury, Zimbabwe may take lessons from that.39 
Despite the positive attributes, research has accused the EU of using anti-dumping rules as a trade 
protective measure in cases of calculating normal value where significant distortions exist.40  The 
author also observed that although Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 was amended to recognise the end 
of China’s transitional period the EU may still be violating WTO rules. This is because the 
amendment indirectly targets companies from China who still need to prove that their products 
were produced under undistorted conditions.41 This, by implication, means that the EU is violating 
WTO laws because the burden of proof is still on Chinese producers to prove that costs are 
undistorted.42 The EU has also been criticised for limiting access to information and lack of 
transparency because of its confidentiality provisions.43  
6.1.3.5 Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 was a discussion based on the main research questions together with ancillary question 
f. The Chapter looked at how dumping is defined in Zimbabwe.44 What do the substantive and 
                                                            
35See generally 3.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
36See generally 1.7 Chapter Outline. 
37See generally 4.4 Substantive Procedures. 
38See generally 4.4 Substantive Procedures 
39 4.4.1 Determination of Dumping; 4.4.2 Determination of Injury. 
404.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
41See generally 4.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
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procedural requirements of the anti-dumping provision entail?45 Are the provisions in compliance 
with WTO? What lessons can Zimbabwe learn from SA and EU?46  
In the analysis of Zimbabwean anti-dumping system and through analyses of the WTO substantive 
and procedural requirements using South Africa and the EU anti-dumping systems as best 
practices, it was found that the hypothesis was correct in stating that Zimbabwean anti-dumping 
system required a major overhaul.   
 Several shortcomings were highlighted in Zimbabwe’s anti-dumping regulation; thereby, 
confirming the need for substantial changes.47 Some of these problems include the fact that the 
Competition and Tariff Commission (CTC) lacks the capacity to make a determination on whether 
the unfair practices are caused by dumping in terms of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002.48 
Moreover, the Minister is charged with making a final decision in the determination of important 
elements in anti-dumping investigations, which arguably creates cumbersome processes prone to 
abuse.49 In addition, the Chapter held that the co-existence of competition policy and tariffs policy 
under the CTC has the potential of posing serious conflicting policy objective.50 
Chapter 5 also discussed that where injury is concerned Zimbabwe may take lessons from South 
Africa and EU whose regulations contain clear rules on how to determine injury.51 It was held that 
Zimbabwe’s provisions when it comes to injury are confusing. This is because the regulation talks 
about prejudice or potential prejudice meaning actual material prejudice; threatening to cause 
prejudice to Zimbabwe’s domestic industry and material retardation.52 The regulation provides no 
further guidance on how to determine such.53 In addition, there are instances where the Act 
contradicts itself, leaving difficult questions in the mind of a reader, and as a result, there is need 
to simplify the Act.54 The study also observed that although Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 is 
                                                            
45See generally 1.7 Chapter Outline. 
46See generally 1.7 Chapter Outline. 
47See generally 5.8 Conclusion. 
48See generally 5.3.2 Institutional Framework. 
49See generally 5.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
50See generally 5.3.2 Institutional Framework. 
515.4.2 Determination of Injury. 
52See generally5.4.2 Determination of Injury. 
53See generally5.4.2 Determination of Injury. 
54See generally 5.5.1 Initiation and 5.6 Reviews. 
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the main regulation for anti-dumping, a number of its provisions are silent on what the Commission 
is required to do.55  
Based on the problems identified in Chapter 5, it is suggested, that Zimbabwe address problems 
that are in the current regulation to enable creation of a sound anti-dumping framework paving 
way for effective regulation.56 Zimbabwe should amend the current legislation and the 
investigating officers should be given capacity to determine whether or not dumping has taken 
place.57  
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.2.1 Anti-Dumping Authority 
In order for Zimbabwe to ensure that local industries are protected from injurious dumping, it is 
important for the government to restructure its anti-dumping policy and the structure and powers 
of the CTC where dumping is concerned. There is need to establish a separate Commission that 
deals with tariffs only and thus separate competition policy and tariffs policy. A legislation that 
gives the Commission its mandate should be promulgated. The Commission may take the name of 
International Trade Tariff Commission (ITTC). It is recommended that the Commission should be 
an independent body but will fall under the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Enterprise 
Development. 
As such, the study recommends the functions of the Commission be clearly written and specified 
(regulated) in the instrument. As an independent body, the Commission should have the capacity 
to determine dumping, injury and causality without intervention from the Minister. This requires 
the Commission to determine all aspects of the three elements, and this must be done in its capacity 
as an independent body.  
The Minister should not have power to determine anything where anti-dumping investigations are 
concerned as this may compromise the independence of the Commission. The Minister should 
only be involved upon the conclusion of investigations where the Commission requests the 
                                                            
55See generally 5.4.1 Determination of Dumping; 5.4.2 Determination of Injury and 5.5 Procedural Requirements. 
56See generally 1.4 Research Questions.  
57See generally 5.3.2 Institutional Framework. 
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Minister to impose provisional measures as in the case of South Africa. The Minister should also 
step in where definitive measures concerned where the Commission recommends that he requests 
the Minister of Finance to impose the duty. The Minister should not be the one to determine if a 
review is necessary as this creates bureaucracy. This should be the mandate of the Commission 
and legislation should be clear in this regard. 
6.2.2 Legislation 
In all the Chapters, it was made clear that anti-dumping investigations are complex and protracted 
and therefore there is need to simplify the process where possible. It is clear that Statutory 
Instrument 266 of 2002 is lacking in different provisions and is not clear on so many issues. These 
include the lack of time frames within which provisional anti-dumping measures remain in place 
and when reviews should, unclear provisions on dumping margin and injury. Also the fact that 
countervailing measures and anti-dumping measures are in one regulation creates more confusion 
to an already complex subject. If Zimbabwe implements the current rules as they are, it may lead 
to irregularities and the domestic industry may not be protected from the injurious dumping it is 
currently faced with. Although lessons may be taken from South Africa and EU but the legislator 
should always be aware of market environments of the two and should discern what exactly to 
incorporate bearing in mind that it should relate to Zimbabwean market.  
It is proposed that a separate legislation dealing with only anti-dumping issues be enacted. The 
structure of the separate legislation may be in the following format:  
Part 1: Definitions  
Part 2: Scope and functions including limitations of the CTC in relation to anti-dumping 
investigations  
Part 3: Substance 
A: Determination of Dumping 
(i) Normal Value 
(ii) Export Price 
(iii) Comparison 
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(iv) Margin of dumping  
 B: Determination of Injury 
 C: Causality 
Part 4: Investigation proceedings and time frames 
(i)   Initiation procedures   
(ii)   Investigation 
(iii)  Provisional Measures 
(iv)  Undertakings 
(v)   Termination without measures and Imposition of definitive duties  
Part 5: Duration, Reviews and Refunds 
Part 6 General Issues such as currency conversion, oral hearings, confidentiality etc 
6.2.3 Issues to be addressed 
Normal Value 
Chapter 5 identified a number of issues that need to be addressed in Zimbabwe’s anti-dumping 
legislation to create an effective anti-dumping regime.  When determining normal value, the 
Commission should consider sale transactions of a ‘like product’.58 Currently, a ‘like product’ is 
any product ‘which the Minister determines as being identical in all respects to the subject products 
or any products which the Minister determines to have characteristics closely resembling those of 
the subject products’.59  It is recommended that the Commission should have the capacity to 
determine such, because the Minister does not have capacity to conduct investigations. 
Another problem identified in Chapter 5 is that sale transactions may only be disregarded as not 
being in the ‘ordinary course of trade’ for reason of price upon determination of the Minister.60 
                                                            
58See generally 5.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
59Section 2 of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002.  
60See generally 5.4.1 Determination of dumping. 
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This may be done if such ‘sales are made within an extended period of time in substantial quantities 
and at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of 
time.’61 Again, this provision empowers the Minister to be actively involved in the investigation, 
which compromises the capacity and independence of the Commission. As such, it is 
recommended that the Minister should not have such power but it should be the mandate of the 
Commission. 
When constructing normal value, it was held that Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 does not give 
further guidance on how to calculate the costs.62 However, the CTC anti-dumping application form 
does provide some guidance, but the form is not a statute or delegated legislation. As such, the 
guidance in the forms should be included in the legislation, if not they are considered ultra vires. 
This will minimise abuse that may happen if the process is subjective. 
Chapter 5 also identified that currently when it comes to methods of comparison Statutory 
Instrument 266 of 2002 only provides for one method.63 This is problematic as some situations the 
weighted average-to-weighted average method will not allow for fair comparison.64 Thus, 
Zimbabwe may take lessons from Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 and amend its legislation. This 
provision will give the Commission capacity to use any allowed method in terms of the WTO that 
allows for fair comparison. The amendment may read as follows: 
‘The comparison under subsection (1) shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-
factory level, and in respect of sales made at, as nearly as possible, the same time and with due 
account taken of other differences which affect price comparability. Where the normal value and 
the export price as established are not on such a comparable basis, due allowance, in the form of 
adjustments, shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences in factors which are claimed, 
and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability. Any duplication when making 
adjustments shall be avoided, in particular in relation to discounts, rebates, quantities and level of 
trade. When the specified conditions are met, the factors for which adjustment can be made are 
listed as follows: 
a) Physical characteristics  
                                                            
61Section 15 (4) of Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002. 
62See generally 5.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
63See generally 5.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
64See generally 5.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
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b) Import charges and indirect taxes  
c) Discounts, rebates and quantities  
d) Level of trade  
e) Transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs  
f) Packing  
g) Credit  
h) Commissions  
i) Other factors other than above if it is demonstrated that they affect price comparability as 
required under this paragraph, in particular if customers consistently pay different prices on the 
domestic market because of the difference in such factors’.65 
When it comes to dumping margin it was stated that Zimbabwe fails to recognise that there are 
instances where the weighted average-to-weighted average method cannot be used.66 As such this 
should be amended to reflect WTO methods. The amended part may read: 
Subject to subsections (1) and (2), the existence of the margin of dumping shall, unless otherwise 
provided by regulations, normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted 
average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions of 
the subject products and where comparison was not made on average -to- average method dumping 
margin should be determined accordingly either on transaction -to-transaction method’ ‘and the 
average-to-transaction method’ or any other made used by the Commission when comparing.67   
Injury 
The other problem that was identified is concerned with determination of injury; the author stated 
that the use of prejudice and potential prejudice is confusing and it would also be ideal for the 
legislator to provide factors that can be looked at when determining injury in the actual Act not 
just on the forms.68 This is because the forms are not binding.  As such the new provision may 
read: 
1) In determining material injury to Zimbabwe the Commission shall consider whether there has 
been a significant depression and/or suppression of Zimbabwe industry’s prices 
                                                            
65Adopted from Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. 
66See generally 5.4.1 Determination of dumping. 
67Adopted from Article 2.4.2 of the ADA. 
68See generally 5.4.2 Determination of injury. 
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2) In its determination of material injury the Commission shall further consider whether there 
have been significant changes in the domestic performance of Zimbabwe industry in respect of 
the following potential injury factors: 
a) Sales volume;  
b) Profit and loss;  
c) Output 
d) Market share;  
e) Productivity;  
f) Return of investments;  
g) Capacity utilisation; 
h) Cash flow; 
i) Inventories; 
j) Employment; 
k) Wages and salaries 
l) Growth;  
m) Ability to raise capital or investments;   
n) and any other relevant factors placed before the Commission 
3) The Zimbabwean industry should provide additional information as required by the 
Commission at any stage during an investigation.69  
When it comes to threat of material injury, the Statutory Instrument 266 of 2002 is silent on how 
to determine threat of material injury.70 It was highlighted that in order to understand an anti-
dumping action, it is important to understand anti-dumping terminology.71 As such, the anti-
dumping legislation should contain a provision on how to determine a threat of material injury. 
The new provision may read as the following:  
1) A determination of threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, 
speculation or remote possibility. The change in circumstances which would create a situation in 
which dumping would cause material injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent.  
2) In considering a threat of material  injury the Commission shall, in addition to the factors indicated 
under  consideration of material injury, and where relevant information is available, consider such 
factors as:  
                                                            
69Adopted from ADR 2003. 
70See generally 5.3.2 Determination of injury. 
71See generally 5.3.2 Determination of injury. 
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a) any significant increase of allegedly dumped imports into the local market indicating the likelihood 
of substantially increased importation. 
a. whether the products concerned enter the country at prices that will have a significant 
depressing or suppressing effect on local prices and are likely to increase demand for 
further imports.  
b. the exporters’ inventories of the product being investigated. 
c. availability of other markets that can absorb the free capacity of the exporter. 
d. state of the economy of the country of origin/export and its influence on the operations of 
the manufacturers/exporters. 
e. any other information relevant to your allegation that the infliction of material injury is 
imminent72 
Causal Link 
When it comes to causality, the study suggested in Chapter 5 that anti-dumping legislation in 
Zimbabwe should include factors to be considered when determining causality.73 This is because 
not giving guidelines places a huge responsibility on investigating authorities.74 In addition, there 
is lack of technical expertise and capacity it may lead to irregularities.75 For this reason, the new 
provision may read as follows: 
For purposes of this section  
(a) The Commission must be satisfied that any causal relationship between the subject products and 
the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence 
before the Commission these include but is not limited to 
(i) the change in the volume of dumped imports, whether absolute or relative to the production or 
consumption in the Zimbabwean market; 
(ii) the price undercutting experienced by the Zimbabwean industry vis-a-vis the imported products;  
(iii) the market share of the dumped imports;  
(iv) the magnitude of the margin of dumping; and 
(v) the price of undumped imports available in  the market76 
                                                            
72Adopted from CTC Anti-dumping Application Form. 
73See generally 5.4.3 Causal Link. 
74 See generally 5.4.3 Causal Link. 
75See generally 5.4.3 Causal Link. 
76Adopted from ADR 2003. 
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(b) The Commission shall also examine any known factors other than the subject products, which at 
the same time are injuring the domestic industry. These factors include but are not limited to:  
(i) the volume and  prices of imports not  sold  at dumped prices; 
(ii) contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption;  
(iii)  trade restrictive trade practices of and competition between the foreign and Zimbabwe’s 
producers;  
(iv)  developments in technology;  
(v)  other factors affecting  Zimbabwe’s prices; the industry’s export performance; and  
(vi)  the productivity of Zimbabwe’s industry.77 
 
Other Issues 
The author also suggested that Zimbabwe’s anti-dumping legislation should include the following 
in order to promote transparency and minimise potential abuse by officials. Anti-dumping 
legislation should also look to address the following: 
i) The Act should add what information is required for submission when one is applying 
for a review.78 This should be done to promote transparency. In addition it is 
recommended that the reviews should be conducted upon determination of the 
Commission as prescribed in the legislation and the Minister should not have the 
capacity to give the Commission permission to conduct one. 
ii) The Act should define what is meant by the phrase ‘ordinary course of trade’79 
iii) The Act should address the procedure of the Reviews because currently it is silent.80 
iv) The Act should include a detailed provision on calculation of normal value.81 
v) The Act should include appropriate time frames indicated in which reviews should be 
finalised because having no time frames may prejudice exporters as CTC will not be 
mandated to conclude reviews in a reasonable time frame.82 It is recommended that the 
time frame should be 12 months or less in accordance with WTO rules. 
                                                            
77Adopted from ADR 2003 
78See generally 5.6 Reviews. 
79See generally 5.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
80See generally 5.6 Reviews. 
81Lesson learnt from the EU in 4.4.1 Determination of Dumping. 
825.5.3 Duration, Termination and Suspension  
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vi) The Act should prescribe the maximum period that provisional measures should be 
applied to prevent uncertainty.83  
vii) The Act should expand on the factors taken from EU when making a comparison and 
define them in accordance with Zimbabwean context. 
viii) The Act should include a time frame of when final determination of dumping and injury 
should be concluded rather than stating that within a period which may be prescribed 
as this creates uncertainty.84 
ix) The Act should contain a provision for application for lesser duty if it is enough to 
eliminate injury like in the case of South Africa and EU.85 This is because under the 
WTO anti-dumping measures are necessary to remedy unfair trade. As such if a lesser 
can eliminate the injurious dumping, it may be better to apply a lesser duty and allow 
a competitive market.  
x) The Act should define or put guidelines in place of how to identify an appropriate third 
country to avoid issues of misinterpretation.86 
6.3 FINAL REMARKS 
Zimbabwe’s current anti-dumping system needs an overhaul in order to pave way for an effective 
anti-dumping regime. As such, there is need for a new legislation that deals with only anti-dumping 
issues. Whilst the current legislation does comply with the requirements of Article VI of GATT 
and the ADA in some of its provisions; most provisions lack transparency. As such a separate 
legislation will help in creating certainty in the market place, and this will enhance transparency 
in the Zimbabwean anti-dumping system.  In addition a number of changes should be addressed 
in order to meet Zimbabwe’s specific needs and protect the domestic industry from the current 
injurious dumping it is facing. Although Zimbabwe can draw lessons from the South African and 
EU experiences, the lawmakers should take heed of what to incorporate bearing in mind that 
markets are different. 
 
                                                            
835.5.2 Provisional Measures and Final Determination of Dumping and Prejudice. 
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